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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the diﬀerent liquidity issues speciﬁc to the sovereign Credit De-
fault Swap (CDS) market. As a ﬁrst step, we present an empirical study of the pricing
eﬀect of liquidity and systematic liquidity risk in the sovereign CDS spreads. We do
ﬁnd a large evidence that the risk premium priced above the sovereign default risk is
mainly driven by both bond and CDS liquidity risk, which implies that liquidity plays
an important role in CDS spread movements. Secondly, we use a factor model in order
to decompose sovereign CDS spreads into default risk, liquidity and correlation com-
ponents. The main objective is to measure the weight of liquidity in the CDS spreads
not by using liquidity proxies such as bid-ask spreads or volumes but by calibrating
the model to the data. Our analysis reveals that sovereign CDS spreads are highly
driven by liquidity (55.6% of default risk and 44.32% of liquidity) and that sovereign
bond spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions and therefore could represent a bet-
ter proxy for sovereign default risk (73% of default risk and 26.86% of liquidity). Our
empirical results advance the idea that the increase in the CDS spreads observed during
the crisis period was mainly due to a surge in liquidity rather than to an increase in
the default intensity. Finally, we focus on the dynamic properties of the risk neutral
liquidity risk premium embedded in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads. We
show that liquidity risk has a non-trivial role and participates directly to the variation
over time of the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads. Our results show that CDS
buyers earned a liquidity premium only during the pre-crisis period.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since early 80s, an extensive research has been done on stocks and bonds liquidity,
here the literature is very large and we will only mention few papers particularly by
Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1991) who ﬁrst state the relationship between liquidity
and returns and show that stock expected returns are an increasing function of stocks
illiquidity. In fact, liquidity is an elusive concept that is not observed directly and has
a number of aspects that cannot be captured in a single measure. In line with that,
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) provide evidence that inventory costs and adverse selection
aﬀect liquidity of securities through the order ﬂow namely through the discounts or
premiums that buyers or sellers are willing to pay. Easley, Hvidjkjaer and O'Hara
(1999) introduced a new measure of liquidity risk based on the probability of informed
trading. This measure reﬂects adverse selection coming from asymmetric information
between traders and is computed using intraday quotes and trades.
Even though liquidity has been studied extensively in traditional markets, little
research has been done in derivatives. We can mention some recent papers, for example
in option markets we have Bollen and Whallen (2004), Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and
Warachka (2006) and Garleau, Pedersen and Poteshman (2007) who study the eﬀect
on supply and demand on equity option prices. Deuskar, Gupta and Subrahmayam
(2006) provide the empirical evidence that there is illiquidity discount in the interest
rate option market meaning that illiquid interest rate options trade for higher prices
12
than liquid ones. Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001) ﬁnd the same result for the non-
tradable currency options. Also, Das and Hanouna (2009) show that lower equity
market liquidity lead to higher CDS spreads.
Recent literature suggests that CDS spreads do not only account for credit risk and
that liquidity may play a non-negligible role. Acharya and Johnson (2007) show the
evidence of informed-based trading in credit derivatives market that causes adverse
selection which in turn aﬀects liquidity in CDS contracts. Berndt et al (2005) and
Pan and Singleton (2008) show that corporate and sovereign CDS spreads are too high
to account only for default risk, they suggested a liquidity factor as possible compo-
nent to represent the non-default part. Following Berndt et al (2005), Tang and Yan
(2007) studied empirically the eﬀect of liquidity on corporate CDS spreads. Finally,
Kucuk (2010) examine liquidity in the sovereign bond market and provide evidence
that sovereign CDS spreads are more expensive than what is implied by the underlying
sovereign bond yield because when news about a speciﬁc sovereign is bad, speculators
without owning the reference entity speculate on worsening credit conditions by buying
CDS contracts. The excess demand increases CDS spreads while bond prices do not
change as much because speculation is not directly related to the reference entity.
With the recent debt crisis, the sovereign CDS market has attracted lot of interest
and understanding its determinants has become capital not only for practitioners but
also for policy makers. According to the BIS quarterly Review (December 2010) ap-
proximately 80% of the CDS market relates to corporate issuers and 20% to sovereign
entities. However the sovereign CDS market has recorded the strongest growth showing
50% increase in gross positions (from 2009 to 2010).
The substantial increase in the trading activities in the sovereign CDS market implies
that liquidity could be a potential driver of the spreads1. Calice, Chen and Williams
(2011) emphasize that the manipulation of market liquidity is often the primary mech-
1Chordia and Subrahmayam (2001) state that liquidity and trading activity are strongly linked as they are inﬂuenced
by common factors.
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anism through which speculative attacks are channeled. Therefore, if credit markets
are subject to speculation, it is very relevant to thoroughly study the components of
the sovereign CDS spreads and quantify how much of it account for default risk and
liquidity. In a recent study, Tang and Yan (2010) examine the demand driven price
pressure on corporate CDS spreads. By constructing a variable that measures the net
trade imbalance called the net buying interest (NBI), the authors are able to show
that there is a strong relation between changes in CDS spreads and NBI and that this
latter contains information on the future CDS spread changes. In fact, this ﬁnding
supports the idea that excessive trading in CDSs can have a signiﬁcant impact on the
spreads. For example, in the sovereign CDS case, default is very rare and in general
when a country is in ﬁnancial turmoil, other countries interfere to propose a bail-out
package. If market participants know that default is highly unlikely, this might give
them an incentive to speculate and sell CDS contracts in order to get the premium
without fearing any default. If the sell-side is stronger than the buy-side then we have
a trade imbalance that might aﬀect CDS spreads even though the pure default risk
hasn't changed; this proves that liquidity has a strong inﬂuence on CDS pricing and it
is therefore important to investigate it.
Therefore the contribution of this thesis is to present the ﬁrst study that investigates
empirically and theoretically diﬀerent liquidity issues speciﬁc to the sovereign CDS
market. In particular, we focus on the instrument-speciﬁc liquidity aspects of the CDS
contract and on the systematic liquidity risk. We ﬁrst start by analysing the liquidity
of the 5 year sovereign CDS contract then we move to study the implied liquidity
risk across the term structure of the sovereign CDS curve. Our results challenge the
conventional idea that sovereign CDSs are a good measure of sovereign default risk and
we provide empirical evidence that liquidity plays a substantial role in sovereign CDS
spread movements.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the structure of the
14
credit default swap market and clariﬁes the link between CDS spreads and liquidity.
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between the CDS spreads and the instrument-
speciﬁc liquidity such inventory costs, search frictions and depth. Chapter 4 investigates
the systematic liquidity risk eﬀect on the sovereign CDS spreads by using the Liquidity-
Adjusted CAPM framework of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Chapter 5 extends the
reduced-form model of Buhler and Trapp (2010) and presents its empirical results.
Chapter 6 analyses the implied liquidity risk in term structure of the sovereign CDS
spreads. Finally, Chapter 7 contains concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Background Information on the CDS
Market
2.1 Structure of the CDS market:
The structure of a standard CDS contract for sovereign issuers share many of its features
with the corporates. The protection buyer pays a semi-annual premium, expressed in
basis points per notional amount of the contract, to the protection seller. Settlement
of a CDS contract is typically done by physical delivery of an admissible bond. The
admissibility and the characteristics of the reference obligation are determined in the
contract. Settlement of a CDS contract can also be done without owning any debt
of the reference entity, these contracts are called naked credit default swaps allowing
traders to speculate on debt issues and the creditworthiness of reference entities. Typ-
ically, only bonds issued in external markets and denominated in one of the standard
speciﬁed currencies (euro, dollar, etc) are deliverable. In fact, bonds issued in domestic
currency, issued domestically, or governed by domestic laws are not deliverable. For
some sovereign issuers without extensive issuance of hard-currency denominated Eu-
robonds, loans may be included in the set of deliverable assets. The countries studied
in this thesis (to be speciﬁed later on) have sizable amounts of outstanding sovereign
bonds and their CDS contracts trade with Bond terms.
When a credit event occurs, we have two types of settlement: (1) either the protection
16
seller pays the buyer the par value of the bond in exchange for physical delivery of
the reference entity (physical settlement) or the protection seller directly pays the
diﬀerence between the market value and the face value of the reference issue to the
protection buyer (cash settlement).
Typically, a sovereign CDS contract lists as credit events any of the following that
aﬀect the reference obligation: (1) obligation acceleration (2) failure to pay (3) restruc-
turing or (4) repudiation/moratorium. Note that default is not included in this list,
because there is no international bankruptcy court that applies to sovereign issuers.
2.2 The Credit Default Swap Market and Liquidity:
In this subsection, we aim to clarify why liquidity can represent an issue to dealers
trading CDSs. CDS contracts are traded over the counter and typically in this market,
two parties agree on the term of trade. Traders go through inter-dealer brokers and
there might be delays in closing trades if the brokers do not ﬁnd a counterparty that
takes the opposite position. In fact, CDSs enable the transfer of credit risk from one
party to another and for investors who want to be exposed for a limited period of time,
the possibility to enter or exit a position with a relative ease and at a fair price is an
important consideration, hence the importance of liquidity.
Fisher Black (1971), Kyle (1985) and Brunnemeir (2009) state that liquidity can be
described as the degree to which an asset can be bought or sold in the market quickly
without aﬀecting the asset's price and it has multiple facets that can be summarized
in the following way. An asset is said to be liquid if (1) its bid-ask spread is small
(tightness), (2) a large amount of the security can be traded without aﬀecting the price
(depth) (3) price recovers quickly after a demand or supply shock (resiliency).
The CDS market is not a continuous market because it requires that a dealer takes
the opposite trade. The diﬃculty in matching a trade could create search frictions as
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dealers may have to wait a certain amount of time before closing a position. Secondly,
the problem of ﬁnding a counterparty could be associated with inventory costs as market
participants may be facing funding constraints. Last but not the least, counterparty
issues could also be linked to market depth; if an asset is not liquid (or deep) then it
is diﬃcult to trade. In summary, we have three main liquidity aspects that aﬀect the
CDS market: depth, inventory costs and search frictions.
2.3 The Credit Default Swap Market and Bond Liquidity:
Typically sovereigns tend to issue more bonds than corporates and the size of the bond
market has an important inﬂuence on sovereign CDS spreads. In what follows, we
discuss four main channels through which bond liquidity can impact the sovereign CDS
market.
(1) Hedging: CDS contracts are often used to manage default risk which arises from
the underlying entity. Therefore any bond yield movements (either caused by default
risk or liquidity risk) could impact CDS spreads.
(2) Physical settlement and the Cheapest-To-Deliver (CTD) option: the majority
of the CDS contract speciﬁes physical delivery because the price determination of cash
settlement is very involved. In fact the delivery option is more valuable when there
are a wider variety of debt instruments eligible for delivery. In particular, some bond
features (long maturity, a below-market coupon, and illiquidity) might make the CTD
option particularly valuable. A recent paper by Ammer and Cai (2007) show that the
CTD option introduces a source of uncertainty into the sovereign CDS market because
CTD value changes with the liquidity and with the number of instruments eligible for
delivery during the life of the CDS contract.
(3) Arbitrage: Duﬃe (1999) demonstrates that there is an arbitrage pricing relation
among the following instruments: a risky ﬂoating rate bond trading at par, a risk-
18
free par ﬂoater of the same maturity, and a CDS contract of the same maturity that
speciﬁcally references the risky bond. According to the author, the yield spread between
risky and risk-free bonds must equal the CDS premium in order to avoid arbitrage, this
is often called the CDS basis. However recent research showed that diﬀerent factors
might complicate this arbitrage relationship, for example liquidity is presented as one of
these factors because liquidity premium in either bonds or CDSs may vary over time1.
Moreover, the CTD option described above also complicates the arbitrage relationship.
(4) Arbitrage through synthetic positions: dealers could also create synthetic long
and short positions in the CDS market in order to speculate on bond yields.
In the following chapters, we investigate the eﬀect of both CDS and bond liquidity
on sovereign CDS spreads.
1Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) conclude that liquidity premium explain much of the variation in
investment-grade bond yield spreads.
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Chapter 3
Sovereign Credit Default Swaps and
Liquidity
3.1 Introduction
Liquidity is usually considered as a risk factor in traditional markets such as bonds,
stocks and as we mentioned above many papers studied its eﬀect on prices and returns.
In fact, liquidity is even more important for opaque markets such as OTC markets
where we typically have search frictions, transactions costs and asymmetric informa-
tion. These factors inﬂate liquidity risk as documented by Amihud and Mendelson
(1986,1991, 2002). Therefore, the study of liquidity risk in the CDS market is particu-
larly relevant.
The issue of liquidity risk in the sovereign CDS market has been brieﬂy mentioned in
Remonola et al (2008) and Pan and Singleton (2008) but to the best of our knowledge
this chapter represents the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the liquidity eﬀect speciﬁc to the
sovereign CDS contract. In particular, we focus on the liquidity aspects that typically
aﬀect OTC markets such as adverse selection, depth, search frictions and inventory
costs. The closest study to ours are Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Tang and Yan
(2007) who do similar type of work but focus only on the corporate CDS market.
Using DTCC data, we show that during crisis time search frictions and inventory
costs do not represent a constraint to market participants and we provide a proxy
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for the CDS liquidity premia of about 2.1%. Furthermore, our results reveal that the
impact of bond liquidity on sovereign CDS spreads is higher during crisis time with a
bond liquidity estimate of 4.8%. This indicates that the ﬂight-to-liquidity episode in
the sovereign bond market inﬂuences signiﬁcantly the sovereign CDS market.
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, we introduce the regression model and deﬁne the
dataset (Section 3.2). We then present the proxies utilised to test for the diﬀerent facets
of liquidity (Section 3.3). Section 3.4 discusses the implications of our results. Finally,
in Section 3.5, we conclude the chapter.
3.2 Empirical Methodology:
3.2.1 Data Description:
In this subsection, we describe a part of the data used in the analysis, the rest will be
presented in the relevant sections. The sovereign CDS dataset has been downloaded
from Thomson Financial Datastream and spans from November 2005 to October 2010,
it contains mid, bid and ask quotes in weekly frequency. Secondly, we obtain the gross
notional, net notional and total number of CDS contracts in a weekly basis from DTCC
clearing house through Reuters and the data spans from November 2008 to October
2010.
Regarding sovereign bond data, we downloaded bid-ask spreads, market value and
prices from ISMA (International Securities Market Association) via Thomson Financial
Datastream (from November 2005 to October 2010). Details about bond data will
be presented in the relevant sections. Finally, the credit risk controls will be deﬁned
thoroughly in Section 3.3. The data was obtained for the following countries: Argentina,
Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Philippines, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. We focus on
these countries in order to avoid any currency mismatch problem, as the sovereign CDS
spreads are quoted in dollar and the main currency of the sovereign debt in emerging
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markets is the dollar.
3.2.2 Regression with Clustering Method:
The objective of this paper is to examine the cross-sectional eﬀect of liquidity in the
sovereign CDS market. Our dataset is constituted of a pooled time series and cross-
section unbalanced panel. When one deals with panel data, one has to be aware of two
types of correlation that can distort the results: (1) observations from the same country
cannot be treated as independent of each other, we thus have to control for the country
eﬀect (or the entity eﬀect) (2) countries might be aﬀected by the same macroeconomic
conditions, we then need to control for the time eﬀect. Peterson (2009) provides a
detailed analysis on the diﬀerent type of methodologies to use when one faces the issue
of time and entity eﬀects in a panel. When the country eﬀect exists adjusting for entity
clustering is the most eﬃcient approach, however when time eﬀect is present, adopting
Fama-Macbeth approach is the preferred one. Finally, when both time and country
eﬀects exist in the data we have to address one parametrically (by using dummies) and
then estimate standard errors by clustering on other dimension1.
Before starting the empirical analysis, it is important to determine the type of de-
pendence present in the data. In fact, when the standard errors clustered by entity (or
country) are much larger than the white standard errors (three to four times) then this
is an indication of presence of a country eﬀect and when the standard errors clustered
by time are much larger than the white standard errors this is an indication of a time
eﬀect. We follow this methodology in order to determine the form of dependence in the
data and ﬁnd that both time and country eﬀects exist even though the time eﬀect is
rather weak.
The regression model used in this study is presented in the following way:
1Another possibility suggested is to address both time and country eﬀects using dummies.
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CDSspreadsit = a+ b ∗ CreditRiskit + c ∗ CDSLiquidityit + εit (3.1)
We regress CDS spread changes against credit risk controls and diﬀerent liquidity
proxies. We run the model by using dummies with the goal to retrieve robust standard
errors. As a further step in our empirical analysis, we do a robustness check2.
3.3 Credit Risk Controls and Liquidity Measures:
As a ﬁrst step of our empirical analysis we control for the default risk component,
however before presenting the credit risk controls and the liquidity risk measures, it
is important to put some theoretical framework to clarify exactly what we would like
to test. The pricing framework of CDSs proposed by Duﬃe (1999), Dai and Singleton
(2003), Pan and Singleton (2008) and others comprises three important elements: the
risk neutral default rate λ, the risk neutral loss given default L and the risk neutral
liquidity premium l and is deﬁned as follows: λL + l. Therefore, the theory suggests
that the higher the liquidity risk, the higher should be the value of l, implying higher
CDS spreads because illiquid securities incur trading costs and investors would like to
be compensated for that (Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005)).
3.3.1 Credit Risk Controls:
As stated before, Duﬃe (1999) suggests two theoretical credit risk components in the
pricing framework and we utilize his model as a guidance to control for the credit risk
part of the CDS contract. In line with this, the sovereign literature proposes number
2We do a robustness check using a ﬁxed eﬀect model. The ﬁxed eﬀect model is conditional upon the value of the
intercepts, this approach makes sense if the entities in the sample are one of a kind (such as countries) and cannot be
viewed as a random sample. Typically, the ﬁxed eﬀect is a good starting point when one deals with panel data set,
the reason is that the correlation between individual intercepts and explanatory variables are ignored by random eﬀect
models and can only be handled by the ﬁxed eﬀect approach. To avoid any doubt we use the Hausman test to conﬁrm
that the ﬁxed eﬀect model is the model of choice. We do not present the results of the robustness check to save space.
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of variables to control for sovereign credit risk:
3.3.1.1 Local Variables
The sovereign credit risk is largely impacted by the local state of the economy. Typically,
local economic forces could impact the default-arrival process and the loss-given default.
Thus in order to capture the state of local economy we use local stock market return
(denominated in local currency), exchange rate of local currency against the dollar and
sovereign's holding of foreign reserves in US dollar (Longstaﬀ et al (2010) and others).
We also use the term of trade in order to control for the eﬀect of local economy.
The terms of trade measures the price of a country's export relative to its imports and
changes in a country's terms of trade aﬀects its ability to generate dollar revenue from
exports and therefore its ability to make payments on its external dollar denominated
debt (Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989)). In fact, a country with more volatile terms of trade
is more likely to experience a severe weakening of fundamentals which may force it
into default (Mendoza (1995, 1997) and Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010)). Therefore, for
each country included in the analysis, we download the terms of trade from Thomson
Financial Datastream on a monthly basis and we use linear interpolation to obtain a
weekly frequency.
3.3.1.2 International Variables
The countries included in the analysis typically have extensive economic relationships
with other sovereigns. Therefore, the ability to repay the debt not only depends on
the local economy but also on the global macroeconomic state. In order to capture
the change in the state of the global economy, we use a number of measures mostly
related to the US economy as recent literature proved that the prices of securities in US
ﬁnancial markets incorporate information about economic fundamentals that is relevant
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to a broad cross-section of countries (Pan and Singleton (2008) and others). Thus in line
with the literature we include equity- and ﬁxed income-related variables to control for
the global economy. On the equity side, we use the US VIX to capture the variation in
US equity investments and on the ﬁxed-income part, we include the ﬁve-year constant
maturity treasury (CMT) because a change in this variable could signal variations in
the US economic growth and in turn the global business cycle. We download US VIX
in a weekly frequency from Datastream and 5 year CMT from H.15 Federal Reserve
Statistical Release.
In total, we use six variables to control for the credit risk component of the sovereign
CDS spreads (local stocks return, changes in the exchange rate, trade balance, total
foreign reserves in dollar, US VIX and 5year CMT).
3.3.1.3 Sovereign Default Risk
We ﬁnd that our credit risk controls produce only 28% R-squared3. CDSs are generally
considered to be a clean representation of the default risk, therefore the value of 0.28
may seem small. However it is important to note that sovereign defaults are rare and
are not only determined by the ability or sometimes the willingness of the country to
pay back its debt but are also subject to the lender capacity to force the repayment of
the debt (Edwards (1984)). Secondly the R-squared value 0.28 is consistent with the
view presented by Remonola et al (2008) and Longstaﬀ (2010) who present evidence
that sovereign CDS spreads are composed of default risk and risk premium components.
In the coming subsections, we test for the presence of bond and CDS liquidity.
3.3.2 Liquidity Proxies: Whole Sample Analysis
Standard sovereign CDS contracts that are quoted and traded do not apply to a speciﬁc
debt instrument. In practice, any dollar denominated senior obligations are eligible for
3In the study of Tang and Yan (2007), the control of default risk and liquidity level gives 60 % R-squared.
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delivery4. In fact, if default happens then all eligible bonds could be delivered even if
there are diﬀerent from the instruments that investors were hedging initially. Therefore,
in order to test for bond liquidity, we download for each country all the available US
dollar denominated and internationally traded sovereign bonds in the market. We thus
have 20 sovereign bonds for Argentina, 2 for Chile, 17 for Mexico, 25 for Brazil, 16 for
Turkey, 11 for Philippines, 4 for Korea, 1 for Malaysia and 12 for Indonesia which gives
a total of 108 sovereign bonds.
In what follows, we present diﬀerent proxies to test for bond and CDS liquidity.
3.3.2.1 Sovereign Bond Depth
One important aspect of liquidity is depth, namely the price sensitivity to the amount of
market activity; this is the measure used by Amihud (2002) to estimate stock liquidity.
This measure can be interpreted as a daily response to one dollar of market activity,
thus if the market is deep then large order is needed to change the price.
We estimate price sensitivity and market activity on a weekly basis by taking the
price volatility and the total bond market value respectively of all the internationally
traded US dollar denominated sovereign bonds. Therefore, by taking the ratio of price
volatility over market activity, we should capture reasonably well the notion of market
depth. Table 3.1 shows a negative coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant at 10% level. The
negative sign implies an inverse relationship between CDS spreads and bond depth. If
bond depth is low or equivalently if bond liquidity is low, it increases CDS spreads, this
is consistent with the idea that illiquid deliverable bonds can have an impact on CDS
spreads.
4For Asian sovereigns in the sample, all the bonds with maturity under 30 years are eligible for delivery. For all other
countries, bonds of any maturity could be delivered.
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3.3.2.2 Sovereign Bond Bid-Ask Spreads:
To capture bond liquidity spill-over on CDS spreads, we use bond bid-ask spread (BAS)
as a measure of liquidity. As emphasized before, higher BAS is associated with higher
illiquidity and if the bond market is illiquid we expect CDS spreads to be higher. We
construct bond BAS for each country and take the weekly average for all the traded
US dollar denominated sovereign bonds in the market (108 bonds for 9 countries).
Table 3.1 shows a negative and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. The negative sign seems
to be counter-intuitive because there is a positive relationship between sovereign bond
bid-ask and CDS spreads. In a recent study, Kucuk (2010) discusses liquidity in the
sovereign bond market and uses CDS spreads to estimate the default and the non-default
component of emerging market sovereign bond yields. The author utilises the BAS as a
direct measure of bond liquidity and divides the bond data into two groups: investment
and speculative grades. He provides evidence that the BAS of investment grade bonds
have positive impact on CDS-basis but speculative grade bonds show negative eﬀect.
Although the previous study is diﬀerent from ours as it focuses on CDS basis and not on
CDS spreads, it points to an important observation, speculative and investment grade
liquidity measures (i.e. BAS) behave diﬀerently and this might be an explanation as
to why the coeﬃcient is negative instead of being positive.
3.3.2.3 Bond Price Volatility:
The empirical evidence for price volatility as liquidity proxy is mixed. For example,
Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003) use yield volatility to measure illiquidity in corpo-
rate bonds. The authors state that in market microstructure models, dealers' inventory
costs are higher if information uncertainty is higher. One essential source of uncer-
tainty in the bond market is related to the predictability of future yield movements.
Therefore, the authors hypothesize that a higher yield volatility leads to larger bid-ask
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spreads and thus to lower liquidity. Because of the inverse relationship between bond
prices and yields, their ﬁnding implies that higher yields (or lower bond prices) lead to
lower liquidity.
On the other hand, Shulman et al. (1993) use price volatility as a proxy for price
uncertainty and ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on bond spreads, meaning that the
higher price volatility the lower the liquidity. Therefore bond spreads should increase
to account for liquidity risk.
In our panel model, we regress CDS spread changes against credit risk controls and
bond price volatility. In order to estimate bond volatility, we average at weekly basis
bond price volatilities5. Table 3.1 shows a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient at 5%
level. Our interpretation of the results is mixed. On one hand, if we follow the ﬁrst
stream of the literature, a negative coeﬃcient implies that yield volatility leads to higher
yield and thus to lower bond liquidity. As discussed before a reduced bond liquidity puts
pressure on the CDS market, causing an increase in the spreads to account for liquidity
risk. This ﬁnding is thus consistent with Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003). On the
other hand, the second stream of the literature (i.e. Shulman et al. (1993)) suggests
that the negative sign that we obtained in our regression is counter-intuitive, because
higher price volatility is an indication of illiquid bond market which should increase
CDS spreads instead of decreasing them.
3.3.2.4 Sovereign Bond Volume:
Recent empirical studies on liquidity dynamics have shown that higher volume does
not necessarily lead to more liquid market. Jones (2002) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of changes in turnover on changes in bid-ask spreads. Evans and Lyons (2002) and
Galati (2000) report no association between the liquidity and the level of activity on
the foreign exchange market. In the U.S. Treasury market, Fleming (2003) ﬁnds that
5We compute bond price volatility by taking the standard deviation of each bond price at 2 months rolling window.
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neither trading volume nor trading frequency are consistently correlated with price
impact or bid-ask spreads. Finally, a more recent paper by Johnson (2007) argue that
the volume of trade is driven by the degree of rearrangement, or ﬂux, of the trading
population. While higher trading volume does not necessarily signal better liquidity
(e.g. the 87' market crash), it is indicative of a higher population ﬂux that leads to
liquidity changes. Therefore, we can associate higher volume with higher liquidity risk.
These results seem to challenge the basic intuition that states that a higher volume
makes it easier to trade in a market; that was the original ﬁnding of Demsetz (1968),
which is viewed as the starting point of the ﬁeld of market microstructure. In this
chapter, we follow the hypothesis of Johnson (2007) and associate a high volume with
high liquidity risk.
To test for bond volume eﬀect on the sovereign CDS market, we download the weekly
market value of all the available US dollar denominated sovereign bonds. Datastream
deﬁnes the market value as the current market value of the issue, that is, the current
market price multiplied by the amount currently in issue. Then by computing the total
market value of the sovereign bonds, we obtain a good proxy of the total traded volume.
The panel regression in Table 3.1 shows a positive coeﬃcient. Although the level of
signiﬁcance is weak we do ﬁnd evidence of a volume eﬀect in the sovereign CDS market.
The positive sign indicates that higher liquidity risk leads to higher CDS spreads.
3.3.2.5 CDS Bid- Ask Spreads:
The bid-ask spread reﬂects diﬀerent facets of liquidity (adverse selection, handling
costs,...) and is one of the most widely used liquidity measure in bond and stock mar-
kets; its importance has been proved since the ﬁrst paper of Amihud and Mendelson
(1986).
Because the CDS market is an OTC market, there are three important facets of
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liquidity that are particularly relevant. We brieﬂy mentioned two of them which are
inventory costs and search frictions and we have another aspect which is the adverse
selection. As shown by Acharya and Johnson (2007), adverse selection is particularly
relevant to the corporate CDS market because lot of informed trading occurs which
tend to intensify asymmetric information between market participants. Concerning our
study, we are focusing on the sovereign CDS market and these instruments are less
subject to adverse selection (Ammer and Cai (2007)). In fact, most of the relevant
information that could impact sovereign CDS spreads such as national economy statis-
tics or the state of government ﬁnances are publicly available so any new information
tend to be quickly incorporated in the market. Following this, we assume that the ad-
verse selection problem is non-existent and we only focus on two liquidity facets: search
frictions and inventory costs6.
One anticipates bid-ask spreads to be higher if liquidity is low and high liquidity
risk increases CDS spreads. We therefore expect to see a positive coeﬃcient in the
regression. The results show negative and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient (Table 3.1).
In Acharya and Johnson (2007), even though the authors presented the evidence of
insider trading in the corporate CDS market they found that bid-ask spread had no
explanatory power on CDS levels. In this study, even though our initial hypothesis is
diﬀerent from their paper as we assume that there is no insider trading in the sovereign
market, we also ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads do not impact CDS spreads. These results
point to the diﬃcult process of liquidity determination and our intuition suggests that
the problem of assuming bid-ask spread or bid-ask percentage spread as being a good
illiquidity proxy in the CDS market is not easy. On one hand, both measures are
aﬀected by the level of CDS premium and on the other hand there is a high correlation
between CDS premium and CDS bid-ask. This, in fact, could account for the lack of
6Even though we assume that there is no insider trading in the sovereign CDS market, we still have asymmetric
information between dealers because credit derivatives are insurance contracts by deﬁnition. However, this asymmetric
information is not high enough to encourage market participants to do insider trading.
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level of signiﬁcance and could also constitute a possible explanation of the negative
coeﬃcient in the regression.
3.3.3 Summary of the Results: Whole Sample Period
In summary, we tried diﬀerent measures in order to test whether liquidity is priced in
sovereign CDS spreads. In this analysis, we considered both CDS and bond related
liquidity proxies. Even though the used measures are intuitive and reﬂect diﬀerent
facets of liquidity (e.g. search frictions, inventory costs, etc) they are not all signif-
icant and some show mixed results. However, we do ﬁnd evidence of bond liquidity
priced in sovereign CDS spreads. Our results show that, for the whole sample period,
bond liquidity7 proxies have an impact on sovereign CDS spreads although the level of
signiﬁcance diﬀers from one liquidity measure to another.
As a further step in this analysis, we follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) methodol-
ogy and attempt to quantify illiquidity premium by multiplying the coeﬃcient estimates
and the standard deviations of the corresponding liquidity proxies. We then take the
signiﬁcant liquidity proxies (bond depth, bond price volatility, bond volume and bond
BAS) and multiply their standard deviations (3.39, 1.76, 14.14 and 0.75 respectively)
by their corresponding coeﬃcient estimates (-1.08, -2.55, 0.67 and -8.83). We ﬁnd that
the average bond liquidity premium associated with these four measures is 4.47 basis
points8. We did not include the eﬀect of CDS liquidity in the quantitative evidence
because CDS BAS is insigniﬁcant.
To the best of our knowledge this chapter is the ﬁrst to provide a quantitative
ﬁgure to the liquidity premium in the sovereign CDS market. In our sample we have 9
emerging countries and the average of CDS spreads is about 246.5 basis points, in terms
of percentage the liquidity premium represents 1.8% of the sovereign CDS spreads. This
7Bond liquidity has a stronger impact on CDS spreads than CDS liquidity.
8In case of negative signs, we take the absolute values because we are interested in the quantities.
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ﬁgure is in line with the literature, for example Longstaﬀ (2004) estimate the 5 year
Treasury bond liquidity premium to 9.99 basis points and Longstaﬀ, Mithal and Neis
(2005) proxy the non-default component of the corporate bond spread to 8.6 basis
points.
Our sample contains two periods that have diﬀerent level of trading activities. Chor-
dia et al (2001) emphasize that liquidity and trading activity are strongly linked as they
are inﬂuenced by common factors. Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2007) mention
that the imbalance of supply and demand in the CDS market can impact the character
of liquidity eﬀect and ﬁnally Tang and Yan (2007) state that cross-sectional variations
in the liquidity eﬀect on CDS spreads are very sensitive to the trading intensity. Thus,
in order to better understand the liquidity features of the sovereign CDS market we
split our sample in two: one period running from November 2005 to March 2008 and
the other from April 2008 to October 2010.
3.4 Comparative Analysis: Pre-Crisis and Crisis Period:
The main aim of this section is to provide a comparative analysis between the pre- and
crisis periods. The point is to observe how liquidity characteristics change with market
conditions and see if liquidity risk is time-varying. In what follows, we mainly discuss
the signiﬁcance of the liquidity measures.
3.4.1 Pre-Crisis Period:
We restrict our empirical analysis to the pre-crisis period (from November 2005 to March
2008). Table 3.2 reveals that the results diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the whole sample period
as none of the bond liquidity measures are signiﬁcant (bond price volatility, bond depth,
bond volume, bond BAS). This implies that the impact of bond market liquidity is weak
during the pre-crisis period. Concerning the CDS-related liquidity measures, we ﬁnd
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that the CDS BAS is insigniﬁcant as well.
3.4.2 Crisis Period:
Due to the availability of Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) data for
this sample period, we are able to test for diﬀerent liquidity facets that characterize the
CDS market such as depth, search frictions and inventory constraints.
3.4.2.1 Sovereign CDS Depth:
Using DTCC data, we test for market depth. We construct CDS depth measure by
taking the ratio of spread sensitivity to CDS volume. To proxy CDS volume, we utilise
the gross notional value provided by DTCC deﬁned as the sum of the CDS contract
bought (or equivalently sold) in a weekly basis and for the spread sensitivity we compute
the standard deviation of the CDS spreads.
Table 3.4 reveals that CDS market depth has signiﬁcant impact on CDS spreads.
The coeﬃcient is negative which indicates that low market depth (i.e. low liquidity)
increases CDS spreads. This ﬁnding is in line with Tang and Yan (2007) who also ﬁnd
that low market depth increases corporate CDS spreads.
3.4.2.2 Search Frictions or Matching Intensity:
Search frictions are among the important facets of liquidity that are present in the
OTC market. The CDS market is very opaque and the International Securities and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) has revealed very few information about it. In a recent
paper, Duﬃe, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005, 2006) show that search costs directly aﬀect
market liquidity and thus market prices. Moreover, Chacko, Jurek and Staﬀord (2007)
show that market makers have a pricing power in search based markets.
In order to proxy for search frictions, we use the net notional value. DTCC deﬁnes
33
the net notional with respect to any single reference entity as the sum of the net
protection bought by net buyers (or equivalently net protection sold by net sellers).
DTCC states that this measure is calculated by the counterparty family. We take as
example a counterparty family A; on this particular family the total gross notional of
CDS bought (sold) on reference entity X is 135,000,000 (-150,000,000) therefore the net
position held by the counterparty family A on the reference entity X is -15,000,000.
Thus, if we interpret this ﬁgure in terms of search frictions, the family A was only able
to match a certain percent of her CDS position on reference entity X and therefore her
net position is -15,000,000.
In fact, what DTCC reports is the aggregate net notional bought namely the position
of a large number of families (i.e. family A,B,C, etc). Therefore, we consider the
aggregate net notional as the best available proxy for search frictions or matching
intensity in the sovereign CDS market.
High search friction (or lower matching intensity) are associated with high bid-ask
spreads because it reﬂects the diﬃculty to ﬁnd a counterparty willing to take the op-
posite trade. Therefore, higher search frictions should lead to higher CDS spreads, we
thus expect a positive relationship.
Table 3.4 shows a negative and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. This result suggests that for
the crisis period search frictions are not priced in sovereign CDS spreads. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the corporate CDS market where search frictions are not priced for
the actively traded CDS contract (Tan and Yan (2007)).
3.4.2.3 Inventory Costs:
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) mention that inventory costs are of a great im-
portance for dealers facing funding constraints. Cao, Evans and Lyon (2006) provide
evidence that inventory information can have signiﬁcant impact on prices even though
the risk related to fundamentals did not change. Concerning the CDS market, inven-
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tory costs can constitute an obstacle to dealers entering a CDS trade (i.e. margin
requirements and/or premium payment).
In order to proxy for this liquidity facet, we use the total number of contracts pro-
vided by DTCC. We take the diﬀerence between week (t) and week (t-1) of the total
number of contracts. For example, a negative diﬀerence would mean that less dealers
were able to enter a CDS trade than the week before suggesting that funding costs are
constraining, however, a positive diﬀerence would imply that more market participants
entered into a CDS trade which in turn indicates that funding problems are trivial. In
this study, we depart from this hypothesis in order to test for inventory costs. High
inventory constraint leads to high bid-ask spreads, there is then a positive relationship
between CDS spreads and inventory costs.
Table 3.4 indicates a positive and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. The result implies that
inventory costs are not priced in the sovereign CDS spreads. These ﬁndings diﬀer from
the corporate CDS market where inventory costs are priced.
3.4.2.4 CDS Volume and CDS BAS:
Table 3.4 shows that CDS volume (proxied by CDS gross notional value) is insigniﬁcant
and has negative sign which means that the volume eﬀect is not priced in the sovereign
CDS market. This result is not consistent with the corporate CDS market where a
signiﬁcant impact of CDS volume has been documented. Finally, Table 3.4 reveals that
CDS BAS has a signiﬁcant impact (i.e. at 10 % level).
3.4.2.5 Bond Liquidity:
In what follows, we test for bond liquidity spill-over using the same bond liquidity
proxies as for the whole sample analysis. Table 3.3 shows that bond price volatility and
depth are insigniﬁcant. Moreover, sovereign bond BAS is signiﬁcant at 1% level and
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has a negative sign. Finally, the volume proxy is signiﬁcant at 10% level. Overall, it
seems that during the crisis period the impact of the bond liquidity is higher than the
pre-crisis period.
3.4.3 Discussion:
In this subsection, we discuss the implications of our comparative analysis. The fact
that CDS market depth is signiﬁcant during the crisis period could explain why other
liquidity measures such as inventory costs and search frictions are insigniﬁcant. Indeed,
a deep market points to the ease of ﬁnding a trading partner for a given order and
it may make search frictions and inventory costs less constraining. The interaction
between diﬀerent liquidity aspects (i.e. depth, inventory costs, search frictions) creates
a cross-sectional variation in the liquidity eﬀect that can account for the lack of level
of signiﬁcance for some facets of liquidity. This interaction eﬀect was also reported in
the corporate CDS market.
In order to provide a rough estimate of the liquidity premium priced in the sovereign
CDS spreads during the crisis period, we multiply the coeﬃcient values of the signiﬁcant
bond and CDS liquidity proxies (i.e. average bond BAS, bond volume, CDS BAS and
CDS depth) by their respective standard deviations and we obtain an average of 12.89
bps (7.75 bps for CDS liquidity and 18.02 bps for bond liquidity). The average CDS
premium of the sample during the crisis period is 372 bps therefore the average liquidity
premium accounts for 3.5% of the sample (2.1% for CDS liquidity and 4.8% for bond
liquidity)9.
The estimated sovereign CDS liquidity premium of 2.1% is lower than the one doc-
umented in the corporate CDS market (i.e. 11 %). The diﬀerence between the two
liquidity premium is quite high and one of the possible explanations could be related
9DTCC does not provide any data for the period before 2008, therefore, we are not able to present a proxy for the
liquidity premium embedded in the sovereign CDS spreads for the pre-crisis period.
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the intensity of asymmetric information embedded in each market. As documented by
Acharya and Johnson (2007), there is adverse selection coming from informed traders in
the corporate CDS market which may intensify search frictions and participate to the
augmentation of liquidity risk. The magnitude of the asymmetric information between
agents depends on informational advantages that banks typically have on borrowers
credit quality, this supremacy of information encourage them to exploit opportunities
by trading as insiders which in turn increase liquidity risk. However for the case of the
sovereign CDS market, the banks are less likely to have informational power which may
reduce the asymmetric information and deter any insider trading.
Furthermore the results show that for the pre-crisis period, all the bond-related
liquidity measures are insigniﬁcant. However during the crisis two out of four bond-
related liquidity measures (i.e. bond BAS and bond volume) are signiﬁcant. This
implies that a change in the trading activity of the sovereign bond market can inﬂuence
sovereign CDS spreads. In fact, in times of recession investors rebalance their portfolio
in order to buy less risky and more liquid assets and this is particularly relevant to
the ﬁxed income market. This phenomenon is known as ﬂight-to-liquidity and ﬂight-
to-quality. In line with this, Beber et al (2009) study the eﬀect of ﬂight-to-liquidity
and ﬂight-to-quality in the sovereign bond market and provide evidence that, under
recession, investors chase liquidity regardless of the credit quality because the short-
term liquidity concerns become the priority. Our empirical results show that bond
liquidity has more impact on sovereign CDS spreads during crisis time and this may
be explained by the ﬂight-to-liquidity phenomenon documented in the sovereign bond
market.
Therefore, our ﬁndings suggest that in times of recession, it is not the search frictions
nor the inventory costs that impact sovereign CDS spreads but rather bond liquidity
seems to have the highest inﬂuence.
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3.5 Conclusion:
In this chapter, we present an empirical analysis where we investigate the eﬀect of
liquidity on the sovereign CDS market. It is important to underline that the elusive
nature of liquidity risk makes it hard to test especially for less transparent markets such
as the OTC markets and that the results that we present are subject to the proxies
used. However to the best of our knowledge, this study represents the ﬁrst attempt
to analyse the eﬀect of search frictions, depth and inventory costs in the sovereign
CDS market. Using DTCC data, we show that during crisis time search frictions and
inventory costs do not represent a constraint to market participants and we provide a
proxy of the CDS liquidity premia of about 2.1%. Furthermore, our results reveal that
the impact of bond liquidity is higher during crisis time with a bond liquidity estimate
of 4.8%. This indicates that the ﬂight-to-liquidity episode in the sovereign bond market
inﬂuences signiﬁcantly sovereign CDS spreads.
Our study reveals that sovereign CDS liquidity is time-varying meaning that liquid-
ity characteristics show dissimilar behavior in diﬀerent states of the market. Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) emphasize that the time-variation of liquidity characteristics
constitutes on itself a systematic liquidity risk that should be priced above liquidity
levels. Therefore, in our next chapter, we investigate the eﬀect of systematic liquidity
risk on the sovereign CDS market.
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Tables:
Table 3.1: CDS and Bond Liquidity: Whole Sample Analysis
We regress CDS spread changes against credit risk controls and liquidity proxies. In our panel model,
we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the table) and cluster
the standard errors by time. To control for default risk we use 6 variables: local stocks, exchange rate,
reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT. Our liquidity proxies are: (1) CDS BAS
(2) Bond Price Volatility (3) Bond Market Value (4) Bond BAS and (5) Bond Depth. '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗'
represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond and CDS Liquidity Proxied by:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 0.81 0.04 16.31 0.40 -6.71 -0.35 21.32 1.1 -1.91 -0.03
Local Stocks -2.21 -2.34 -2.56 -2.42 -2.29 -2.43 -2.26 -2.40 -2.51 -2.38
FX rate 0.17 0.75 0.17 0.72 0.15 0.66 0.12 0.55 0.18 0.75
Reserve in -0.005 -0.1 -0.02 -0.33 -0.013 -0.23 -0.018 -0.03 -0.007 -0.12
Trade Balance -7.5e^-4 -0.06 -1.4e^-3 -0.11 -1.7e^-3 -0.14 -6.9e^-4 -0.06 -4.5e^-4 -0.03
US VIX 1.18 3.15 1.17 3.01 1.18 3.13 1.17 3.13 1.17 3.01
CMT 5 years -27.65 -1.84 -27.79 -1.78 -27.36 -1.82 -28.64 -1.91 -27.71 -1.77
Liquidity -21.86 -0.85 -2.55 -2.21∗∗ 0.67 1.67∗∗∗ -8.83 -3.14∗ -10.9 -1.68∗∗∗
N 2278 2127 2278 2278 2278
R2 0.284 0.286 0.285 0.287 0.285
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Table 3.2: CDS and Bond Liquidity: Pre-Crisis Period
We regress CDS spread changes against credit risk controls and liquidity proxies. In our panel model,
we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the table) and cluster
the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables: local stocks, exchange
rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT. Our liquidity proxies are: (1) CDS
BAS (2) Bond Price volatility (3) Bond Market Value (4) Bond BAS and (5) Bond Depth. '∗', '∗∗'
and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond and CDS Liquidity Proxied by:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 0.27 0.06 21.1 1.57 -0.72 -0.11 3.5 0.5 0.35 0.03
Local Stocks -0.70 -2.02 -0.67 -1.51 -0.70 -2.03 -0.71 -2.04 -0.67 -1.52
FX rate -0.36 -3.91 -0.4 -4.02 -0.37 -3.93 -0.37 -3.93 -0.4 -3.96
Reserve in 0.014 0.56 -0.044 -0.15 0.015 0.57 0.017 0.66 -0.0012 -0.04
Trade Balance -5.3e^-3 -1.14 -0.005 -0.99 -5.4e^-3 -1.18 -5.3e^-3 -1.14 -4.3e^-3 -0.87
US VIX -0.24 -1.18 -0.27 -1.29 -0.24 -1.18 -0.24 -1.18 -0.27 -1.31
CMT 5 years 10.26 1.57 10.33 1.52 10.37 1.59 10.22 1.56 10.4 1.53
Liquidity -4.48 -0.73 -0.54 -0.73 0.07 0.21 -1.43 -0.59 -0.52 -1.09
N 1162 1011 1162 1162 1029
R2 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43
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Table 3.3: Bond Liquidity: Crisis Period
We regress CDS spread changes against credit risk controls and liquidity proxies. In our panel model,
we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the table) and cluster
the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables: local stocks, exchange
rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT. Our liquidity proxies are: (1) CDS
BAS (2) Bond Price volatility (3) Bond Market Value (4) Bond BAS and (5) Bond Depth. '∗', '∗∗'
and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond and CDS Liquidity Proxied by:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const -5.7 -0.2 1.35 0.05 -22.5 -0.72 27.46 0.91 0.062 0.0
Local Stocks -2.64 -1.48 -2.83 -1.59 -3.03 -1.70 -2.92 -1.65 -2.80 -1.58
FX rate 0.17 0.42 0.15 0.37 0.096 0.24 0.08 0.2 0.15 0.38
Reserve in -0.07 -0.28 -0.05 -0.24 -0.10 -0.46 -0.09 -0.4 -0.047 -0.2
Trade Balance 0.003 0.13 -0.0014 0.06 -1.3e^-3 -0.06 1.6e^-3 0.07 1.8e^-3 0.08
US VIX 1.43 2.56 1.4 2.5 1.39 2.5 1.37 2.46 1.4 2.5
CMT 5 years -37.29 -1.49 -36.2 -1.44 -35.9 -1.43 -37.3 -1.49 -36.2 -1.44
Liquidity -154.42 -1.69∗∗∗ -1.37 -0.74 1.73 1.81∗∗∗ -11.11 -2.61∗ -0.33 -0.35
N 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 0.281 0.28 0.282 0.284 0..27
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Table 3.4: CDS Liquidity: Crisis Period
We regress CDS spread changes against credit risk controls and liquidity proxies. In our panel model,
we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the table) and cluster
the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables: local stocks, exchange
rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT. Our liquidity proxies are: (5) CDS
BAS (6) Depth CDS (7) Search Frictions (8) CDS Volume and (9) Inventory Costs . '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗'
represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond and CDS Liquidity Proxied by:
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const -5.7 -0.2 29.9 0.45 2.94 0.04 1.43 0.02 413 6.25
Local Stocks -2.64 -1.48 -0.33 -0.20 -0.52 -0.31 -0.53 -0.31 -1.16 -0.69
FX rate 0.17 0.42 -0.14 -0.31 -0.15 -0.35 -0.162 -0.36 -0.25 -0.58
Reserve in -0.07 -0.28 0.001 0.01 0.063 0.19 -0.10 -0.36 -0.19 -0.76
Trade Balance 0.003 0.13 0.005 0.21 0.002 0.09 0.004 0.15 0.007 0.3
US VIX 1.43 2.56 1.13 2.32 1.14 2.32 1.13 2.32 0.75 1.49
CMT 5 years -37.29 -1.49 -49.33 -1.64 -49.31 -1.64 -49.62 -1.65 -44.31 -1.5
Liquidity -154.42 -1.69∗∗∗ -15.12 -2.23∗∗ -3.54 -0.94 -0.07 -0.19 1.5e^-3 0.19
N 1116 856 856 856 847
R2 0.281 0.224 0.21 0.22 0.24
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Chapter 4
Sovereign Credit Default Swaps and
Systematic Liquidity Risk
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on the correlation of ﬂuctuations of liquidity measures across
assets, these common ﬂuctuations (also called systematic liquidity risk) are more likely
to impact assets characterized by commonality. Our aim is to investigate whether
systematic liquidity risk is a priced state variable and participates directly to sovereign
CDS spread movements.
Recent literature provides evidence that commonality is an important source of risk
in the sovereign CDS market. Longstaﬀ et al (2010) document that the ﬁrst principal
component account for 64% of the variation in the sovereign CDS spreads across dif-
ferent markets, this percentage reaches 75 % when the sample is restricted to the crisis
period. Pan and Singleton (2008) investigate the default intensity and the recovery rate
using the term structure of the sovereign CDS spreads and show that the ﬁrst prin-
cipal component captures 96% of the variation over-time of the CDS term structure.
Finally, Augustin and Tedongap (2010) develop a consumption based model in order
to link sovereign credit risk premia to consumption growth forecast, macroeconomic
uncertainty and investors preferences. By using PCA, they ﬁnd that three factors are
suﬃcient to explain 95% of the commonality in spread movements.
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All these papers document signiﬁcant commonality in the sovereign CDS market1
which is an important source of risk because it may facilitate credit risk or liquidity
contagion between diﬀerent sovereign economies. We contribute to the literature by
oﬀering the ﬁrst study that focuses entirely on sovereign entities by analyzing issues
speciﬁc to the commonality in liquidity (or systematic liquidity risk). The closest study
to ours is Meng and Gwilym (2008) where the authors investigate liquidity of CDSs
(corporates and sovereigns) with a speciﬁc focus on how bid-ask spreads are aﬀected by
the characteristics of the contracts such as demand supply pressure, inventory risks and
clientele eﬀects. Although this latter study is very similar in spirit to that of Tang and
Yan (2007) where the authors explain that liquidity participates to CDS spread changes,
it diﬀers by having a focus on the determinants of liquidity proxied by bid-ask spread.
The other diﬀerence is related to the data used. Tang and Yan (2007) concentrate
only on corporate entities while Meng and Gwilym (2008) pool together a large dataset
where sovereign entities represent less than 20 % of the sample therefore the results are
heavily biased towards the corporates. Finally, Meng and Gwilym (2008) ﬁnd evidence
of commonality in liquidity of all CDSs (corporates and sovereigns) consistent with the
results of Tang and Yan (2007) for corporates.
Secondly, in contrast to Meng and Gwilym (2008), we do not attempt to analyze
the determinants of the bid-ask spreads but, using a CAPM-type framework, we test
whether systematic liquidity risk2 participates to CDS spread movements independently
of any reassessment of the default risk. Furthermore, we also examine liquidity spiral
eﬀects which are described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) as the joint impact
of market and funding liquidity risks3. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to empirically
test for liquidity spiral eﬀects in the CDS market.
1Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) ﬁnd that the systematic liquidity risk is priced in the expected stock return, they
present as explanation the signiﬁcant level of commonality present in the stock markets.
2In our study, we use the terms market liquidity risk and systematic liquidity risk interchangeably.
3 Sovereign CDSs are subject to margin deposit and are therefore exposed to funding liquidity risk
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By applying the Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM of Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we ﬁnd
that, before the crisis, the risk premium priced above the default risk and liquidity level
is mainly driven by CDS systematic liquidity risk. In times of low uncertainty, dealers
use CDSs more for speculation than for hedging. Since speculation is not directly
related to the reference entity or the underlying asset, it weakens the inﬂuence of the
bond market. However in times of crisis, high default probability increases signiﬁcantly
global risk aversion which induce dealers to use CDSs to hedge their bond positions;
hence the tightening of the relationship between CDS and bond markets. Thus, bond
systematic liquidity risk becomes the main driver of the risk premium priced above the
default risk and liquidity level. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the joint impact
of market and funding liquidity risks (i.e. liquidity spiral) has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on CDS spreads. Finally, our results imply that speculation may participate to the
widening of bid-ask spreads and that funding liquidity risk is more constraining during
crisis time.
4.2 Related Literature
There is an increasing literature that focus on the market-wide liquidity triggered by
common ﬂuctuations across assets. Chordia et al (2000), Hasbrouk and Seppi (2001)
and Huberman and Halka (1999) investigate systematic liquidity risk in the stock mar-
kets. Chordia et al (2002) ﬁnd that the ﬂuctuations in liquidity are correlated across
stocks and bonds. Eisfedlt (2002) develops a model where liquidity ﬂuctuations are
correlated with real fundamentals such investment and productivity.
Indeed very few papers investigated the eﬀects of systematic liquidity risk in the
CDS market. Dunbar (2008) extends a reduced-form CDS pricing framework in order to
include market liquidity and ﬁnds that this additional factor improves the explanatory
power of the model. Tang and Yan (2007) provide evidence that systematic liquidity risk
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is priced in corporate CDS spreads but its magnitude is very weak. Pu, Wang and Wu
(2011) examine the potential eﬀects of systematic liquidity and counterparty risks on
corporate CDS spreads. After controlling for default risk part which represents 25% of
the R-squared, they ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant portion of CDS spread changes is attributable
to systematic counterparty and liquidity risks. Finally, Bongaerts, De Jong and Driessen
(2011) also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of systematic liquidity risk in corporate CDS spreads is
signiﬁcant but economically small. In fact, these results are intuitive because market
liquidity is mainly triggered by liquidity ﬂuctuations across securities, these common
shocks are less likely to aﬀect corporate CDS spreads because these instruments are
less exposed to global macroeconomic factors than their sovereign counterparts.
Other studies emphasize the importance of liquidity commonality across the bond
and the CDS markets. Pu (2010) is one of the ﬁrst paper that explores the properties
of liquidity measures across corporate bond and CDS spreads. The author ﬁnds that
there is a strong commonality across all the constructed liquidity measures and shows
that a substantial amount of credit spreads could be explained by liquidity common
factors. Calice, Vhen and Williams (2011) analyze the potential liquidity spill-over
between sovereign bond and CDS markets during the European crisis in 2010. The
authors report three important results. First, it is found that when the sovereign bond
market liquidity dries up, CDS market liquidity increases signiﬁcantly. Moreover, the
paper shows a strong liquidity spill-over from the CDS to the bond market. Finally,
the authors document that prior to the crisis, bond yields determined CDS spreads,
however during the crisis the relationship inverted with CDS spreads taking the lead
over bond yields.
The research spirit of this study is more in line with Longstaﬀ et al (2011) and Re-
monola et al (2008) where the authors decompose sovereign CDS spreads into expected
loss and default risk premium components. Longstaﬀ et al (2011) view the risk premium
as a compensation to unpredictable changes in the default arrival rate; this is what they
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call the distress risk. The authors quantify this risk premium by taking the diﬀerence
between theoretical values of CDS spreads under both the risk neutral and physical
measures and ﬁnd that on average the risk premium represents a third of the sovereign
CDS spreads. Remonola et al (2008) also disentangle sovereign CDS spreads by using
rating information. In fact, the studies of Longstaﬀ et al (2011) and Remonola et al
(2008) are similar in spirit, the diﬀerence lies in the risk that the papers study, while the
former focuses on distress risk, the latter discusses the jump-at-default risk. In this
chapter, we contribute to the literature by mainly focusing on the systematic liquidity
risk eﬀect on sovereign CDS spreads. It is important to note that because of the strong
ties between sovereign CDS and bond markets, systematic liquidity risk could not only
be triggered by the sovereign CDS market itself but also by the sovereign bond market
(Pu (2010) and Calice, Vhen and Williams (2011)). Therefore, in this study we focus
on both eﬀects.
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis we start by controlling for the default risk4 and the
liquidity level, then we construct diﬀerent liquidity risk factors and test whether these
are priced in addition to the control variables. Similarly to the previous chapter, we
focus on nine emerging markets (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Philippines,
Malaysia, Turkey, Chile and Indonesia). By examining systematic liquidity risk, we
aim to clarify further the source of commonality that characterizes the sovereign CDS
market and shed some light on the drivers of sovereign CDS spreads.
In Section 4.3, we introduce the model used to test for systematic liquidity and
funding liquidity risk. In Section 4.4, we deﬁne the data and the methodology used
and in Section 4.5 we discuss the implications of our results. Finally, in Section 4.6, we
conclude.
4We control for default risk using the same variables as for Section 3.3 of Chapter 3.
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4.3 Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM
As speciﬁed in Chapter 2 and 3, liquidity could be an obstacle to CDS dealers for many
reasons (depth, timing, prices etc....). However since there is a high correlation5 between
diﬀerent liquidity measures, it is highly likely that systematic liquidity risk inﬂuences
instrument-speciﬁc liquidity6 which may create more frictions to CDS dealers who want
to exit or enter a position for a limited amount of time.
In their CAPM framework, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose that systematic
liquidity risk be represented by three components: (1) the sensitivity of the liquidity
of individual securities to market-wide liquidity shocks (β2); (2) the sensitivity of the
return of individual securities to market-wide liquidity shocks (β3); and (3) the sensi-
tivity of the liquidity of individual securities to market return (β4). The unconditional
Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM relates the expected excess return of a security at time t,
E(rt− rft ), to the expected level of liquidity, E(ct), the market beta (β1) and the three
liquidity sensitivities mentioned above in the following form:
E(rt − rft ) = E(ct) + λβ1 + λβ2 − λβ3 − λβ4 (4.1)
where λ = E(λt) = E(r
M
t − cMt − rf ) is the market risk premium, with rMt and cMt
being the market return and liquidity measure at time t respectively. One of the
beneﬁts of Acharya and Pedersen's framework (AP-thereafter) is that it presents a
simple theoretical model that helps explain how asset prices are aﬀected by liquidity
risk and commonality in liquidity.
In this study we are working with CDS spreads and since by nature CDS contracts
do not have initial costs at the inception, the concept of percentage returns is not
well deﬁned7. Therefore, we use CDS spread changes as a proxy for CDS returns. In
what follows we present the constructed variables that aim to capture three types of
5Subsection 4.4.3 discusses the correlation between the diﬀerent liquidity factors.
6We use the term instrument-speciﬁc liquidity and liquidity level interchangeably.
7This point is discussed in details in the Appendix of this chapter.
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systematic liquidity risk that could impact sovereign CDS spreads. We ﬁrst start with
CDS and bond systematic liquidity risk then we discuss liquidity spiral eﬀects.
4.3.1 CDS Systematic Liquidity Risk Betas:
To accommodate the CDS market, the equation (4.1) could be rewritten in the following
way:
E(CDSt)−DefaultRisk = E(cCDSt ) + λβ2i − λβ3i − λβ4i (4.2)
Where the beta risk factors corresponding to the CDS systematic liquidity risk of each
country8 i are deﬁned as follows:
β2i =
Cov(cCDSt − Et−1(cCDSt ), cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM ))
var(rCDSM − Et−1(rCDSM )− cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM ))
(4.3)
β3i =
Cov(rCDSt , c
CDS
M − Et−1(cCDSM ))
var(rCDSM − Et−1(rCDSM )− cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM ))
(4.4)
β4i =
Cov(cCDSt − Et−1(cCDSt ), rCDSM − Et−1(rCDSM ))
var(rCDSM − Et−1(rCDSM )− cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM ))
(4.5)
where β2 is the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to market-wide liquidity
shocks; β3 the sensitivity of the return of individual CDS to market-wide liquidity
8We focus on nine emerging countries (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Philippines, Malaysia, Turkey, Chile
and Indonesia).
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shocks; and β4 the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to the CDS market
return. cCDSt is the CDS bid-ask spread. r
CDS
M and c
CDS
M correspond to CDS market
return and CDS market liquidity proxied respectively by a weekly average of CDS
changes and a weekly average of CDS bid-ask spread of the countries included in the
market portfolio which are Argentina, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Korea, Chile,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, Columbia, Venezuela, Peru, Hungary, Panama, South
Africa, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Israel, China, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Qatar, Thailand,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Australia, Lithuania, Latvia and Czech Republic9. The constructed
market portfolio10 will enable us to capture the eﬀect of systematic liquidity risk.
In order to estimate the liquidity betas deﬁned above, we ﬁrst need to construct
liquidity shocks. Since we are using weekly data, for each week and for each CDS we
ﬁlter out the persistence of liquidity by using an AR(2) process11.
cCDSt = a+ γ1c
CDS
t−1 + γ2c
CDS
t−2 + εt (4.6)
where cCDSt represents the bid-ask spreads and εt the liquidity shocks or innovations.
Throughout the analysis, the construction of the innovations will be conducted in the
same way.
As speciﬁed above, the AP model puts lot of emphasis on market liquidity, it thus
represents a suitable modeling framework for sovereign CDS spreads as they are mostly
linked to global macro factors. Our main aim is to test whether the risk premium related
to these betas is priced above the default risk and liquidity level12. The estimation of
the CDS liquidity betas is conducted over the entire sample resulting in one set of betas
for each country (Table 4.1).
9The same countries have been used in the study of Longstaﬀ et al (2010).
10Typically the construction of the hypothetical market portfolio is an issue in the CAPM framework (Roll (1977)).
11In some cases we use AR(3) to make the autocorrelation between lag 1 and 2 less than 5%.
12Since we control for default risk in the same manner as in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, in equation (4.2) we ignore β1i
because it represents the systematic default risk.
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4.3.2 Bond Systematic Liquidity Risk Betas:
There is also a large evidence that the sovereign bond market has a signiﬁcant impact
on CDS spreads. For instance, Calice, Vhen and Williams (2011) ﬁnd strong liquidity
spill-over between sovereign bond and CDS markets. Thus, similarly to the previous
section, we accommodate equation (4.1) in order to take into consideration the bond
liquidity spill-over. The main assumption is that there are market-wide liquidity shocks
that are transmitted to the sovereign CDS market. In fact, in case of default, CDS
sellers of country i can deliver all country-speciﬁc eligible bonds even if they may be
diﬀerent from the instruments that investors were initially hedging which imply that
country-speciﬁc bond liquidity could inﬂuence CDS spreads in addition to the market-
wide bond liquidity. Therefore, in this subsection, we analyse liquidity spill-over from
(1) the country-speciﬁc bond portfolio and (2) the market-wide bond portfolio.
In what follows, we extend the Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM framework deﬁned above
and explore all the potential channels through which bond liquidity could inﬂuence CDS
spread changes. In other terms, after controlling for default risk and bond liquidity level,
we examine the liquidity eﬀect of the country-speciﬁc bond portfolio (through β5i) and
of the market-wide bond portfolio (through β6i, β7i and β8i). The model is deﬁned as
follows:
E(CDSt)−DefaultRisk = E(cBondt ) + λβ5i + λβ6i + λβ7i + λβ8i (4.7)
where β5i represents the sensitivity of CDS liquidity to country-speciﬁc sovereign
bonds.
β5i =
Cov(cCDSt − Et−1(cCDSt ), cBondsL − Et−1(cBondsL ))
var(rBondsL − Et−1(rBondsL )− cBondsL − Et−1(cBondsL ))
(4.8)
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cBondsL represents the average bond bid-ask spread of the country-speciﬁc bond port-
folio. rBondsL is the average total return of the country-speciﬁc bond portfolio including
the interest payments, as well as the appreciation or depreciation in bond prices. rBondsL
is computed in the following way:
rBondsLt = r
Bonds
Lt−1 ∗
Pt +At +NCt + CPt
Pt−1 +At−1 +NCt−1
(4.9)
where Pt is the clean bond price, At is the accrued interest, NCt is the next coupon
and CPt is the value of any coupon received on time t or since time t-1.
The aim of the risk factor β5i of country i is to capture the impact of the Cheapest-
To-Deliver (CTD) option on sovereign CDS liquidity as suggested by the literature13.
If liquidity dries up in the country-speciﬁc bond market, it may cause frictions to CDS
sellers who, in case of default, have to ﬁnd a cheap and liquid bond to deliver. As we
stressed above the CTD is more valuable when the number of deliverable bonds is high,
this value should be incorporated in the CDS contract, however if the cheapest bond
is illiquid then CDS spreads should reﬂect that change. For example for the case of
Argentina and Chile we have 20 and 3 deliverable bonds respectively, this diﬀerence
have a direct implication on the value of CTD and thus CDS spreads. To estimate
the CTD eﬀect, we construct a portfolio of all active and available dollar denominated
country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds and take the average of the bid-ask spreads to proxy
for liquidity.
Moreover, the second goal of β5i is also to capture the potential liquidity spill-over
13Ammer and Cai (2007) suggest that CTD option could be an obstacle to CDS liquidity.
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coming from the bond market through hedging. In fact, if traders use mainly CDSs
for hedging purposes then any movement of bond yields either caused by default or
liquidity risk can impact CDS spreads14.
β6i, β7i and β8i introduced in equation (4.7) aim to measure the commonality in
liquidity between sovereign CDS and bond markets and are deﬁned as follows:
β6i =
Cov(cCDSt − Et−1(cCDSt ), cBondsM − Et−1(cBondsM ))
var(rBondsM − Et−1(rBondsM )− cBondsM − Et−1(cBondsM ))
(4.10)
β7i =
Cov(rCDSt , c
Bonds
M − Et−1(cBondsM ))
var(rBondsM − Et−1(rBondsM )− cBondsM − Et−1(cBondsM ))
(4.11)
β8i =
Cov(cCDSt − Et−1(cCDSt ), rBondsM − Et−1(rBondsM ))
var(rBondsM − Et−1(rBondsM )− cBondsM − Et−1(cBondsM ))
(4.12)
The betas represent the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market
liquidity (β6i), the sensitivity of CDS spreads to sovereign bond market liquidity (β7i)
and the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market return (β8i). rBondsM
corresponds to the return of the overall bond portfolio. In order to estimate rBondsM , we
utilize the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) which is the most com-
prehensive US dollar denominated emerging market debt benchmark. Included in the
index are the US dollar-denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds and traded loans issued
by sovereign and quasi sovereign entities. The countries of the EMBI index are: Ar-
14It is important to note that although the aim of this beta risk factor is to capture systematic liquidity risk coming
from the local bond market, the results could be weakened by the small number of available bonds that some of
countries have (i.e. Chile and Malaysia have only two and one traded sovereign bonds respectively).
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gentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Russia, Venezuela, Philippines, Poland, Malaysia,
Panama, Bulgaria, Nigeria, China, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Morocco, Greece, Turkey,
Hungary, Croatia, Lebanon, South Africa, Algeria, Thailand, Chile, Cote D'ivoire15. To
proxy for liquidity in the overall bond market cBondsM , we download for each country
mentioned above the bid-ask spreads of all active sovereign bonds traded in the in-
ternational market which make a total of 274 bonds and take the weekly average to
measure the overall bond liquidity. The beta estimations are conducted over the entire
sample resulting in one set of risk factors for each country (Table 4.2).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) emphasize that market liquidity is closely linked
to the level of funding available. They argue that in crisis time market illiquidity could
be reinforced by funding liquidity creating what they call a liquidity spiral. In what
follows, we discuss the issues related to the joint eﬀect of market and funding liquidity
risks and relate it to the sovereign CDS market.
4.3.3 Liquidity Spiral: The Joint Eﬀect of Market and Funding Liquidity
Risks:
In this subsection we create an uniﬁed measure that captures the joint impact of
market liquidity and funding liquidity β9t (i.e liquidity spiral) and test whether it has
an inﬂuence on the sovereign CDS spreads.
The sovereign CDS market is an ideal laboratory to test for liquidity spiral eﬀect
because it fulﬁlls all the conditions mentioned by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009):
(1) there is a high level of commonality which could intensify market liquidity shocks
(2) CDS contracts are subject to funding liquidity because trading involves collateral
agreement and thus access to funding and (3) there is large amount of speculative
trading in the CDS market.
15The number of countries included in the JPMorgan EMBI index is higher than that of the global CDS portfolio
constructed in subsection 4.3.1. As mentioned above, the construction of the hypothetical market portfolio in any CAPM
framework is typically an issue in asset pricing (Roll (1977)), therefore as long as the market portfolio is global enough,
the number of countries included in each case should not constitute a problem to our analysis.
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Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) mention that liquidity spirals could occur in crisis
time when both market and funding liquidity are low (margin spiral and loss spiral16).
Because of mutual reinforcement, the joint impact of market and funding liquidity is
larger than the sum of their separate eﬀects. Therefore, testing for each eﬀect separately
may not give us an accurate measure of the joint impact as there may be an incremental
liquidity shock not embedded neither in market liquidity nor in funding liquidity risk.
In the previous sections we extensively explained the potential eﬀects of market
liquidity coming from both sovereign CDS and bond markets. At this stage, we aim
to clarify and motivate why funding liquidity is a risk to CDS traders and establish a
link to liquidity spirals. In fact, the diﬀerent uses of CDSs will help us understand why
funding liquidity can impact CDS spreads. As we speciﬁed before, CDSs can be used
for hedging default risk, speculating and/or exploiting trading opportunities through
arbitrage. First, we start by relating the funding liquidity to arbitrage and then we
explain the link between speculation and funding needs.
Although in theory, arbitrage does not involve any risk and requires no capital, in
reality arbitrage is risky. As Bhanot and Guo (2010) and many other authors discussed,
arbitrage entails the purchase of the bond, the CDS and borrowing an amount corre-
sponding to the price of the bond. In fact, the arbitrageur cannot borrow the entire
bond price against the collateral (the bond) and typically, the lender requires a hair-
cut or a margin to protect himself against any sudden movement of the collateral. The
amount of haircut/margin required changes as it depends on the ability of the lenders to
sell the collateral in case the borrower defaults. On top of these margin requirements,
the availability of funds is also an issue to arbitrageurs because the ﬁnancing of the
trade (through the repo) is a short term ﬁnancing. Therefore, the agents are obliged to
roll-over their position in order to match the maturity of the CDS and the bond which
16Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) explain that margin spirals occur if margins are increasing in a situation where
the markets are illiquid. However, loss spirals emerge when funding shocks worsen market liquidity leading to big losses
on speculators initial positions.
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creates a roll-over risk as it is not guaranteed that the initial repo rate stays constant.
Furthermore speculation, which constitutes an important part of CDS trading activ-
ity, is also closely related to funding liquidity. Typically even though CDS contract are
swaps with zero-value at inception there are margin requirements that are imposed on
every CDS dealer. The value of this margin changes during the life of the contract and
could be very constraining if one has a large CDS position because the total margin of
all positions cannot exceed a trader's capital at any time. In their paper, Brunnermeir
and Pedersen (2009) mention that traders ﬁnance their trades through borrowings from
agents who set the margins to control their Value-at-Risk. Since agents can readjust
their margins in each period, traders or speculators bear the funding liquidity risk com-
ing from higher margins which could destabilize them and force them to delever their
positions. The authors show that in time of crisis this phenomenon can intensify as
most of traders are forced to reduce their positions which ultimately negatively impact
market liquidity.
Having emphasized the importance of funding liquidity in the CDS market, we proxy
for it using both libor spreads (diﬀerence between 3-months libor rates and 3 months T-
bills) and the general collateral repo rate (the rate at which an arbitrageur can borrow
to fund his position). Moreover, we construct a new measure β9t in order to capture a
possible co-variation of funding and market liquidity (i.e. liquidity spiral). The main
goal behind the construction of this variable is to pick up any incremental liquidity
eﬀect that could not be captured by doing a separate analysis on market and funding
liquidity risk. Equation (4.13) illustrates how we test for the signiﬁcance of the risk
premium λ speciﬁc to the (liquidity) spiral risk eﬀect.
E(CDSt)−DefaultRisk = E(cCDSt ) + λβ9t (4.13)
where
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β9t =
Cov(Liborit − Et−1(Liborit), cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM ))
var(rCDSM − Et−1(rCDSM )− cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM )
(4.14)
or
β9t =
Cov(repot − Et−1(repot), cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM ))
var(rCDSM − Et−1(rCDSM )− cCDSM − Et−1(cCDSM )
(4.15)
where Liborit and repot correpond to the proxies used to estimate funding liquidity
risk. Similarly to the other liquidity betas, rCDSM and c
CDS
M represent CDS market
return and CDS market liquidity respectively. Since the estimation of β9t is common to
all sovereign countries resulting in one beta factor, we use a 3 month rolling window to
construct a time-varying liquidity beta.
4.4 Regression Analysis and Results:
4.4.1 Data
The 5 year sovereign CDS dataset has been downloaded from Thomson Financial Datas-
tream. It spans from November 2005 to October 2010 and contains mid, bid and
ask quotes in weekly frequency. Regarding the sovereign bond data, we take bid-ask
spreads and bond returns from Thomson Financial Datastream. The bond data was
obtained for the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Russia,
Venezuela, Philippines, Poland, Malaysia, Panama, Bulgaria, Nigeria, China, Ecuador,
Peru, Colombia, Morocco, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Croatia, Lebanon, South Africa,
Algeria, Thailand, Chile, Cote D'ivoire. In order to avoid any currency mismatch, we
focus on nine emerging markets (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Philippines,
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Malaysia, Turkey, Chile and Indonesia), as their sovereign CDSs are quoted in dollar
and the main currency of the sovereign debt in emerging markets is the dollar. We
downloaded the JPMorgan EMBI from Bloomberg in weekly frequency. Concerning
the funding liquidity proxies, we downloaded the collateral repo rate and the 3 months
Libor rate from Datastream in weekly frequency. Finally, the 3 months T bills is taken
from H.15 Federal Reserve Statistical Release.
4.4.2 Empirical Methodology
As a ﬁrst step of our empirical analysis, we control for default risk and liquidity level
in our panel dataset. Peterson (2009) provides a detailed analysis on the diﬀerent type
of methodologies to use when one faces the issue of time and entity eﬀects in a panel.
The author shows that when both time and country eﬀects exist in the data then it
is preferable to address one parametrically (i.e. country dummies) and then estimate
standard errors by clustering on the other dimension (i.e. time clustering). Therefore,
we run a ﬁxed eﬀect regression by introducing dummies to control for the country eﬀect
and cluster the standard errors by time in order to obtain robust estimations. Moreover,
to control for the liquidity level we follow the approach of Tang and Yan (2007) and use
the bid-ask spreads for CDSs and bonds. In the second step, we maintain the control
on the default risk and liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk
beta factors by doing a cross-sectional regression i.e. by taking the average for each
reference entity. Since the beta risk factors are constant within each entity but change
between entities there is no time series correlation however we still have to correct for
the cross-sectional correlation. We then use the between eﬀect which is the equivalent
of running a regression by taking the means across time of each variable in the model.
The estimation of the time-varying liquidity spiral β9t is slightly diﬀerent because
we only have to control for the time-series correlation. The reason is because β9t is
similar across the studied countries (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Philippines,
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Malaysia, Turkey, Chile and Indonesia). In this situation, we also run a two-stage
regression. In the ﬁrst part, we input variables that have both cross-sectional and time-
series correlation17, then we extract the residuals and run the second stage regression
which only comprises the variables that have time-series correlation18.
It is important to note that we have 9 cross sectional units and diﬀerent liquidity
risk beta factors to estimate. Therefore in order to avoid consuming degrees of freedom
at the second stage regression, we test for the beta risk factors individually and then
evaluate the overall liquidity eﬀect by computing βinet = β
2i−β3i−β4i. The signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients would imply that systematic liquidity risk is priced above the default
risk and the liquidity level.
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics:
In this subsection, we intend to present a descriptive statistics of the data and discuss
the correlation between the diﬀerent liquidity risk betas.
Table 4.1 shows that the CDS liquidity risk factors of the country (Chile) with
the highest CDS bid-ask spreads has the highest sensitivity to the CDS market-wide
liquidity (β2i) and the highest sensitivity to the CDS market return (β4i). This suggests
that illiquid assets are the most sensitive to market liquidity.
The bond liquidity risk factors (Table 4.2) show that the country with the highest
bid-ask spread (Argentina) has the lowest sensitivity to local bond market (β5i), the
highest sensitivity to bond market return (β8i) and the highest sensitivity to bond
market liquidity (β7i). The implications of β7i and β8i are the same as above as it
seems that assets that are relatively illiquid are more sensitive to the market. The
result of β5i suggests diﬀerent interpretations. In fact, Argentina has 22 international
sovereign bonds and the low value of β5i indicates that the potential impact of the CTD
option on CDS liquidity is very weak which could be explained by the high number of
17The variables are local stocks, exchange rate, trade balance, reserve in dollar and CDS BAS.
18The variables are VIX, 5 years CMT and β9i
Libor/Repo
.
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sovereign bonds available for delivery19.
Furthermore, from Table 4.1 and 4.2, we can observe that the estimations of liq-
uidity risk betas produce very small values, this is because we are doing our analysis
with liquidity innovations rather than liquidity levels. Finally, Table 4.3 shows that
there is high correlation between liquidity risk factors and bid-ask spreads (BAS), this
reﬂects what the literature designates as commonality in liquidity. We are particularly
interested in the correlation coeﬃcients of CDS BAS with β2i , β3i and β4i and bond
BAS with β5i , β6i, β7i and β8i. For example the correlation between CDS BAS and
β2i is -0.72 and the correlation between bond BAS and β7i is 0.68. Although the high
level of correlation is interesting in itself, it creates collinearity that could complicate
the task of statistically distinguishing systematic liquidity risk and liquidity level.
4.4.4 Description of the Results: Whole Sample Period
After controlling for default risk and CDS liquidity level, our results show that CDS
liquidity factors β2i, β3i and β4i are insigniﬁcant (Table 4.4). The results suggest that
for the period covering the whole sample, CDS systematic liquidity risk is not priced in
the CDS spreads.
The ﬁndings on bond systematic liquidity risk suggest diﬀerent interpretations. In
fact, even though β5i and β6i are insigniﬁcant, β7i and β8i are highly signiﬁcant in-
creasing the R-squared of the second stage regression to 0.9 (Table 4.5). This suggests
that liquidity risk of the sovereign bond market has an important inﬂuence on sovereign
CDS spreads. The coeﬃcients of β7i and β8i show positive signs indicating that (1) the
higher the sensitivity of CDS spreads to sovereign bond market liquidity the higher the
spreads and (2) the higher the sensitivity of CDS liquidity to sovereign bond returns the
higher the spreads. The interpretations of results for β7i are intuitive because the lower
19The result on β5i is mixed for the others countries that beneﬁt from a high number of sovereign bonds such as Brazil,
Mexico and Turkey.
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the liquidity (i.e the higher the liquidity risk) in the bond market, the higher should
be the CDS spreads20 to account for higher frictions costs that dealers bear when they
implement arbitrage strategies between both markets. The positive sign of β8i indicates
that when returns are low, bonds are less attractive which could increase liquidity risk.
In the second part of the analysis, we test whether there are any CDS systematic
liquidity risk factors priced above bond liquidity level. The ﬁndings show that the only
CDS liquidity risk factor priced above bond liquidity is β3i increasing the R-squared to
0.89, this underlines the importance of systematic liquidity risk in the sovereign CDS
market.
4.4.5 Description of the Results: Comparative Analysis
In the coming subsection we split our sample in order to study the behavior of liquidity
in the pre and crisis periods. For each sample, we re-estimate the systematic liquidity
risk factors resulting in a new set of betas.
4.4.5.1 Before Crisis
We do the same analysis but we restrict our dataset to the period before 2008. We
observe that controlling for the default risk on its own produce an R-squared of 0.40
which is higher than the whole sample analysis 0.28 (Table 4.6).
Concerning CDS systematic liquidity risk, our ﬁndings suggest that only β3i is sig-
niﬁcant increasing the R-squared to 0.59 (Table 4.6). The overall eﬀect of systematic
liquidity risk βinet is highly signiﬁcant at 1% level suggesting 0.7183 R-squared
21. β3i
20High liquidity risk causes an increase in bond yields which in turn augment CDS spreads because of the one-to-one
relationship between bond yields and CDS spreads.
21 Following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), βinet represents the overall net eﬀect of CDS liquidity risk and is deﬁned
βinet = β
2i − β3i − β4i.
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shows a negative sign which seems counter-intuitive since an increase in market liq-
uidity risk should drive CDS spreads up and not decrease them as the negative sign
infers. However the overall liquidity eﬀect βinet displays a positive sign in line with our
intuition. Furthermore, our empirical result reveals that the none of the bond liquidity
risk beta factors are priced in the CDS spreads (Table 4.7).
In summary, we can conclude that the eﬀect of CDS systematic liquidity risk is
more important that previously shown (i.e. Table 4.4), however the impact of bond
liquidity risk is considerably reduced during the pre-crisis period. This suggests that
during normal conditions, CDS spreads are mostly impacted by default risk and CDS
systematic liquidity risk.
4.4.5.2 During Crisis
The control of default risk shows an R-squared of 0.2922. Among the CDS liquidity risk
factors, only β3i is signiﬁcant and the overall eﬀect of systematic liquidity risk (βinet)
is also signiﬁcant suggesting an R-squared of 0.34 which is smaller than the R-squared
0.7183 of the pre-crisis period (Table 4.8). The signs of β3i and βinet are positive and
negative respectively.
The bond liquidity risk factors show interesting results (Table 4.9). For the ﬁrst time,
β5i and β6i are signiﬁcant at 10% and 5% level respectively. These results demonstrate
that, during the crisis period, bond systematic liquidity risk has a higher impact than
the CDS systematic liquidity risk23. The signs of β5i and β6i will be discussed thoroughly
in the coming section.
22In the pre-crisis period, the control of default risk produces an R-squared of 0.4 while the R-squared of the crisis
period is only 0.29. This seems counter-intuitive because default risk and thus the R-squared should be higher during
crisis time. However, these results are in line with what we found in Chapter 5 as we provided evidence that during the
crisis there is a surge in liquidity and a decrease in pure default risk.
23We observe in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 that the R-squared of bond liquidity risk are higher than that of CDS liquidity
risk. The R-squared of βinet is 0.34.
62
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 CDS and Bond Systematic Liquidity Risk:
Our results show that for the pre-crisis period the eﬀect of bond systematic liquidity
risk is weak. However, CDS systematic liquidity risk has a signiﬁcant impact on CDS
spreads. However, during the crisis period, the eﬀect of bond systematic liquidity risk
is high and tend to dominate the eﬀect of CDS systematic liquidity risk.
The interesting part of this analysis is to observe that β5i is signiﬁcant at 10% level.
The β5i risk factor was constructed using only country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds in order
to capture liquidity coming from the local bond market. The signiﬁcance of this
risk factor reveals very important implications. Indeed, if β5i represents liquidity risk
coming from the CTD then the impact of this risk factor is compatible with the idea
that illiquidity of deliverable bonds has a direct impact on CDS spreads because CDS
dealers bear more costs or frictions to ﬁnd cheap and liquid bonds.
Intuitively, one might expect the CTD option to have greater inﬂuence on CDS
spreads when there is a higher probability that protection buyers will exercise it and
this is what we observe in our results as we show that during crisis period CTD has more
inﬂuence on CDS spreads. This reveals that the CTD option is an increasing function
of the probability of default because CDS sellers would not worry about which bonds
they might have to deliver unless there is a high probability of default. Furthermore,
the results for β5i are consistent with Ammer and Cai (2007) who present a variety of
evidence showing that CTD option aﬀects CDS spreads and that its value is increasing
with the probability of a default event24.
On the other hand, the impact of β5i on CDS spreads can also be interpreted in a
diﬀerent way. Typically in crisis time, higher probability of default may create a panic
in ﬁnancial markets which pushes CDS dealers to trade CDS contracts more for hedging
than for speculation or arbitrage purposes. If the majority of users are hedgers then
24We believe that the weak level of signiﬁcance of β5i due to the low number of deliverable bonds. In fact, the impact
of the CTD option might be more important for countries that beneﬁt from a high number of deliverable bonds but less
obvious to detect for sovereigns that issued few bonds.
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CDS spreads should follow closely bond yields spreads whether the yields are driven by
default or liquidity risk and this might also explain the signiﬁcance of β5i.
Furthermore, β5i has a positive coeﬃcient, in other words the higher the sensitivity
of CDS liquidity to the country-speciﬁc bond market the higher the CDS spreads. This
result is intuitive because CTD option introduces an additional source of uncertainty
that negatively aﬀects the CDS contract and thus increases the spreads25.
4.5.2 Liquidity Spiral Eﬀect:
The results in Table 4.10 show that CDS spreads are not aﬀected by β9t for the pre and
crisis periods. These ﬁndings suggest that even though in theory traders face a liquidity
spiral eﬀect, it does not carry any risk premium. In fact this could be intuitive during
the pre-crisis period because liquidity issues may be more relevant during crisis time.
However, for the period including the crisis, the results are counter-intuitive and this
requires some clariﬁcation.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) mention two types of liquidity spirals: margin and
loss spiral. A margin spiral occurs if margins are increasing when markets are illiquid.
If margins increase in liquid markets, it is relatively easy for speculators to refund
themselves; however in a situation where liquidity is low, an increase in margins harms
speculators ability to ﬁnance their positions which in turn lowers market liquidity. This
scenario is likely to happen in the CDS market. However, the inﬂuence of the loss spiral
on CDS spreads is less obvious. A loss spiral occurs if an increase in market liquidity
triggers losses in speculators existing positions which worsen their funding problems
forcing them to sell-oﬀ their assets. The selling-oﬀ decreases asset prices and creates
even more losses to speculators. Even though this scenario is possible for assets such
as equity or bonds, it may be not be similar for CDSs. Indeed, if a loss spiral happens
25Dealers face additional uncertainty because they do not know which of the sovereign bonds will be liquid enough for
delivery, especially in crisis time when the sovereign bond market experiences a ﬂight-to-liquidity episode. In line with
this, β6i which speciﬁcally characterizes this phenomenon of ﬂight-to-liquidity as it captures the impact of the overall
bond liquidity on CDS spreads, has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on CDS spreads.
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during crisis time and dealers sell CDSs to get their premium in order to increase their
funding capability then the selling-oﬀ would not necessary drop CDS spreads because
market participants would still want to hedge their default risk by buying protections.
Thus the demand and supply in the CDS market would be more stable (Figure 4.2).
This might present an explanation as to why the liquidity spiral has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on CDS spreads.
4.5.3 Summary:
Our main ﬁnding is that, during the pre-crisis period, the risk premium priced above
the default risk and liquidity level is mainly driven by CDS systematic liquidity risk
(Table 4.6). The reason we present is in times of low uncertainty, dealers use CDSs
more for speculation than for hedging and since speculation is not directly related to
the reference entity or the underlying asset, it weakens the inﬂuence of the bond market
(Table 4.7). However in times of crisis, high default probability increases signiﬁcantly
global risk aversion which induces sovereign investors to hedge their bond positions
hence the tightening of the relationship between CDS and bond markets. Therefore,
bond systematic liquidity risk becomes the main driver of the risk premium priced above
the default risk and liquidity level (Table 4.9).
In order to support our results we create a measure to assess speculators ability
to trade before and during the crisis period. As previously mentioned, CDS trading
requires a collateral agreement from both sides of the trade and therefore dealers need
access to funding. Therefore, there is one-to-one relationship between speculation and
access to funds because the incentive to trade as a speculator is largely dependent on
capital availability. In what follows, we attempt to construct a measure that should
capture speculators ability to access funding.
Speculation is largely dependent on the available funds which in turn depend on past
returns (Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2008)). Therefore, in order to test for speculation
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eﬀect, we construct a hedge fund return index26 (HFRI). The index is an average of
the following indices: Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income-Corporate Index, Relative
value Index, Fixed-Income Asset Backed Index and Fixed-Income Convertible Arbitrage
Index27. All the indices are downloaded from Hedge Fund Research28 website in monthly
basis and we use linear interpolation to lower the frequency and match the weekly data.
The HFRI will be used as a measure to test for capital access and indirectly as a proxy
for speculation eﬀect.
As a ﬁrst step, we control for default risk and liquidity levels and regress CDS changes
on the HFRI. The results prior and during the crisis are reported in Table 4.11.
It seems that, prior to the crisis, access to capital does not seem to impact CDS
changes, namely in quiet times market volatility would not harm speculators capital.
However, the crisis period reveals that HFRI is highly signiﬁcant and shows a negative
sign. The negative sign indicates that negative hedge fund return or lower access to
capital increases CDS spreads. If, as our results suggest, hedge funds have lower access
to capital during crisis time, they are then less inclined to buy CDS protections29 which
lowers liquidity for protection buyers until a new equilibrium is reached and this is what
we observe in Figure 4.2 as we see a narrowing of bid-ask spreads during the crisis30.
In the pre-crisis period, HFRI is insigniﬁcant this indicates that, in less volatile
market conditions, access to capital is relatively easy. Therefore margin calls31are not
26According to Bank of America estimate reported by Duﬃe (2008), banks and hedge funds are the largest market
participants with 33%, 31% (39%, 28%) of the buy (sell) side of CDS trading activities. Recent papers study the use of
CDSs by banks. Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) use data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding
Company database (BHC) in order to analyze CDS positions. The authors ﬁnd that CDS trading is concentrated among
large banks and that CDSs were mostly used for trading than for hedging purposes. Van Ofwegen et al (2010) analyze the
relation between the probability of default of E.U banks and the use of credit derivatives and ﬁnd that these instruments
tend to inﬂate default risk which may not be consistent with hedging motives. On the other hand, Hirtle (2009) provide
evidence that commercial banks are net buyers of credit protection suggesting that banks may be hedging. Since there
is no clear consensus in the literature on the main goals behind the use of CDSs by banks, we assume that the majority
of trades that banks do are on behalf of their clients (i.e to hedge client positions) and that hedge funds are the main
speculators as they face little regulation. Therefore, we utilise the hedge fund return index to proxy for the hedge fund
access to capital.
27The deﬁnition of the indices are provided in Hedge Fund Research website: http://www.hedgefundresearch.com/.
28By using the deﬁnitions in the Hedge Fund Research website, we focus on indices that are likely to capture speculation
and arbitrage in the ﬁxed income and equity markets. This leaves us with Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income-
Corporate Index, Relative value Index, Fixed-Income Asset Backed Index and Fixed-Income Convertible Arbitrage
Index.
29Bank of America study (2007) reports that hedge funds are net CDS protection buyers.
30This is also suggest that wide bid-ask spread may be due to an excess of CDS buyers in the market.
31According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), there is one-to-one relationship between volatility and margin
requirements. A surge in market volatility increases margin calls harming speculators' ability to trade.
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constraining which may encourage speculators to buy protections which in turn lead to
an excess of supply of CDS protection buyers. The surplus of protection buyers widens
the bid-ask spreads as we can observe in Figure 4.2.
In summary, our results lead to two conclusions (1) speculation may impede sovereign
CDS liquidity since the excess of protection buyers disturbs the balance of supply and
demand and therefore widens the bid-ask spreads (2) funding liquidity risk (i.e. capital
availability) has an eﬀect on CDS spreads but seems to be more predominant in crisis
time.
4.6 Conclusion
We present an empirical analysis where we investigate the eﬀect of systematic liquidity
risk on sovereign credit default swap spreads. We focus on the aspect of liquidity that
is caused by the correlation of ﬂuctuations of liquidity measures across assets. These
common ﬂuctuations are more likely to impact assets characterized by commonality.
Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to investigate whether systematic liquidity
risk aﬀects CDS spread movements.
By applying the Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM framework of Acharya and Pedersen
(2005), we ﬁnd that, before the crisis, the risk premium priced above the default risk and
liquidity level is mainly driven by CDS systematic liquidity risk. The reason we present
is in times of low uncertainty, dealers use CDSs more for speculation than for hedging
and since speculation is not directly related to the reference entity or the underlying
asset, it weakens the inﬂuence of the bond market. However in times of crisis, high
default probability increases signiﬁcantly global risk aversion which induces sovereign
investors to hedge their bond positions; hence the tightening of the relationship between
CDS and bond markets. Therefore, bond systematic liquidity risk becomes the main
driver of the risk premium priced above the default risk and liquidity level.
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Furthermore, we provide evidence that the joint impact of market and funding liq-
uidity risks (i.e. liquidity spiral) have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on CDS spreads. Finally,
our results imply that speculation may participate to the widening of bid-ask spreads
and that funding liquidity risk is more constraining during crisis time.
In summary, our study provides empirical evidence that market or systematic liq-
uidity risk is a priced state variable. Thus, further research would be warranted to
understand the pricing implications of the systematic liquidity risk in a CDS pricing
model. In the next chapter, we extend the reduced-form model of Buhler and Trapp
(2010) and investigate its tractability.
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4.7 Appendix CDS Returns:
The CAPM framework involves a direct use of the excess return as the main dependent
variable. CDS contracts do not have initial costs at the inception, therefore the concept
of percentage returns is not well deﬁned. In our study we chose to proxy returns with
CDS changes.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no consensus in the literature on how to deﬁne
CDS returns. In one of the few papers that tackle this issue, Berndt and Obreja (2009)
extract CDS returns using a CDS pricing model. In what follows, we ﬁrst replicate their
methodology and then explain the reasons why we chose to not adopt their approach
to estimate CDS returns.
Berndt and Obreja (2009) advance the idea that over a short term interval the change
in value of a CDS contract is equal to minus the CDS changes multiplied by the value
of T-year annuity A(T ).
4VCDS = −4CDS ∗A(T ) (4.16)
where 4VCDS represents the change in value of the CDS contract and A(T ) is the
annuity deﬁned as:
A(T ) =
1
2
2T∑
j=1
r(j/2).q(j/2) (4.17)
r(j/2) and q(j/2) represent the risk-free discount factor and the risk-neutral survival
probability respectively. Both variables are divided by two in order to account for the
semi-annual payment. In order to proxy for the risk-free discount rate, we use a cubic
spline algorithm to bootstrap, from the Treasury Constant Maturity Curve, the values
of the zero-coupon bonds. To estimate q(j/2), we assume a constant risk neutral default
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intensity λ which lead to a survival probability equal to:
q(j/2) = e−λ/2 (4.18)
In line with Berndt and Obreja (2009), we compute the default intensity λ directly
from CDS spreads by using a discrete-time approximation of the CDS pricing formula
deﬁned as follows:
CDS ∗A(T ) = L ∗ 1
2
2T∑
j=1
r(j/2)[q(j − 1/2)− q(j/2)] (4.19)
L = 1 − Recovery and is the risk neutral loss rate in the event of default. The left
hand side of the equation represents the value of the protection-buyer leg and the right
hand side the value of the protection seller at the initiation of the contract. Rearranging
equation (4.19) we can infer the default intensity CDS/2 = L(eλ/2− 1) which leads to:
λ = 2 ∗ log(1 + CDS
2 ∗ L ) (4.20)
Plugging back equation (4.20) into (4.18) and assuming a value for the recovery
rate, we can estimate CDS returns. For corporate CDSs, the standard approach is to
assume 40% recovery, however for the case of sovereigns there is no consensus on the
recovery rate. A recent research by Credit Suisse (2010)32 reports the recovery values33
in some recent defaults. The report shows that recovery values of sovereign defaults
can be extremely variable (from 5 to 95 %). The average of these recoveries is 39%,
however the standard deviation is quite high reaching 26%; this in fact implies that
each sovereign default requires to be considered on its own. In any case, we follow Pan
and Singleton (2008) and set L = 75% which gives a recovery value of 25%.
32Credit Suisse (2010): Sovereign CDS Primer
33The recovery value is the market price as a % of nominal of the bonds just after default has occurred.
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In Figure 4.1, we plot our estimation of CDS returns (i.e. equation 4.16) and com-
pare it to CDS changes (i.e. CDS(t)-CDS(t-1)). We can see that the behavior of
CDS returns is very diﬀerent from CDS changes especially for the period coming after
September/October 2008. The magnitude of the Y-axis on both graphs is also dis-
similar. In fact, these results raise many questions about the validity of CDS returns
extracted from a pricing model as return values can be heavily inﬂuenced by the as-
sumption made on the recovery rate. Moreover, in order to compare CDS changes and
returns under the same Y axis, we take the CDS log changes (i.e. log(CDS(t)/CDS(t-
1))) and compare them to CDS returns. Figure 4.1 shows that the discrepancy is still
present between both measures.
We mentioned above the issue of recovery rate, however there is also another dif-
ﬁculty that could arise during the estimation of default intensity λ. When following
the approach of Berndt and Obreja (2009), we assumed a constant risk neutral default
intensity, this assumption goes against the ﬁndings of Pan and Singleton (2008) that
show the one-factor log-normal stochastic process captures quite well the behavior of the
default intensity of sovereign CDS spreads. Therefore, by assuming constant intensity
λ, we take the risk of not capturing default risk dynamics.
In summary, the uncertainty around the inputs of a CDS pricing model can heavily
inﬂuence the estimation of CDS returns. Therefore in order to avoid any complication,
we use CDS changes as a proxy for CDS returns.
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Figures:
Figure 4.1: Time Series Plot of CDS Changes (Top), CDS Returns (Middle) and CDS Log
Changes (Bottom)
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Figure 4.2: Time Series Plot of Bid-Ask Spreads (in bps)
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Tables
Table 4.1: CDS Liquidity Risk Values
The table shows the values of CDS liquidity betas. The estimation of liquidity risk is conducted over
the entire sample resulting in one set of betas for each country i. The table shows small values, this
is because we are doing the analysis with liquidity innovations rather than liquidity levels. BAS is
the average bid-ask spreads. β2i is the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to market-wide
liquidity shocks, β3i the sensitivity of the return of individual CDS to market-wide liquidity shocks
and β4i the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to the market return.
BAS β2i (10^-6) β3i(10^-4) β4i(10^-5)
Chile -0.22 1.09 2.25 13
Malaysia -0.09 0.27 2.18 -7.9
Korea -0.08 0.42 3.59 1.43
Mexico -0.04 -0.09 2.61 0.725
Indonesia -0.04 0.17 3.43 0.7
Philippines -0.03 0.1 0.87 -5.5
Argentina -0.029 -0.0054 29 10.3
Brazil -0.026 0.02 0.72 -0.93
Turkey -0.029 0.1 2.47 -7.33
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Table 4.2: Bond Liquidity Risk Values
The table shows the values of bond liquidity betas. The estimation of liquidity risk is conducted
over the entire sample resulting in one set of betas for each country i. The table shows small values,
this is because we are doing the analysis with liquidity innovations rather than liquidity levels. BAS
represents the average bid ask spreads of the dollar denominated sovereign bonds available for each
country and > is the total number of sovereign bonds per country. β5i represents the sensitivity of the
liquidity of sovereign CDS to country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds. β6i is the sensitivity of CDS liquidity
risk to sovereign bond market liquidity, β7i the sensitivity of CDS spreads to sovereign bond market
liquidity and β8i the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market return.
> BAS β5i(10^-5) β6i(10^-6) β7i(10^-2) β8i(10^-5)
Malaysia 1 0.43 3.7 -4.2 0.026 13
Chile 3 0.55 72 7.5 0.03 21
Korea 5 0.60 13 -4.9 0.037 5.01
Philippines 20 0.65 -7.0 -3.7 0.019 -9.2
Mexico 18 0.65 5.2 -0.12 0.045 8.4
Indonesia 11 0.78 -73 -13 0.033 14
Turkey 18 0.80 -11 -3.1 0.012 -5.4
Brazil 24 0.88 -1.9 -0.48 0.03 1.18
Argentina 22 2.31 1.8e^-3 -6.04 0.71 46
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Table 4.3: Correlation of Liquidity Risk Factors
The table shows the average correlation coeﬃcients between CDS bid-ask spread, bond bid-ask spread,
CDS liquidity risk and bond liquidity risk for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Philippines, Malaysia,
Korea, Indonesia and Turkey. The correlation coeﬃcients demonstrate the high level of commonality
in liquidity. BAS is the average bid-ask spreads. β2i is the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS
to market-wide liquidity shocks, β3i the sensitivity of the return of individual CDS to market-wide
liquidity shocks and β4i the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to the market return. β5i
represents the sensitivity of the liquidity of sovereign CDS to country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds. β6i
is the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market liquidity, β7i the sensitivity of CDS
spreads to sovereign bond market liquidity and β8i the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign
bond market return.
CDS BAS β2i β3i β4i Bond BAS β5i β6i β7i β8i
CDS BAS 1 -0.72 0.15 -0.40 0.18 -0.56 -0.48 0.15 -0.17
β2i -0.72 1 -0.22 0.49 -0.24 0.66 0.53 -0.25 0.14
β3i 0.14 -0.22 1 0.52 0.67 -0.02 -0.22 0.99 0.84
β4i -0.40 0.49 0.52 1 0.32 0.46 0.33 0.52 0.74
Bond BAS 0.18 -0.24 0.67 0.33 1 -0.08 -0.17 0.68 0.51
β5i -0.56 0.66 -0.02 0.46 -0.08 1 0.91 0.001 0.15
β6i -0.48 0.53 -0.22 0.33 -0.17 0.91 1 -0.18 -0.05
β7i 0.15 -0.25 0.99 0.52 0.68 1 0.001 -0.18 1 0.83
β8i -0.17 0.14 0.84 0.74 0.51 0.15 -0.05 0.82 1
76
Table 4.4: CDS Liquidity Risk Proxied by Betas Factors: Whole Sample Period
We regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity risk proxies.
In our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the
table) and cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables: local
stocks, exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT, for the liquidity
level we utilise the CDS BAS. In the second stage regression, we maintain the control on the default risk
and liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk factors by doing a cross-sectional
regression i.e by taking the average for each reference entity. R2and R2• represent the R-squared of the
ﬁrst and the second stage regressions respectively. β2i is the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual
CDS to market-wide liquidity shocks, β3i the sensitivity of the return of individual CDS to market-wide
liquidity shocks and β4i the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to the market return. βinet
is deﬁned as β2i-β3i-β4i. '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
CDS Liquidity risk Proxied by:
β2i β3i β4i βinet
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 1.44 0.17 1.44 0.17 1.44 0.17 1.44 0.17
Local Stocks -2.21 -1.19 -2.21 -1.19 -2.21 -1.19 -2.21 -1.19
Exchange rate 0.172 0.4 0.172 0.4 0.172 0.4 0.172 0.4
Reserve in Dollar -5e^-3 -0.24 -5e^-3 -0.24 -5e^-3 -0.24 -5e^-3 -0.24
Trade Balance -7e^-4 -0.11 -7e^-4 -0.11 -7e^-4 -0.11 -7e^-4 -0.11
US VIX 1.18 1.80 1.18 1.80 1.18 1.80 1.18 1.80
CMT 5 years -27.6 -0.98 -27.6 -0.98 -27.6 -0.98 -27.6 -0.98
CDS Liquidity level -21.86 -0.9 -21.86 -0.9 -21.86 -0.9 -21.86 -0.9
CDS Liquidity Risk 0.029 0.61 9.59e^-6 0.49 2.6e^-4 1.18 -1.04e^-5 -0.56
N 2278 2278 2278 2278
Clusters 256 256 256 256
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
R2• 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.04
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Table 4.5: Bond Liquidity Risk Proxied by Betas Factors: Whole sample
We regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity risk proxies.
In our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in
the table) and cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables:
local stocks, exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT, for the
liquidity level we utilise the bond BAS. In the second stage regression, we maintain the control on
the default risk and liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk factors by doing
a cross-sectional regression i.e by taking the average for each reference entity. R2and R2• represent
the R-squared of the ﬁrst and the second stage regressions respectively. β5i represents the sensitivity
of the liquidity of sovereign CDS to country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds. β6i is the sensitivity of CDS
liquidity risk to sovereign bond market liquidity, β7i the sensitivity of CDS spreads to sovereign bond
market liquidity and β8i the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market return. '∗', '∗∗'
and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond Liquidity risk Proxied by:
β5i β6i β7i β8i
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 22.45 1.16 22.45 1.16 22.45 1.16 22.45 1.16
Local Stocks -2.26 -1.22 -2.26 -1.22 -2.26 -1.22 -2.26 -1.22
Exchange rate 0.12 0.3 0.12 0.3 0.12 0.3 0.12 0.3
Reserve in Dollar -1.8e^-3 -0.10 -1.8e^-3 -0.10 -1.8e^-3 -0.10 -1.8e^-3 -0.10
Trade Balance -6.9e^-4 -0.10 -6.9e^-4 -0.10 -6.9e^-4 -0.10 -6.9e^-4 -0.10
US VIX 1.17 1.75 1.17 1.75 1.17 1.75 1.17 1.75
CMT 5 years -28.64 -1.03 -28.64 -1.03 -28.64 -1.03 -28.64 -1.03
Bond Liquidity level -8.83 -1.18 -8.83 -1.18 -8.83 -1.18 -8.83 -1.18
Bond Liquidity Risk 3.15e^-5 0.806 -2.3e^3 -0.32 5.09e^-7 8∗ 5.43e^-4 2.56∗∗
N 2278 2278 2278 2278
Clusters 256 256 256 256
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
R2• 0.00 0.01 0.901 0.48
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Table 4.6: CDS Liquidity Risk Proxied by Betas Factors: Before Crisis
In this table, we restrict our analysis to the pre-crisis period from November 2005 to Mars 2008. We
regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity risk proxies. In
our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the
table) and cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables: local
stocks, exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT, for the liquidity
level we utilise the CDS BAS. In the second stage regression, we maintain the control on the default risk
and liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk factors by doing a cross-sectional
regression i.e by taking the average for each reference entity. R2and R2• represent the R-squared of the
ﬁrst and the second stage regressions respectively. β2i is the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual
CDS to market-wide liquidity shocks, β3i the sensitivity of the return of individual CDS to market-wide
liquidity shocks and β4i the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to the market return. βinet
is deﬁned as β2i-β3i-β4i. '∗','∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
CDS Liquidity risk Proxied by:
β2i β3i β4i βinet
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 0.64 0.26 0.64 0.26 0.64 0.26 0.64 0.26
Local Stocks -0.72 -1.39 -0.72 -1.39 -0.72 -1.39 -0.72 -1.39
Exchange rate -0.32 -2.88 -0.32 -2.88 -0.32 -2.88 -0.32 -2.88
Reserve in Dollar 0.017 0.80 0.017 0.80 0.017 0.80 0.017 0.80
Trade Balance -0.006 -0.82 -0.006 -0.82 -0.006 -0.82 -0.006 -0.82
US VIX -0.26 -1.42 -0.26 -1.42 -0.26 -1.42 -0.26 -1.42
CMT 5 years 6.30 0.88 6.30 0.88 6.30 0.88 6.30 0.88
CDS Liquidity level -2.89 -0.43 -2.89 -0.43 -2.89 -0.43 -2.89 -0.43
CDS Liquidity Risk 9.26e^-6 0.01 -1.61e^-5 -3.22∗∗ -1.97e^-5 -0.72 1.77e^-5 4.23∗
N 1053 1053 1053 1053
Clusters 117 117 117 117
R2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
R2• 0.0 0.596 0.07 0.7183
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Table 4.7: Bond Liquidity Risk Proxied by Betas Factors: Before Crisis
In this table, we restrict our analysis to the pre-crisis period from November 2005 to Mars 2008. We
regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity risk proxies. In
our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the
table) and cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables:
local stocks, exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT, for the
liquidity level we utilise the bond BAS. In the second stage regression, we maintain the control on the
default risk and liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk factors by doing a
cross-sectional regression i.e by taking the average for each reference entity. R2and R2• represent the
R-squared of the ﬁrst and the second stage regressions respectively.β5i represents the sensitivity of the
liquidity of sovereign CDS to country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds. β6i is the sensitivity of CDS liquidity
risk to sovereign bond market liquidity, β7i the sensitivity of CDS spreads to sovereign bond market
liquidity and β8i the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market return. '∗', '∗∗' and
'∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond Liquidity risk Proxied by:
β5i β6i β7i β8i
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 3.04 0.35 3.04 0.35 3.04 0.35 3.04 0.35
Local Stocks -0.72 -1.4 -0.72 -1.4 -0.72 -1.4 -0.72 -1.4
Exchange rate -0.32 -2.88 -0.32 -2.88 -0.32 -2.88 -0.32 -2.88
Reserve in Dollar 0.018 0.85 0.018 0.85 0.018 0.85 0.018 0.85
Trade Balance -6.8e^-3 -0.81 -6.8e^-3 -0.81 -6.8e^-3 -0.81 -6.8e^-3 -0.81
US VIX -0.26 -1.41 -0.26 -1.41 -0.26 -1.41 -0.26 -1.41
CMT 5 years 6.22 0.86 6.22 0.86 6.22 0.86 6.22 0.86
Bond Liquidity level -1.10 -0.31 -1.10 -0.31 -1.10 -0.31 -1.10 -0.31
Bond Liquidity Risk -9.07e^-7 -0.08 -3.8e^-4 -1.36 -7.24e^-7 -1.48 -5.43e^-6 -0.63
N 1053 1053 1053 1053
Clusters 117 117 117 117
R2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
R2• 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.053
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Table 4.8: CDS Liquidity Risk Proxied by Betas Factors: During Crisis
In this table, we restrict our analysis to the crisis period from April 2008 to October 2010. We regress
CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity risk proxies. In our panel
model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the table) and
cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables: local stocks,
exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT, for the liquidity level we
utilise the CDS BAS. In the second stage regression, we maintain the control on the default risk and
liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk factors by doing a cross-sectional
regression i.e by taking the average for each reference entity. R2and R2• represent the R-squared of
the ﬁrst and the second stage regressions respectively.β2i is the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual
CDS to market-wide liquidity shocks, β3i the sensitivity of the return of individual CDS to market-wide
liquidity shocks and β4i the sensitivity of the liquidity of individual CDS to the market return. βinet
is deﬁned as β2i-β3i-β4i. '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
CDS Liquidity risk Proxied by:
β2i β3i β4i βinet
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 1.18 0.08 1.18 0.08 1.18 0.08 1.18 0.08
Local Stocks -3.38 -1 -3.38 -1 -3.38 -1 -3.38 -1
Exchange rate 0.39 0.62 0.39 0.62 0.39 0.62 0.39 0.62
Reserve in Dollar -0.045 -0.48 -0.045 -0.48 -0.045 -0.48 -0.045 -0.48
Trade Balance 0.002 0.28 0.002 0.28 0.002 0.28 0.002 0.28
US VIX 1.48 1.88 1.48 1.88 1.48 1.88 1.48 1.88
CMT 5 years -36.9 -1.2 -36.9 -1.2 -36.9 -1.2 -36.9 -1.2
CDS Liquidity level -115.9 -1.33 -115.9 -1.33 -115.9 -1.33 -115.9 -1.33
CDS Liquidity Risk -1.75 -1.06 -1.3e^-3 -4.78∗ 8.2e^-4 1.17 9.6e^-4 1.94∗∗∗
N 1229 1229 1229 1229
Clusters 139 139 139 139
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
R2• 0.13 0.76 0.16 0.34
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Table 4.9: Bond Liquidity Risk Proxied by Betas Factors: During Crisis
In this table, we restrict our analysis to the pre-crisis period from April 2008 to October 2010. We
regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity risk proxies. In
our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the
table) and cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we use 6 variables:
local stocks, exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years CMT, for the
liquidity level we utilise the bond BAS. In the second stage regression, we maintain the control on the
default risk and liquidity level and regress the residuals against the liquidity risk factors by doing a
cross-sectional regression i.e by taking the average for each reference entity. R2and R2• represent the
R-squared of the ﬁrst and the second stage regressions respectively.β5i represents the sensitivity of the
liquidity of sovereign CDS to country-speciﬁc sovereign bonds. β6i is the sensitivity of CDS liquidity
risk to sovereign bond market liquidity, β7i the sensitivity of CDS spreads to sovereign bond market
liquidity and β8i the sensitivity of CDS liquidity risk to sovereign bond market return. '∗', '∗∗' and
'∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Bond Liquidity risk Proxied by:
β5i β6i β7i β8i
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const 30.27 1.1 30.27 1.1 30.27 1.1 30.27 1.1
Local Stocks -3.5 -1.05 -3.5 -1.05 -3.5 -1.05 -3.5 -1.05
Exchange rate 0.31 0.53 0.31 0.53 0.31 0.53 0.31 0.53
Reserve in Dollar -0.069 -0.66 -0.069 -0.66 -0.069 -0.66 -0.069 -0.66
Trade Balance 1.5e^-3 0.17 1.5e^-3 0.17 1.5e^-3 0.17 1.5e^-3 0.17
US VIX 1.45 1.79 1.45 1.79 1.45 1.79 1.45 1.79
CMT 5 years -31.71 -1.05 -31.71 -1.05 -31.71 -1.05 -31.71 -1.05
Bond Liquidity level -9.73 -1.18 -9.73 -1.18 -9.73 -1.18 -9.73 -1.18
Bond Liquidity Risk 1.5e^-4 1.99∗∗∗ 8.9e^-3 2.58∗∗ -1.3e^-7 -0.92 -2.5e^-5 -0.16
N 1229 1229 1229 1229
Clusters 139 139 139 139
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
R2• 0.36 0.49 0.10 0.00
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`Table 4.10: Liquidity Spiral Eﬀect
We regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and liquidity spiral proxies.
In our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-not shown in the
table) and cluster the standard errors by time. Since our liquidity spiral proxy is ﬁxed across countries
by changes within each country, we only have to control for the time-series correlation. In this situation,
we also run a two-stage regression. In the ﬁrst part, we regress CDS spread changes against variables
that have both cross-sectional and time-series correlations (local stocks, exchange rate, trade balance,
reserves in dollar and CDS BAS), then we extract the residuals and run the second stage regression
which only comprises the variables that have time-series correlation (VIX, 5 yeas CMT and β9Libor or
β9Repo). β
9+
Libor (or β
9+
Repo) represents the proxy for the liquidity spiral eﬀect for the pre-crisis period
and β9++Libor (or β
9++
Repo) for the crisis period. '
∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance
level respectively. R2• represents the R-squared of the second stage regression.
Liquidity Spiral Eﬀect Proxied by:
β9+Libor β
9+
Repo β
9++
Libor β
9++
Repo
Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t
Const -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -1.77 -0.38 -1.77 -0.38
Local Stocks -0.75 -1.43 -0.75 -1.43 -3.52 -1.04 -3.52 -1.04
Exchange rate -0.32 -2.92 -0.32 -2.92 0.33 0.54 0.33 0.54
Reserve in Dollar -2.2e^-3 0.21 -2.2e^-3 0.21 5e^-3 0.27 5e^-3 0.27
Trade Balance -1.4e^-3 -0.28 -1.4e^-3 -0.28 3e^-3 0.27 3e^-3 0.27
US VIX -0.18 -1.15 -0.18 -1.15 0.76 2.02 0.77 2.03
CMT 5 years 2.52 0.59 2.53 0.59 -16.8 -1.14 -16.8 -1.14
CDS Liquidity level -2.43 -0.67 -2.43 -0.67 -39.4 -1.18 -39.4 -1.18
Funding Liquidity Risk -1.7e^-3 -0.13 -7e^-4 -0.07 -0.029 -0.09 -0.34 -0.19
N 1053 1053 1229 1229
Clusters 117 117 139 139
R2• 0.39 0.39 0.28 0.28
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Table 4.11: Speculation Eﬀect
We regress CDS spread changes against default risk, liquidity level controls and the Hedge Fund Return
Index (HFRI). In our panel model, we address country eﬀect parametrically (i.e. by using dummies-
not shown in the table) and cluster the standard errors by time. To control for the default risk we
use 6 variables: local stocks, exchange rate, reserves in dollar, trade balance, VIX and the 5 years
CMT, for the liquidity level we utilise the CDS bid-ask spreads (BAS). HFRI+ represents a proxy
for the speculation eﬀect for the pre-crisis period and HFRI++ for the crisis period. '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗'
represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively. R2• represents the R-squared of the second
stage regression.
Speculation Proxied by:
HFRI+ HFRI++
Coef t Coef t
Const 0.38 0.32 -0.77 -0.15
Local Stocks -0.60 -1.69 -3.95 -2.39
Exchange rate -0.65 -6.52 -1.47 -4.24
Reserve in Dollar 6.5e^-3 0.51 5.3e^-3 0.14
Trade Balance -2.8e^-3 -0.92 4.5e^-3 0.36
US VIX -0.57 -2.94 2.01 4.63
CMT 5 years -25.36 -4.79 -35.4 -2.10
CDS Liquidity level -0.97 -0.20 -27.58 -0.5
HFRI -1.18 -1.49 -3.70 -3.33∗
1053 1029
N
Clusters 117 139
R2• 0.39 0.31
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Chapter 5
Do Sovereign Credit Default Swaps
Represent a Clean Measure of
Sovereign Default Risk? A Factor
Model Approach
5.1 Introduction:
The objective of this chapter is to quantify the size of the liquidity component in the
sovereign CDS spreads by utilising a CDS pricing model and to provide a detailed
decomposition of the spreads by using information from both CDS and bond markets.
In fact, few papers tried to decompose sovereign CDS spreads in order to isolate the
default risk from the risk premium. Longstaﬀ et al (2011) found that a third of the
sovereign CDS spreads is attributable to the distress risk premium. Remonola et al
(2008) show that jump-at-default risk is priced in the sovereign CDS spreads without
quantifying its magnitude. In the bond literature there are papers that study credit and
liquidity eﬀects on sovereign bond yields such as Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003),
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004), Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009), Favero,
Pagano and Thadden (2010), Schwarz (2010) and Monfort and Renne (2011). All
these papers agree that liquidity is present in sovereign bond yields. We diﬀer from
the previous studies by using information from both CDS and bond markets to do our
decomposition because both assets are driven by the same default risk and their liquidity
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are highly correlated (Pu (2010) and Calice, Vhen and Williams (2011)). In fact, by
jointly calibrating the model to both CDS and bond data we are able to use a large
amount of information on sovereign default risk and thus present a better decomposition
and estimate the components more precisely.
In order to carry out this analysis, we extend the factor model of Buhler and Trapp
(2010)-BT thereafter. BT framework is a reduced-form credit risk model that contains
credit risk and liquidity eﬀects of both CDS and bond spreads. It allows us to jointly
estimate default risk using information from both bond and CDS markets and measure
the correlation components between default risk and liquidity. Favero, Pagano and
Thadden (2010) argue that an estimation that ignores the interaction eﬀect between
the aggregate default risk and liquidity may underestimate the impact of liquidity on
prices. The fact that our model enables us to estimate the correlation parameters
between default risk and other risk premium is one of the key diﬀerences between our
study and that of Longstaﬀ et al (2011) and Remonola et al (2008).
Our results reveal that default risk represents on average 73% of the bond spreads,
liquidity 26.86% and correlation risk 0.0014 %. On the CDS side we ﬁnd that, on
average, default risk account for 55.6% of the spreads, liquidity for 44.32% and correla-
tion risk for 0.043%. Our ﬁndings reveal that sovereign CDS spreads are highly driven
by liquidity and that sovereign bond spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions and
therefore could represent a better proxy for sovereign default risk. Secondly, we show
empirically that ﬂight-to-liquidity and systematic liquidity play a non-negligible role
and contributes to both sovereign bond and CDS spread movements. Finally, our
decomposition exercise puts forward the idea that the increase in the CDS spreads ob-
served during the crisis period was mainly due to a surge in liquidity rather than to an
increase in the default intensity.
Our paper has important implications for practitioners and policy makers and en-
hances our understanding of the main drivers of sovereign bonds and most importantly
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sovereign CDS spreads because if high CDS spreads imply high liquidity instead of high
default risk then central banks could take appropriate measures to monitor the liquidity
embedded in the spreads.
To the best of our knowledge this chapter provides several contributions to the
literature. Firstly, we provide the ﬁrst study that attempts to quantify the size of
the liquidity component in the sovereign CDS market. Secondly our model extension
enables us to study the joint eﬀect of systematic liquidity and ﬂight-to-liquidity in
both sovereign bond and CDS markets, an analysis that hasn't been accomplished yet.
Finally, by studying the correlation risk premium between default risk and liquidity we
are able to provide a better decomposition than the one documented in Remonola et
al (2008) and Longstaﬀ et al (2011)1.
In the following subsections, we discuss the related literature and the motivation
behind our model extension. In Section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, we present in more details the
model extension, introduce our data and describe the calibration procedure respectively.
In Section 5.5, we discuss the results for each rating. Finally in Section 5.6 we conclude.
5.1.1 Related Literature:
A large amount of literature have tried to explain the components of corporate bond
yields2 . A consensus from these studies is that corporate bond yields are heavily
inﬂuenced by other factors than credit risk, such as liquidity risk, tax and macroeco-
nomic variables. Longstaﬀ et al (2005) present the ﬁrst study that uses CDS spreads
to decompose bond yields and ﬁnd that the non-default component is time-varying and
heavily inﬂuenced by bond liquidity factors. In the same spirit, Han and Zhou (2007)
study the corporate bond yields using the term structure of CDS spreads and ﬁnd that
1In the next subsection, we will discuss in some details how our study improves the sovereign CDS spread decompo-
sition presented in Remonola et al (2008) and Longstaﬀ et al (2011).
2Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995), Colin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Driessen
(2005), Longstaﬀ, Mithal and Neis (2005), Han and Zhou (2007), Mahanti, Nashikar and Subrahmanyam (2007), Lin,
Lui and Wu (2009) and many others.
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the non-default component ﬂuctuates with macroeconomic variables and stock market
liquidity.
The bond literature also tried to measure the non-default component of the sovereign
bond yields. Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) study the determinants of the euro-
area diﬀerentials with both monthly and daily data and found that international factors
rather than domestic ones have strong explanatory power while liquidity plays a role
for few countries. Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004), using a CIR model, ﬁnd that
bond yields for EMU countries are mainly explained by a global risk factor and that
liquidity does not have any impact. Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) study the
components of sovereign bond yields and use the CDS data for European sovereigns to
measure the eﬀect of ﬂight-to-quality and ﬂight-to-liquidity. They shown that credit
and liquidity risks are positively correlated and that credit risk represents the majority
of the sovereign bond yields. Favero, Pagano and Thadden (2010) also explore the
determinants of the sovereign bond yields by taking into account the interaction eﬀect
between aggregate default and liquidity risks, they show that default risk explains the
majority of the sovereign bond yields and that liquidity plays a minor role. Schwarz
(2010) investigate the eﬀect of liquidity risk on sovereign bond yields and ﬁnd that
market liquidity explains 68% of the widening of sovereign bond spreads, this value
is surprisingly high and is in sharp contrast with what has been documented in the
literature. Panyanukul (2010) examines the eﬀects of liquidity on sovereign bond returns
and show that the combined eﬀect of liquidity level and liquidity risks can explain
roughly 1% of extra yield spreads for the countries that have higher sensitivity to
market liquidity shocks. Finally, Monfort and Renne (2011) provide and estimate an
aﬃne term structure model that directly measures liquidity and credit risks in the
term structure of euro bonds. They ﬁnd that the liquidity part of the spreads is less
important than the credit related one even though liquidity eﬀect is non trivial.
In fact, the studies of Longstaﬀ et al (2005) and Han and Zhou (2007) mentioned
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above consider that CDS spreads are not subject to liquidity risk, however there is a
growing literature that acknowledges the importance of liquidity in the CDS market.
Qui and Yu (2011) provide the ﬁrst study that explores the determinants of endogenous
liquidity provision in the corporate CDS market. The authors treat liquidity as being
endogenously determined by information heterogeneity and frequency of uninformed
trading. One of their main ﬁndings suggests that endogenous liquidity provision in the
CDS spreads is an increasing function of the level of information heterogeneity present
in the market. They empirically prove that the information ﬂow is increasing with
the number of CDS quote providers and this is particularly relevant under unfavorable
credit conditions. Finally, they report a mixed result by arguing that the degree of
information heterogeneity plays a capital role on how liquidity aﬀects CDS spreads.
All these papers show that liquidity plays an important role in CDS spreads which
lead other studies to extend the model of Longstaﬀ, Mithal and Neis (2005) (LMN-
thereafter) to account for CDS liquidity in order to measure the non-default component
of corporate bond yields. Lin et al (2009) extend the LMN model to incorporate CDS
liquidity eﬀect and quantify the size of liquidity component in both corporate CDS and
bond spreads. They are able to show that liquidity represents on average 13% of the
CDS spreads. Secondly, they provide evidence that on average corporate bond yield
are composed of 47% of default risk, 30% of taxes and 23% of liquidity factor. Buhler
and Trapp (2010) also extend the LMN model but diﬀer from Lin et al (2009) by taking
into account the correlation eﬀect between credit and liquidity risks and between bond
and CDS liquidity risks. Therefore by calibrating their model to both CDS and bond
data they are able to capture important dynamics at cross-sectional and time-series
level. Overall, they show that 60% of bond spreads are to due to default risk, 35 % to
liquidity risk and 5 % to correlation between credit and liquidity risks. For the CDS
spreads, credit risk represents 95%, liquidity 4% and correlation 1%.
On the sovereign CDS side, few papers tried to isolate default risk from the risk
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premium. Longstaﬀ et al (2011) and Remonola et al (2008) decompose the sovereign
CDS spreads into default risk and risk premium components, while the former focuses
on distress risk, the latter discusses the jump-at-default risk. Our paper diﬀers from
the previous literature by not only focusing on the eﬀect of instrument-speciﬁc liquidity
and systematic liquidity risk but also by using information from both bonds and CDSs
to carry out the analysis.
Decomposing sovereign CDS spreads using information from both bonds and CDSs
is essential in many aspects. Typically both markets are highly integrated because they
share the same default risk. Secondly there is large literature showing that bond and
CDS liquidity risks are highly correlated. Amadei et al (2011) study the issues related
to the European sovereign CDS market and its relation with the bond market. They
ﬁnd that, during the recent crisis, bond-CDS arbitrage relation didn't hold. However
when the sovereign bond market is less liquid, CDSs have the leading role in terms of
price discovery. Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd no clear evidence that speculation has a
direct eﬀect on sovereign bond prices, therefore any regulatory measure taken against
speculation must be assessed with caution because this might hamper the functioning of
the sovereign bond market. Ismailescu and Philips (2011) investigate the impact of CDS
trading initiation on sovereign bonds from the perspective of market completeness, price
discovery and borrowing costs. The authors report that CDSs are not redundant assets
and contribute to an incremental increase of pricing information of about 67%. However,
the authors show that this result diﬀers at a cross sectional level. Countries with high
openness do not beneﬁt as much from price informativeness gains. Finally, according
to the paper, CDS introduction appears to provide a liquidity service to investment
grade sovereigns resulting in lower borrowing costs. Foley-Fisher (2010) examines the
relationship between government bond and CDS spreads during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis and shows that there is a violation of arbitrage conditions between both markets
occurring at diﬀerent times and in diﬀerent countries. Fontana and Scheicher (2010)
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document that the recent repricing of the sovereign credit risk in Europe is mainly
driven by common factors. Furthermore, the authors show that the ﬂight-to-liquidity
episode observed in the European bond market increased the CDS spreads more than
the corresponding bond yields. Finally, Arce et al (2011) analyze the relationship
between sovereign bond and CDS spreads from three angles. Firstly, the authors ﬁnd
that there is a persistent deviation from the parity relationship between CDS and
bond spreads and that this deviation accelerated during the subprime crisis. Secondly,
they ﬁnd that counterparty risk indicators, funding costs and liquidity have signiﬁcant
impact on the CDS-bond basis. Moreover, the authors analyze what market leads the
pricing discovery by using the approach of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and conclude
that global risk aversion, funding costs, market liquidity and debt volume are all playing
an important role in determining which market leads the discovery.
All these papers emphasize that bonds and CDSs share common features hence the
importance of doing a joint calibration in order to present a better decomposition of the
spread components. In the following subsection, we discuss the BT model extension.
5.1.2 Systematic Liquidity and Flight-To-Liquidity Risks:
As we previously emphasized, the sovereign CDS market is subject to a high level of
commonality across countries. In Chapter 4, we empirically showed that systematic
liquidity participates to the sovereign CDS spread movements. To this end, we extend
the CDS pricing model of Buhler and Trapp (2010) however we diﬀerentiate ourselves
from the authors by not only focusing on the sovereign CDS market but also by including
an extra factor to test for the inﬂuence of the systematic liquidity3.
Moreover, we also investigate the ﬂight-to-liquidity eﬀect. As highlighted by Be-
ber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009), during some subperiods large ﬂows in the sovereign
bond market are almost exclusively determined by liquidity and not credit quality be-
3Buhler and Trapp (2010) focus mainly on the instrument speciﬁc liquidity of the corporate CDS spreads.
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cause investors rebalance their portfolios and chase the most liquid bonds regardless of
their default risk, this is what the authors name as ﬂight-to-liquidity risk. Since bond
liquidity has an importance inﬂuence on the defaultable leg of the CDS contract, it is
plausible that the ﬂight-to-liquidity risk aﬀects the liquidity of the deliverable sovereign
bonds. While Buhler and Trapp (2010) mention only bond liquidity, in this chapter, we
depart from the assumption that ﬂight to liquidity risk adds more weight to the CDS
defaultable leg and may decrease sovereign CDS spreads. We thus add an extra liquid-
ity adjustment to take into account the potential inﬂuence of the ﬂight-to-liquidity4.
In summary, we have two sources of risk that have a substantial inﬂuence on sovereign
CDS spreads. Therefore, by extending the original model of Buhler and Trapp (2010)
we aim to provide a comprehensive framework that contains the major sources of risk
that aﬀect both CDS and bond spreads. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the
ﬁrst study that analyses the impact of both systematic and ﬂight-to-liquidity risk in the
sovereign CDS market. In the following section, we present our model in some details.
5.2 Model Deﬁnition: The Sovereign Market Case
In our model, we choose the default-free zero coupon bond as liquidity numeraire and
depart from the assumption that the risk-free rate is independent from the default and
the liquidity intensities (Longstaﬀ et al (2005), Pan and Singleton (2008)). Therefore,
the risk structure of our model is composed of:
D(t, τ) = exp(−
τˆ
t
rsds)
(5.1)
4In Chapter 4, we showed that bond systematic liquidity or ﬂight-to-liquidity risk is more pressurizing during the
crisis time.
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where D(t, τ) is the risk-free discount factor,
P (t, τ) = exp(−
τˆ
t
λsds)
(5.2)
where P (t, τ) is the risk neutral survival probability and
L(t, τ) = exp(−
τˆ
t
γlsds)
(5.3)
where L(t, τ) is the risk neutral liquidity intensity. The superscript l in the liquidity
intensity L(t, τ) refers to either CDS or bond liquidity.
CDS spreads can be impacted by default risk, instrument-speciﬁc liquidity and pos-
sibly by liquidity changes in CDS and bond markets. Typically, high liquidity risk is
accompanied by high bid-ask spreads and thus high CDS spreads. On one hand, liq-
uidity risk increases the price of buying CDS protection because the ask quote has to
compensate the CDS seller (i.e. dealer) for the credit and liquidity risk. On the other
hand, liquidity risk also reduces the price of selling CDS protection, the intuition is that
CDS buyers (i.e. dealer) will only agree to buy the protection at a cheap price (i.e. low
bid). Therefore, the bid-ask spread constitutes a hidden cost to market participants
when they trade assets and we measure its eﬀect with the following liquidity intensities
γask(t) and γbid(t)5.
In our setting, we make the assumption that systematic liquidity risk may inﬂate or
5γask(t) and γbid(t) measure only the eﬀect of the instrument speciﬁc liquidity.
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deﬂate CDS bid-ask spreads. Therefore one of the goals of our model is to measure how
much extra eﬀect can systematic liquidity risk have on the bid-ask spreads in addition
to the eﬀect that is due only to the instrument-speciﬁc liquidity described above. We
thus add another liquidity intensity γsys(t) in order to measure the extra eﬀect speciﬁc
to the systematic liquidity risk.
Concerning the bonds, we also try to capture the impact of bond liquidity γb(t) and
the risk of ﬂight-to-liquidity γgb(t) in the sovereign bond market. The intuition is that
the ﬂight-to-liquidity risk creates liquidity shocks that may not be captured by the
standard bond liquidity discount factor γb(t).
We thus have six risk factors: the default intensity λ(t), CDS liquidity (γask(t),
γbid(t)), systematic liquidity intensity (γsys(t))), bond liquidity intensity (γb(t)) and
the ﬂight-to-liquidity intensity (γgb(t)). The structure of the factor model can be sum-
marized as follows:

dλ(t)
dγb(t)
dγask(t)
dγbid(t)
dγgb(t)
dγsys(t)

=

1 gb gask gbid ggb gsys
fb 1 wb,ask wb,bid wb,gb wb,sys
fask wask,b 1 wask,bid wask,gb wask,sys
fbid wb,bid wbid,ask 1 wbid,gb wbid,sys
fgb wgb,b wgb,ask wgb,bid 1 wgb,sys
fsys wsys,b wsys,ask wsys,bid wsys,gb 1

∗

dx(t)
dyb(t)
dyask(t)
dybid(t)
dygb(t)
dysys(t)

(5.4)
The left hand-side of the equation (5.4) represents the correlated intensities and
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the right-hand side the factor matrix multiplied by the pure intensities. One of the
assumptions of our model is that the pure intensities x(t) and yl(t), which represent
pure default risk and liquidity, are not correlated neither at time-series nor at cross-
sectional level. On the other hand, the factor sensitivity matrix reﬂects the interactions
between default risk, instrument-speciﬁc liquidity and market liquidity. For instance,
the default intensity λ(t) can be written in the following form:
λ(t) = x(t) + gb ∗ yb(t) + gask ∗ yask(t) + gbid ∗ ybid(t) + ggb ∗ ygb(t) + gsys ∗ ysys(t)
(5.5)
The matrix approach will enable us to isolate the pure intensities from their corre-
lated components and therefore present accurate decomposition of the CDS spreads.
The parameter f in the factor matrix represents the impact of pure default risk x
on the liquidity intensity γl(t), g corresponds to the impact of pure liquidity yl(t) on
the credit risk premium λ. A negative sign of f is likely if high sovereign default risk
decreases bond liquidity. In line with this, Favero, Pagano and Thadden (2010) ﬁnd
that there is a negative relationship between aggregate default risk and liquidity. The
parameter w captures the interactions between CDS and bond liquidity.
Bonds and CDSs can be a substitute to each other, in fact if there is high liquidity risk
in the bond market investors will use CDSs as an alternative to take long (short) credit
risk positions which might reduce CDS liquidity risk. On the other hand, if market
participants use CDSs mainly to hedge their bond positions then high CDS liquidity
risk may increase bond liquidity risk. This two way relationship causes liquidity spill-
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over6 from one market to another. For example, in the factor sensitivity matrix, we
introduced wgb,ask which represents the interaction between the ﬂight-to-liquidity7(gb)
and the CDS ask quote (ask). If the ﬂight-to-liquidity risk inﬂuences the liquidity of
the deliverable bonds, CDS buyers may require a discount which translate into a lower
ask quote .
In this setting, we assume a CIR process for the pure default intensity in order to
ensure that the default arrival rate is always non-negative:
dxt = (α− β ∗ x(t)) ∗ dt+ σ
√
x(t) ∗ dW λ(t)
(5.6)
Concerning the pure liquidity intensity yt, we follow the approach of Longstaﬀ et al
(2005) and assume a Gaussian process in order to allow liquidity to take both positive
and negative values:
dylt = η ∗ dW l(t)
(5.7)
W l and W λ are independent Brownian motions speciﬁc to the liquidity and the
default intensities respectively. α, β, η > 0, σ > 0 represent the parameters speciﬁc to
each intensity.
5.2.1 Bond Market:
The price of a defaultable bond denoted as CB(t) is the sum of expected semi-annual
coupon bond weighted by the default probability and the bond liquidity discount factor.
6Commonality risk may also intensify the liquidity spill-over eﬀect which could in turn inﬂate the inﬂuence of the
systematic liquidity (gsys) on the credit risk premium λ.
7In this study we use bond market liquidity and ﬂight-to-liquidity interchangeably.
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We assume that the recovery R is equal to 25% of the face value8F . We also adopt
the discrete time setting in order to match the coupon semi-annual payment date ti
(t1,t2, .., t10).
CB(t) = c ∗ Σni=1D(t, ti) ∗ Et[P (t, ti) ∗ Lb(t, ti) ∗ Lgb(t, ti)] +
F ∗D(t, tn) ∗ Et[P (t, tn) ∗ Lb(t, tn) ∗ Lgb(t, tn)] +
R ∗ F ∗ Σnj=1D(t, tj) ∗ Et[4P (t, tj) ∗ Lb(t, tj) ∗ Lgb(t, tj)]
(5.8)
In this framework we assume that default can only happen at the payment date tj
(ti = tj) and that recovery occurs the following day9. The last term of CB(t) corre-
sponds to the recovery after default has occurred. D(t, ti) denotes the zero coupon bond,
Lb(t, ti) the bond liquidity discount factor, L
gb(t, ti) the ﬂight-to-liquidity discount fac-
tor, P (t, tn) the survival probability until time tn and 4P (t, tj) = P (t, tj−1) − P (t, tj)
the probability of surviving from time t to time tj−1 and defaulting between tj−1 and
tj. All the expectations are taken under the risk neutral measure. The intuition behind
the inclusion of Lb(t, ti) and L
gb(t, ti) is that sovereign bonds could be inﬂuenced by
their own liquidity and by the ﬂight-to-liquidity risk.
8In this study, we follow market convention and assume a recovery of 25% across all ratings. Pan and Singleton (2008)
study the recovery implicit in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads and ﬁnd that the estimate of the recovery
rate are in the region of 25% for Turkey and Korea. However Mexico displays a recovery rate of about 50%. In order to
ensure that our results are robust, we repeat our analysis using the recovery rate of 20%, 40% and 50% for the rating
A,BBB and BB and we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in our decomposition results (section 5.5.2).
9Our model could be easily extended to allow for stochastic settlement times in case of a credit even. However since
our framework is multi-dimensional we make this assumption in order to gain computational speed.
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5.2.2 CDS Market:
The CDS contract has two legs: the ﬁxed leg where CDS buyers pay a semi-annual
premium and the ﬂoating leg where CDS sellers receive the premium until default
occurs. In the same way as for the bonds, we assume that default only happens at the
payment dates, therefore we do not have any accrual payments. The ﬁxed leg is deﬁned
as follows:
CDS
ask/bid
fix (t) = s
ask/bid ∗ (Σni=1D(t, ti) ∗ Et[P (t, ti) ∗ Lask/bid(t, ti) ∗ Lsys(t, ti)])
(5.9)
For the CDS ask/bid premium, we assume that spreads are not only inﬂuenced by the
default arrival rate P (t, ti) but also by liquidity. Therefore, L
ask/bid(t, ti) and L
sys(t, ti)
reﬂect the part of the CDS spreads that is attributed to the instrument-speciﬁc10 and
the systematic liquidity respectively. For instance, if the CDS market as a whole is
illiquid, this may exacerbate asset illiquidity therefore the dealer is likely to increase
(decrease) the ask (bid) quote to compensate for the additional risk that systematic
liquidity represents.
On the other hand, the value of the ﬂoating or defaultable leg is described as follows:
CDS
ask/bid
float (t) = F ∗ Σnj=1D(t, Tj) ∗ Et[4P (t, tj)]
− R ∗D(t, tj) ∗ Et[4P (t, tj) ∗ Lb(t, tj) ∗ Lgb(t, tj)]
10The instrument-speciﬁc liquidity reﬂects the aspects of liquidity that are speciﬁc to the asset for instance transaction
costs, depth, etc.
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(5.10)
The equation implies that CDS sellers get the bond principal minus the recovery value
which, as we mentioned in the previous subsection, could be impacted by bond liquidity
and ﬂight-to-liquidity risk. This double eﬀect is valid whether the settlement is physical
or cash because if the sovereign bond market is illiquid then the value of the cheapest-
to-deliver bond could be aﬀected.
Overall, the theoretical CDS and bond values for sovereigns should incorporate all
these aspects in order to have a comprehensive picture of the diﬀerent risks that could
inﬂuence the spreads. In Appendix 5.7.1, we present the analytical solutions for equa-
tions (5.8), (5.9), and (5.10) using the exponential aﬃne framework.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics:
We focus on emerging market countries to run our analysis. Similarly to the previous
chapters, our data spans from November 2005 to September 2010. For the term struc-
ture of the default free interest rate, we follow the approach of Longstaﬀ et al (2005)
and Pan and Singleton (2008) and use the Treasury Curve commonly known as CMT.
We collect the data on a daily basis from the Federal Reserve H.15 statistical release
for the constant maturity six-month, one, two, three, ﬁve, seven, ten, twenty and thirty
year rates. We then use the cubic spline algorithm to infer the discount factors at
semi-annual intervals.
We download bid, ask and mid of the 5-year CDS spreads on a daily basis from
Datastream Reuters for the following countries: Chile, Korea, Mexico, Colombia, Peru,
Brazil, Philippines, Indonesia and Turkey. We pick a country only if it has at least two
bond issues11. The dataset contains more than 35,000 observations. For the purpose
of our study, we also collect the current and the historical S&P credit rating from
11The S&P historical ratings are not given at regular intervals but only when upgrades or downgrades occur.
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Datastream. We assign a rating to a country by giving a number to each rating category
and taking the average of our sample period (we round up if necessary). The ratings
that we obtain are as follows:
Bra Chile Indo Philip Tur Peru Colo Mex Kor
Ratings BBB A BB BB BB BBB BBB BBB A
This results in four rating categories A, BBB and BB. For each category we take the
averages of the CDS mid quotes and the bond prices.
We obtain the bond data on a daily basis from Datastream. We collect the bid, ask
and mid prices for each dollar denominated bond issued by the relevant country and
focus only on ﬁxed coupon bonds with no option embedded. The bid/ask are ICMA
data, these are quotes provided by 30 investment banks. At the end of each working
day, their closing bid and ask quotes are sent to Xtrakter where they are validated and
processed to provide an average bid and ask for each security12.
In our implementation we are interested in the bid, ask and mid yields. Since they
are not directly downloadable, we need to compute them in order to compare the 5-year
bond spreads with the 5-year sovereign CDS spreads.
Sovereign bonds are semi-annual coupon bonds which means that for a bond price
Pt(C,N, τ), the annual yield-to-maturity can be computed in the following way:
Pt(C,N,τ)=
∑N
i=1
C
2
(1 +
yt
2
)−(τ+0.5(i−1)) + F ∗ (1 + yt
2
)−(τ+0.5(N−1))
(5.11)
where C is the annual coupon rate13, F the face value, N the number of remaining
coupon payments and τ = T−t
T
the ratio of the number of days until the next coupon
12Besides for Chile which has two bond issues, each country has large number of bonds. In fact, the diversity in the
maturity dates will be useful in providing a good estimate for the 5 year bond spread.
13We assume that the ﬁrst coupon payment occurs in the ﬁrst settlement date of our time series.
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payment to the number of days in the coupon period.
In order to estimate sovereign bond spreads using equation (5.11), we ﬁrst need to
extract the risk-free rate. Therefore, for each bond we solve for the synthetic default-
free bond with identical coupon and maturity as the defaultable bond. This is done
in two steps, ﬁrst we use the default free term structure of interest rate (i.e Treasury
curve) to compute the price of default-free coupon bonds as the sum of discounted zero
coupon rates multiplied by C/2, then we solve for the default-free yield. Finally, we
compute the bond spread by taking the diﬀerence between defaultable bond yields and
synthetic default-free coupon bonds.
The last phase consists of computing the ﬁve year bond spreads. In fact, it would
be ideal if we had a ﬁve year bond available at each time step in order to compare it
with CDS spreads, however this is rarely the case. To address this problem we use the
interpolation method implemented by Houweling and Vorst (2005).
Our dataset runs from 2005 to 2010, therefore the CDS maturity dates associated
with our sample are from 2010 to 2015, hence we need bond with maturities from 2010
to 2015 to estimate the 5 year bond spreads. The countries that we picked do not
always have a set of 6 bonds that mature exactly in 2010/2011/2012/2013/2014/2015,
therefore when a bond maturity is missing we use as proxy a bond that has the closest
maturity to the missing one. This methodology enables us to interpolate bond spreads
to match CDS maturity.
Figure 5.1 shows the results for each rating class. The ﬁgures show that credit and
CDS spreads for rating A, BBB and BB track each other very closely although it seems
that on average bond credit spreads are slightly higher than CDS spreads.
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5.4 Measuring Credit Risk, Liquidity, Systematic Liquidity and
Correlation Premium:
5.4.1 Description of the Time Series Properties:
Using the grid search technique14, we estimate the parameters of the factor sensitivity
matrix and the 6 intensity processes deﬁned in equation (5.4) for each rating (i.e. A,
BBB and BB). We ﬁt the model to the data with a very small error. We obtain a mean
error of 0.305, 0.35 and 0.369 bps for both bond and CDS spreads for rating A, BBB
and BB respectively. In Figure 5.2, we plot the model-implied bond and CDS spreads
with the actual data. We can see that the model tracks very well the data even when
there are spikes, this is due to a daily cross-sectional ﬁtting.
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the estimated parameters. It shows
that default intensities are positive across all the ratings however liquidity intensities
have both negative and positive values. The signs are consistent with the assumptions
made on the processes driving the intensities. The table also reveals that the magnitude
of the pure default risk x increases as the rating deteriorates this is consistent with the
idea that default risk has higher importance when the rating is low.
On the other hand, Table 5.2 reveals that the weight of bond liquidity yb for rating
BB is lower than for the other ratings (i.e. ratings A and BBB). However, similarly to
the default risk, it appears that the weight of the ﬂight-to-liquidity ygb is higher as we
decrease in the rating quality. In fact, our results show an interesting pattern; as default
risk increases, the weight of the instrument speciﬁc (or bond) liquidity decreases but
that of the ﬂight-to-liquidity increases substantially which indicate that bond market
liquidity is more pressurizing for lower quality ratings which is in turn imply that bond
market ﬂows head towards low rated countries. These results are consistent with those
of Beber et al (2009) who ﬁnd that during some sub-periods large ﬂows in the bond
market are determined almost exclusively by liquidity consideration than by credit risk
14Appendix 5.7.2 deﬁnes in details the steps of the calibration procedure.
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concerns.
Finally, Table 5.1 reports the latent factors of the CIR and Gaussian processes
deﬁned in Section 5.2. As we can see, ratings BBB and BB have parameters that are in
the same range. However rating A has higher liquidity volatilities than the other ratings
which may suggest that, due to the low weight of default risk (Table 5.2), the volatility
that rating A experienced during our sample period (Figure 5.1) was mostly captured by
liquidity. As we will explain in Section 5.5.1, this phenomenon may be partly explained
by the ﬂight-to-quality eﬀect where investors prefer to buy and hold safer securities,
this means that the increase in demand and supply in rating A substantially augments
its liquidity volatility15.
5.4.2 Estimation Procedure:
In this subsection, we plug back the calibrated intensities into the CDS and the bond
pricing formula (equation (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10)) and decompose the spreads in order
to retrieve the default and the non-default components of each asset.
We decompose the credit spreads into a pure credit risk component bd, a pure liq-
uidity component bl, a pure global bond liquidity component blg and a correlation
component bc. In the same spirit as BT, bd, bl and blg correspond to the bond spread if
only credit risk, liquidity and bond market liquidity are priced, in that case the factor
sensitivities are equal to 0 (f = g = w = 0) and pure and correlated intensities coin-
cide. bc corresponds to the part of the bond spreads resulting from the correlation eﬀect
between credit and liquidity risk (f 6= g 6= w 6= 0). The sum of the four components
mentioned above corresponds to the full bond spreads with maturity and payment dates
equal to those of the CDSs.
Likewise, we disentangle the CDS spreads into four components: a pure credit risk
15This ﬁnding also seems to be consistent with Beber et al (2009) who ﬁnd that liquidity plays a non-trivial role for
low credit risk countries.
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component sdg, a pure liquidity component sl, a pure systematic liquidity component
slg and a correlation component sc. sdg corresponds to the theoretical mid spread
without a CDS liquidity eﬀect16. In the second step, we consider CDS liquidity sl
and systematic liquidity slg without taking into account the correlation components
(f = g = w = 0). In the last step, we consider the correlation (sc) between credit risk
and CDS liquidity. The sum of the four components indicates the full theoretical value
of the CDS spreads17.
5.5 Credit Risk, Liquidity, Systematic Liquidity Risk and Cor-
relation Premium: Cross-Sectional Results:
5.5.1 Factor Sensitivities:
In this subsection we present the results related to the factor sensitivity matrix and
discuss the interactions between credit, liquidity and systematic liquidity risks. In order
to interpret the results, we use the signs of the mean of the pure liquidity intensities
(Table 5.2) combined with the signs of the sensitivity factors (Table 5.3) in order to
infer whether the impact on the correlated intensities is positive or negative (equation
(5.4)).
5.5.1.1 Rating BB:
Table 5.3, shows that pure default risk x has a positive impact on bond liquidity (fb).
The positive sign suggests that high default risk increases bond liquidity which might
put forward the idea that agents show strong interest in trading bonds with low rating.
Secondly, it seems that pure default risk x inﬂuences negatively CDS ask liquidity (fask)
implying that high default risk leads to low CDS ask liquidity (i.e. high liquidity risk)
which in turn means that dealers sell protection at a higher ask quote, the result is
16sdg is measured by the default free rate, default probability, bond liquidity and bond market liquidity.
17A more detailed deﬁnition on how to measure credit and liquidity risks is available in Appendix B of Buhler and
Trapp (2010).
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intuitive as high credit risk increases the cost of the CDS protection. On the other
hand, we observe that pure default risk x impact positively CDS bid liquidity (fbid)
indicating that high default risk leads to high CDS bid liquidity and therefore higher
bid quote. The results of fask and fbid advance that an increase in the pure default
risk doesn't inﬂuence in a similar manner the bid and the ask quotes. This might be
explained by the fact that for the case of rating BB an increase in the pure default
risk augments the ask and the bid quotes in the same time because dealers are willing
to buy protections from investors in order to sell them back at a higher ask. In fact,
dealers may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to buy protections at high bid because they know that
they could sell them at an attractive price. Moreover, the negative sign of fsys indicates
that an increase in the pure default risk decreases systematic liquidity resulting in a
higher ask, this result is also in line with fask.
On the other hand, the table reveals that gask and gbid, the parameters representing
the impact of CDS ask and bid liquidity on credit risk premium λ, carry negative signs,
this result suggests that high liquidity decreases the credit risk premium, this is in line
with our intuition as in case of high liquidity, the impact of CDS liquidity risk decreases
which makes the credit risk premium λ closer to the pure default risk x. On the other
hand, the impact of the systematic liquidity on the credit risk premium λ (i.e. gsys ) is
also negative18 which is in line with gask and gbid implying that the lower the eﬀect of
liquidity the lower the distance from the pure default risk x.
Bond liquidity gb and bond market liquidity ggb display negative signs which indicates
that high bond liquidity decrease the credit risk premium λ. In fact, high bond liquidity
makes the inﬂuence of the delivery option on the defaultable leg of the CDS contract
insigniﬁcant19. This leads to a decrease of the credit risk premium narrowing the gap
18gsys is positive, however the pure liquidity intensity ysys has negative sign which implies negative impact on the
credit risk premium λ.
19When the bond market is illiquid and the number of liquid bonds are limited, the Cheapest-To-Deliver (CTD) option
becomes valuable. If the value of the CTD changes, dealers may require additional compensation which in turn could
lead to an increase in the CDS spreads. On the other hand, when the bond market is liquid, the impact of the CTD is
insigniﬁcant because dealers will easily ﬁnd a bond to deliver in case of default.
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between λ and the pure default risk x.
The parameters (wb,ask and wb,bid) reﬂecting the liquidity spill-over between bonds
and CDSs show negative and positive sign respectively. This implies that high bond
liquidity increases CDS bid liquidity and slightly decreases CDS ask liquidity. This
means that for rating BB an increase in bond liquidity tend to be accompanied with
a bid-initiated transaction in the CDS market. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
substitution eﬀect as investors could take a long credit risk position in the CDS market
and sell it back in the bond market20.
The positive sign of the bond liquidity spill-over wgb,g reveals that high bond market
liquidity leads to high bond liquidity implying a positive correlation between bond
market and bond liquidity.
Finally, the parameters wsys,ask and wbid,sys showing the interaction between the sys-
tematic liquidity and CDS liquidity display a negative and a positive sign respectively21.
This indicates that high systematic liquidity increases CDS ask liquidity (i.e. lower ask)
and decreases CDS bid liquidity (i.e. lower bid). This ﬁnding reveals that when the
CDS market as a whole is liquid (or illiquid) this tend to decrease (increase) the cost of
the CDS protection and decrease (increase) the sale price. In other words, systematic
liquidity risk can deﬂate liquidity risk from the ask (i.e. lower ask) and inﬂate it from
the bid side (i.e. lower bid) of the CDS quotes. Therefore, the impact of systematic
liquidity risk can be diﬀerent from both the bid and the ask side of the CDS contract.
This ﬁnding supports our model and implies that systematic liquidity risk carries an
extra premium because if the CDS market is illiquid then the liquidity of individual
CDSs change.
20This result is also consistent with the negative sign of wgb,ask and the positive sign of wgb,bid which indicate that
high bond market liquidity leads to high CDS bid liquidity and low CDS ask liquidity.
21We recall that the pure intensity ysys has negative sign combined with the negative sign of wsys,ask, this leads to a
positive impact of the liquidity intensity γask.
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5.5.1.2 Rating BBB:
The results of rating BBB are not very dissimilar from rating BB and we will only high-
light the diﬀerences. Table 5.3, shows that the pure default risk x aﬀects positively both
CDS ask (fask) and CDS bid liquidity (fbid) meaning that high default risk improves
CDS liquidity by decreasing the ask and increasing the bid quotes respectively. How-
ever, high default risk seems to increase systematic liquidity (fsys), which infers that
when rating BBB observes an increase in default risk investors trade less frequently in
the CDS market which in turn inﬂates liquidity risk. This result is in contrast with
rating BB.
Similarly to rating BB, gask, gbid and ggb are negative suggesting that high liquidity
decreases the credit risk premium λ. In case of high liquidity, the eﬀect of liquidity risk
weakens and the credit risk premium λ converges to the pure default risk x. However
gb has no inﬂuence on the credit risk premium λ.
The parameters wb,ask and wb,bid show positive signs. This implies that high bond
liquidity leads to high CDS liquidity decreasing the CDS ask and increasing the CDS
bid quote. This ﬁnding is interesting because it shows that when there is high bond
liquidity investors hedge their positions with CDSs increasing the liquidity of the CDS
market.
5.5.1.3 Rating A:
Pure default risk x has a negative impact on bond liquidity (fb) which suggests that
high default risk decreases bond liquidity. This result is in contrast with rating BBB
and BB but is intuitive because high credit risk makes investors more risk averse and
therefore bond liquidity decreases. Secondly, the pure default risk x aﬀects positively
both CDS ask (fask) and CDS bid liquidity (fbid) meaning that for the case of rating
A, high default risk improves CDS liquidity from both the bid and ask quotes. Overall,
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it seems that the impact of fask and fbid is relatively small comparing to the rating
BB and BBB. Similarly to rating BB, high default risk decreases systematic liquidity
(fsys), however the magnitude of the impact is low.
On the other hand, the table shows that gask and gbid, the parameters characterizing
the impact of CDS liquidity on the credit risk premium λ, have negative and positive
signs respectively which indicate that high CDS liquidity increases CDS ask and de-
crease CDS bid liquidity. This is equivalent to say that the ask side is closer to the pure
default risk x than the bid side. This scenario is likely to happen in a market where
investors prefer to buy and hold safer securities instead of selling them, hence the in-
crease in liquidity on the ask side. This phenomenon is similar to the ﬂight-to-quality
eﬀect.
In contrast with rating BBB and BB, bond liquidity gb and bond market liquidity ggb
carry positive signs implying that high bond liquidity increases the credit risk premium
λ, this result seems to be counter intuitive as an increase in liquidity should reduce
the liquidity risk eﬀect and bring the credit risk premium closer to the pure default
risk. Finally, the eﬀect of bond liquidity spill-over (wb,gb) and systematic liquidity risk
(wsys,ask and wsys,bid) both display similar eﬀects to the previous ratings.
5.5.1.4 Summary:
Overall, the results of the factor sensitivity matrix indicate that the interaction be-
tween credit risk and liquidity is dependent on the quality of the rating. However
there are common features across all the ratings that are worth highlighting. First
of all, our ﬁndings show that CDS liquidity and systematic liquidity (or CDS mar-
ket liquidity) are positively correlated22. If CDS market liquidity is low it negatively
inﬂuences the instrument-speciﬁc liquidity and vice versa. This ﬁnding supports the
idea that systematic liquidity risk carries a premium and participates directly to the
22This result is implied from the signs of wsys,ask and wsys,bid.
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CDS spread movements. Moreover, Table 5.3 also shows that bond liquidity and bond
market liquidity are positively related23. This result backs the initial assumption that
ﬂight-to-liquidity risk can exacerbate the (il)liquidity of deliverable bonds and put more
weight on the defaultable leg of the CDS contract.
In their original paper, Buhler and Trapp (2010) ﬁnd that, in the corporate CDS
market, the pure liquidity intensities yl (with l=ask, bid or b) do not aﬀect the credit
risk premium λ however the pure default risk x has an impact on the liquidity intensities
γl. For the case of the sovereign CDS market, we ﬁnd that there is a two-way interaction
between credit risk and liquidity24. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that high bond liquidity tends
to be accompanied with high CDS liquidity25, this is consistent with the hedging eﬀect26.
If investors mainly hedge their bond position with CDSs, then an increase in the trading
activities in the bond market will lead to an increase in CDS liquidity.
5.5.2 Premia Components:
In this subsection, we present the results of the decomposition exercise that we brieﬂy
discussed in section 5.4.3 and we do a comparative analysis across the diﬀerent ratings.
Table 5.4, presents the model implied premium components of each rating for bonds
and CDSs27. Panel A shows that the diﬀerence in value of the bond pure credit risk
premium bd across ratings is relatively small. However, the bond pure liquidity premium
bl increases in percent term as the rating quality increases. This result indicates that
investors give more importance in trading assets with lower rating which explains their
high liquidity level (i.e. low liquidity risk). On the other hand, the bond pure global
23This relationship is deduced from the sign of parameter wb,gb.
24With one exception for the bond market liquidity where the pure default risk x does not inﬂuence ygb, however the
liquidity intensity γgb impacts the credit risk premuim λ.
25This result is implied from the positive signs of wb,ask and wb,bid and the pure liquidity intensities y
bid and yask
for rating A, BBB and BB. There is one exception for rating BB where wb,ask has a negative sign but its eﬀect is very
weak as it is equal to -0.0019.
26This result is in line with the original paper of Buhler and Trapp (2010) who also report a hedging eﬀect between
the corporate bond and the CDS market.
27As discussed in Duﬃe (1999) and Duﬃe and Liu (2001) the yield spreads on ﬁxed-coupon bonds cannot be directly
compared to CDS spreads. The comparison is only valid if the maturity of both bonds and CDSs are identical and if
the bonds are priced at par.
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liquidity premium blg (i.e. ﬂight-to-liquidity) increases as the rating decreases, this
shows that rating BB is the most sensitive to changes in bond market liquidity. The
overall magnitude of the correlation premium bc, representing the interaction between
credit risk and liquidity, is quite small28, this is consistent with the idea that the risk
eﬀect coming from the correlation risk is very weak.
Panel B shows the results of the CDS decomposition. The table reveals that CDS
pure credit risk premium sdg is increasing in percentage as the rating quality deterio-
rates. This indicates that the weight of default risk is increasing in importance when
the rating is low. This is consistent with the bond decomposition results in Panel A
as rating BB has the highest percentage of the default risk. Secondly, the CDS pure
liquidity premium sl has the highest weight in rating A, although it seems that the
diﬀerence across the rating A, BBB and BB is not as signiﬁcant as it is for the bond
market. Furthermore, the ﬁndings of the CDS pure global liquidity premium slg (i.e.
systematic liquidity) are similar to those of the bonds as the lowest ratings (i.e. BBB
and BB) have the highest weights. The fact that slg is (nearly) equally important
across the ratings highlights the importance of the systematic liquidity in the sovereign
CDS market. Overall, Panel B of Table 5.4 demonstrates that CDS liquidity is not
highly dependent on the rating quality (or equivalently the default intensity)29 and its
eﬀect is relatively stable across the ratings.
Regarding the bond decomposition, for rating A, we ﬁnd that on average the pure
credit risk premium bd, represents 73.8% of the sovereign bond spreads, bond pure
liquidity premium bl, 19.49%, bond market liquidity premium blg, 6.6% and the corre-
lation premium bc, 0.00079% . For rating BBB, bd, represents 71.2% of the sovereign
bond spreads, bl, 13.9%, blg, 14.6% and bc, 0.003%. Finally for rating BB, bd, cor-
28The fact that the correlation risk premium is very small (or close to zero) does not imply that the credit and liquidity
risk are independent but it means that the risk coming from the correlation between the credit and liquidity risk is small
to insigniﬁcant. Table 5.3 shows that signs of the interactions are both positive and negative, the opposite signs might
reduce eﬀect of the correlation risk between the intensities and might also explain the weak weight of the correlation
component.
29The quality of the rating and the magnitude of the default risk are inversely related. The lower the rating the highest
the default intensity.
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responds to 74% of the sovereign bond spreads, bl, to 5%, blg, to 20.9% and bc, to
0.00053%.
These ﬁndings indicate that the pure default risk represents the majority of the bond
spreads and that liquidity plays a minor role. This result is largely supported by the
sovereign literature. Geyer et al (2004) and Codogno et al (2003) ﬁnd that the yield
diﬀerentials under the EMU are mainly explained by a common default risk factor
measured by the diﬀerence between corporate and government bond yields and that
liquidity eﬀects have a trivial role. Using a sample period from 2003 to 2004, Beber et
al (2009) study the default versus liquidity decomposition in the sovereign bond market
and ﬁnd that credit represents 89% of sovereign bond spreads while liquidity account for
11%. Favero et al (2010) show that the aggregate risk proxied by the diﬀerence between
US corporate and government bonds is the most important explanatory variable for
Euro-area diﬀerentials and that a liquidity eﬀect is present for only few countries.
Finally, Monfort and Renne (2011) show that the liquidity part of the spreads is less
important than the credit part even though liquidity plays a non trivial role30.
On the other hand, the results of the CDS decomposition show that, for rating A,
the CDS pure credit risk premium sdg represents on average 54.5% of the CDS spreads,
CDS pure liquidity premium sl, 24.1%, CDS pure global liquidity premium slg, 21.5%
and the CDS correlation premium sc, 0.0035%. For rating BBB, sdg, corresponds to
55.7% of the CDS spreads, sl, to 16.1%, slg, to 28.1% and sc, to 0.038%. Finally, for
rating BB sdg, corresponds to 56.6% of the CDS spreads, sl, to 16.4%, slg, to 26.8%
and sc, to 0.09%.
The weight of the pure credit risk in the sovereign CDS spreads seems to be smaller
than the one of the corporate CDSs31. In fact, few papers decompose sovereign CDS
30Although our results on bond spreads are in line with the majority of sovereign literature they are not consistent
with Schwarz (2010). In her approach, the author regresses the bond yield diﬀerentials against credit risk and liquidity
risk proxies and explains that market liquidity account for 68% of sovereign bond spreads, this is surprisingly high. In
fact, using sovereign CDS diﬀerentials as a credit risk proxy in the regression is a questionable method because it might
reduce the credit risk explanatory power and this may explain why liquidity represents signiﬁcant portion of the bond
yields.
31BT(2010) and Lin et al (2009) ﬁnd that credit risk represent 95% and 87% of corporate CDS spreads respectively.
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spreads. Remonala et al (2008) provide the ﬁrst study in this direction and show that
the jump-at-default risk is priced in the sovereign CDS spreads. Longstaﬀ et al (2010)
extend the model of Pan and Singleton (2008) in order to decompose sovereign CDS
spreads and calculate the risk premium related to distress risk. By applying the model
to a large set of countries, they ﬁnd that on average 34% of the spreads are due to
distress risk premium. If we take the average risk premium of the countries that both
this study and Longstaﬀ et al (2010) have in common32, we obtain a value of 41% in
the latter. The magnitude of the liquidity premium that we ﬁnd across all the ratings
is 44.33%. Finally, our results show that, on one hand, ﬂight-to-liquidity risk has an
impact both on the credit risk premium λ33 and on the CDS bid-ask spreads34. On the
other hand systematic liquidity risk also inﬂuences CDS bid-ask spreads35.
As a further step in our analysis, we split our sample period into a pre-crisis and a
crisis period and we do the same decomposition exercise as before36. Surprisingly, Table
5.4 indicates that the magnitude of the pure default risk is higher during the pre-crisis
than the crisis period. In fact, the diﬀerence is even more striking for the CDS market.
In contrast with the default risk, we observe that the liquidity component increase in
magnitude during the crisis time and the diﬀerence is more discernable for the instru-
ment speciﬁc liquidity (bl) of the CDS market. This suggests that default risk and CDS
liquidity move in opposite direction, when default risk is high liquidity decreases (or
liquidity risk increases) and vice versa. This negative (positive) relationship between
the aggregate sovereign default risk and liquidity (liquidity risk) has also been docu-
mented in recent papers by Beber et al (2009) and Favero et al (2010)37. Therefore,
32The countries that Longstaﬀ et al (2011) and this paper have in common are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Mexico,
Philippines, South Africa and Turkey, thus Longstaﬀ et al (2011) cover 80% our sample.
33The parameter ggb, representing the inﬂuence of bond market liquidity or ﬂight-to-liquidity on the credit risk
premium λ, shows a signiﬁcant impact.
34The parameters wgb,bid and wgb,ask reﬂecting the interaction between bond market liquidity and CDS liquidity risks
also have an impact.
35The parameters wask,sys and wbid,sys representing the impact of systematic liquidity on the CDS bid-ask spreads
are all signiﬁcant.
36The pre-crisis period runs from November 2005 to January 2008 and the crisis period spans from January 2008 to
September 2010.
37The negative relationship between default risk and liquidity is not totally consistent with the signs of the parameters
of the factor sensitivity matrix. The reason is because the factor sensitivity matrix has been retrieved by calibrating the
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this decomposition puts forward the idea that the increase in the CDS spreads observed
during the crisis period was mainly due to a surge in liquidity rather than to an increase
in the default intensity.
In summary, our analysis reveals that sovereign CDS spreads are highly inﬂuenced
by liquidity and that sovereign bond spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions which
implies that bond spreads could represent a better proxy for sovereign default risk.
Secondly, as Table 5.4 shows, bonds and CDSs are exposed to the ﬂight-to-liquidity
and systematic liquidity risks respectively which stress the importance of these risks
in sovereign CDS spread movements. Finally, the weight of the correlation premium is
negligible relatively to the other risk factors.
5.6 Conclusion:
In this chapter, we provide the ﬁrst study that quantiﬁes the size of the default risk,
liquidity and correlation components in sovereign CDS spreads. In order to carry out
this analysis, we extend the factor model of Buhler and Trapp (2010) and jointly cali-
brate it to both sovereign CDS and bond data. By doing so, we are able to use a large
amount of information on sovereign default risk and thus present a better decomposi-
tion of sovereign bond and CDS spreads. Our results reveal that default risk represents
on average 73% of the bond spreads, liquidity 26.86% and correlation risk 0.0014 %.
On the CDS side we ﬁnd that, on average, default risk account for 55.6% of the spreads,
liquidity for 44.32% and correlation risk for 0.043%.
Overall, our results reveal that sovereign CDS spreads are highly driven by liquidity
and that sovereign bond spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions and therefore could
represent a better proxy for sovereign default risk. Secondly, we show empirically that
ﬂight-to-liquidity and systematic liquidity play a non-negligible role and contributes to
model to the whole sample period (i.e. pre-crisis and crisis period at the same time).
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both sovereign bond and CDS spread movements. Finally, our decomposition exercise
puts forward the idea that the increase in the CDS spreads observed during the crisis
period was mainly due to a surge in liquidity rather than to an increase in the default
intensity.
Our results ﬁnd large support in the literature. Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003),
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004), Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009), Favero,
Pagano and Thadden (2010) and Monfort and Renne (2011) provide evidence that
default risk represents the majority of bond spreads and that liquidity plays a minor
role. On the other hand, Longstaﬀ et al (2011) document that 41% of sovereign CDS
spreads are due to distress risk premium, we report that liquidity represents 44.33% of
the CDS spreads.
In summary, this chapter indicates that liquidity plays an important role in the
5 year sovereign CDS spread movements. Further research should be done to better
understand the eﬀects of liquidity at term structure level. In the next chapter, we study
the liquidity risk implied in the term structure of the sovereign CDS curve.
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5.7 Appendices:
5.7.1 Appendix 1: Analytical Solutions for the Discount Factors:
In this appendix, we present in some details the derivations of the discount factors of
equation (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10). The derivations of the discount factors are similar
across the CDS bid, CDS ask and bonds. Therefore, we present only the solutions for
the bonds.
A. Solving the Expectations in the CDS and Bond using the PDE approach
(simultaneous discount factor): D(t, Ti) ∗ Et[P (t, ti) ∗ Lb(t, ti) ∗ Lgb(t, ti)]
Let's denote x(t) = λi(t), λi corresponds to the pure default intensity.
Et[P (t, ti) ∗ Lb(t, ti) ∗ Lgb(t, ti)] = Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
λs + γ
b
s + γ
gb
s ds)]
= Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
(1 + fb + fgb) ∗ λids] ∗ Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
(1 + gb + wgb,b) ∗ ybds)]
Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
(gask + wb,ask + wgb,ask) ∗ yaskds)] ∗ Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
(gbid + wb,bid + wgb,bid) ∗ ybidds)]
Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
(wb,gb + ggb + 1) ∗ ygbds)] ∗ Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
(wb,sys + gsys + wgb,sys) ∗ ysysds)]
(5.12)
This decomposition allows us to retrieve the independent intensities which in turn en-
ables us to solve each expectation separately. We ﬁrst solve for P (λ, T ) = Et[exp(−
´ τ
0
(1+
fb + fgb) ∗ λi] and apply Ito Lemma to get the PDE:
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−(1 + fb + fgb) ∗ λit ∗ P (λ, t)− PT + Pλ(α− β ∗ λi) +
1
2
∗ Pλλ ∗ σ2 ∗ λi = 0
(5.13)
We guess a solution for the P (λ, T )
P (λ, T ) = a1(T ) ∗ exp(−a2(T ) ∗ λi ∗ (1 + fb + fgb))
(5.14)
We solve for a1(T ) and a2(T ) by solving the following system of ODEs:

−1− a′2 − β ∗ a2 + σ
2
2
∗ (1 + fb + fgb) ∗ a22 = 0
−a′1 + α ∗ a1 ∗ (1 + fb + fgb) ∗ a2 = 0
(5.15)
We retrieve the following solutions:
a1(T ) = (
1− κ
1− κ ∗ exp(φ(τ − t)))
2α
σ2 ∗ exp(α(β + φ)
σ2
∗ (τ − t))
(5.16)
a2(T ) =
φ− β
σ2 ∗ (1 + fb + fgb) +
2 ∗ φ
σ2 ∗ (1 + fb + fgb) ∗ (κ ∗ exp(φ(τ − t))− 1)
(5.17)
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where
φ =
√
2 ∗ σ2 ∗ (1 + fb + fgb) + β2
(5.18)
and
κ =
β + φ
β − φ
(5.19)
We solve liquidity discount factors in the same manner, we have in total 5 liquidity
intensities:
F (γ, T ) = Et[exp(−
τˆ
0
K ∗ yds)]
(5.20)
where "K" changes with the liquidity intensity:
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
or
K = (1 + gb + wgb,b)
K = (gask + wb,ask + wgb,ask)
K = (gbid + wb,bid + wgb,bid)
K = (wb,gb + ggb + 1)
K = (wb,sys + gsys + wgb,sys)
(5.21)
We then derive the PDE and guess a solution for F (γ, T )
−γt ∗K ∗ F (γ, T )− FT + 1
2
∗ Fγγ ∗ η2t = 0
(5.22)
F (γ, T ) = a3(T ) ∗ exp(−a4(T ) ∗K ∗ γ)
(5.23)
Solving a system of ODEs:

a
′
4(T ) = −1
−a′3(T ) + 12 ∗ η2 ∗ T 2 ∗K2 ∗ a3(T ) = 0
(5.24)
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We retrieve:
a4(τ − t) = τ − t
(5.25)
a3(τ − t) = exp(K
2 ∗ η2 ∗ (τ − t)3
6
)
(5.26)
B. Solving the Expectation in the CDS and Bond using the Moment Gen-
erating Function (MGF) (non-simultaneous discount factor):
Et[4P (t, ti) ∗ Lb(t, ti) ∗ Lgb(t, ti)] = Et[(P (t, tj−1)− P (t, tj)) ∗ Lb(t, ti) ∗ Lgb(t, ti)]
(5.27)
Assume t = 0 , tj−1 = t1 and tj = t2 where t < tj < tj−1
Et[P (t, t1) ∗Lb(t, t2) ∗Lgb(t, t2)] = Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
λsds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t
γbsds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t
γgbs ds)]
= Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
λs) ∗ exp(−
t1ˆ
t
γbsds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
γbsds) ∗ exp(−
t1ˆ
t
γgbs ds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
γgbs ds)]
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(5.28)
Using the previous solutions of P (λ, T ) , we transform the correlated intensities to
non-correlated ones:
Et[P (t, t1) ∗ Lb(t, t2) ∗ Lgb(t, t2)] =
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(1 + fb + fgb) ∗ λids) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(fb + fgb) ∗ λids)] ∗
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(1 + gb + wgb,b) ∗ ybds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(1 + wgb,b) ∗ ybds)] ∗
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(gask + wb,ask + wgb,ask) ∗ yaskds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(wb,ask + wgb,ask) ∗ yaskds)]∗
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(gbid + wb,bid + wgb,bid) ∗ ybidds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(wb,bid + wgb,bid) ∗ ybidds)] ∗
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(wb,gb + ggb + 1) ∗ ygbds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(wb,gb + 1) ∗ ygbds)] ∗
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(wgb,sys + wb,sys + gsys) ∗ ysysds) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(wb,sys + wgb,sys) ∗ ysysds)]∗
(5.29)
K1i = (wgb,sys +wb,sys + gsys) and K2i = (wb,sys +wgb,sys) where i = 1, 2, ...6. K1 and
K2 change with the liquidity intensity.
Using the law of iterated expectation we can solve the second exponential in each
line by using P (λ, T ) and F (γ, T ) and transforming the equations into MGFs.
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The ﬁnal result for the default intensity is:
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(1 + fb + fgb) ∗ λids) ∗ exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(fb + fgb) ∗ λids)] =
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(1 + fb + fgb) ∗ λids) ∗ Et[exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
(fb + fgb) ∗ λids)]
= −a1(t1, t2) ∗ Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(1 + fb + fgb) ∗ λids) ∗ exp(−a2(t1, t2) ∗ (fb + fgb) ∗ λi(t1))]
(5.30)
where a1(t1, t2) and a2(t1, t2) are deﬁned in Appendix 5.7.1.A.
The ﬁnal result for the liquidity process is:
Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
K1i∗yds)∗exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
K2i∗yds)] = Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
K1i∗yds)∗Et[exp(−
t2ˆ
t1
K2i∗yds)]]
= a3(t1, t2) ∗ Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
K1i ∗ y(t)ds) ∗ exp(−a4(t1, t2) ∗K2i ∗ y(t1)ds)]
(5.31)
where a3(t1, t2) and a4(t1, t2) are deﬁned in Appendix A.
Equation (5.28) and (5.29) are MGFs that will be solved in order to retrieve the
closed form solution of the expectations38.
38The MGF will be solved using the Proposition 6.2.4 of Lamberton and Lapeyre (page 162), this proposition is used
to characterize the joint law of (Xt,
´ t
0 Xsds) (in our case Xt is either equal to λ
i
s or y
l ) and is the key to any pricing
within the CIR model. To solve the MGF of the liquidity intensities, we use the same law by assuming that a Gaussian
process is a special case of a CIR process.
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Solving the MGF of the default intensity gives:
P (t, (1+fb+fgb), (fb+fgb)) = −a1(t1, t2)∗Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
(1+fb+fgb)∗λisds)∗exp(−a2(t1, t2)∗(fb+fgb)∗λis(t1))]
The guessed solution is:
P (t, (1 + fb + fgb), (fb + fgb)) = a1(t1, t2) ∗ b1(t, t1, t2) ∗ exp(−b2(t1, t2) ∗ λi) (5.32)
where:
b1(t, t1, t2) = (
2 ∗ φ ∗ exp( τ1−t
2
(φ+ β))
σ2 ∗ a2(t1, t2) ∗ (fb + fgb) ∗ (exp(φ(τ1 − t)− 1) + φ− β + exp(φ(τ1 − t))(φ+ β))
2∗α
σ2
(5.33)
b2(t, t1, t2) = (
a2(t1, t2) ∗ (fb + fgb) ∗ (φ+ β + exp(φ(τ1 − t))(φ− β) + 2 ∗ (1 + fb + fgb) ∗ ((exp(φ(τ1 − t)− 1)
σ2 ∗ a2(t1, t2) ∗ (fb + fgb) ∗ (exp(φ(τ1 − t)− 1) + φ− β + exp(φ(τ1 − t))(φ+ β)
(5.34)
Solving the MGF of the liquidity intensities leads to:
L(t,K1, K2) = a3(t1, t2) ∗ Et[exp(−
t1ˆ
t
K1 ∗ yds) ∗ exp(−a4(t1, t2) ∗K2 ∗ y(t1)ds)]
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We guess a solution
L(t,K1, K2) = a3(t1, t2) ∗ b3(t1, t2) ∗ exp(−b4(t1, t2) ∗ y)
(5.35)
b3(t1, t2) = exp[
η2 ∗K21
6
∗(τ1−1)3+η
2 ∗K22 ∗ a4(t1, t2)
2
∗(τ1−1)2+(η
2 ∗K2 ∗ a4(t1, t2)
2
)∗a4(t1, t2)∗K2∗(τ1−1)]
(5.36)
and
b4(t1, t2) = a4(t1, t2) ∗K2 +K1 ∗ (τ1 − 1)
(5.37)
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5.7.2 Appendix 2: Calibration Procedure: Grid Search Method
We calibrate the model to bond and CDS data for the following ratings: A, BBB
and BB. Our calibration procedure is similar in spirit to Buhler and Trapp (2010),
however since our model involves many parameters it is worth discussing in details
the calibration and the diﬀerent robustness checks carried throughout the analysis. As
mentioned before, we assume a CIR process (equation (5.6)) for default intensity and
a Gaussian process (equation (5.7)) for liquidity intensities, this gives us a total of 8
parameters ( µ, β, σ, ηb, ηask, ηbid,ηgb,ηsys).
• We initialize a 8-dimensional grid for the drift and the diﬀusion parameters listed
above. j represents the grid number and i the grid point in the grid j.
(a) The initialized vector (µij, βij, σij, η
b
ij, η
ask
ij , η
bid
ij , η
gb
ij , η
sys
ij ) deﬁnes the pa-
rameters in each grid point i in grid j.
(b) In each grid point i, we initialize the factor matrix Hijk where k counts
the number of iterations. k will be diﬀerent across the ratings.
(c) The calibration is done at cross-sectional level. Assuming that the ini-
tialized parameters in step (a) are true, for each time t (where t = 1, 2, ...., T
) we numerically specify the parameters (λij, γ
b
ij, γ
ask
ij , γ
bid
ij , γ
gb
ij , γ
sys
ij )(t) that
minimize the sum of squared diﬀerences between the theoretical values and
the observed prices (i.e. CDS and bond yield spreads both in basis points).
Step (c) is performed by assuming Hijk to be an identity matrix, this leads
to a one-to-one relationship between the correlated and the independent in-
tensities.
(λˆij, γˆ
b
ij, γˆ
ask
ij , γˆ
bid
ij , γˆ
gb
ij , γˆ
sys
ij )(t) = argminΣ
N
n=1(P
mod
n − P obsn )2
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(5.38)
where Pmodn represents the model price, P
obs
n the observed values and n the
number of cross-sectional units.
(d) In order to determine the true factor matrix Hijk, we need to minimize
the element-wise-sum of the squared diﬀerences between the assumed latent
factors in step (a) and the empirical variance, covariance and autocovariance.
We denote this sum as Mijk(Hijk).
(e) To minimize Mijk(Hijk) we need to numerically change the parameters of
Hijk. We stop this iteration when the max-norm of Hˆijkopt and Hˆijkopt−1 is
smaller than 0.01. Due to the high number of parameters in the factor matrix,
we try many minimizations with diﬀerent guessed values in order to compare
the outputs and ensure that the global minimum is picked.
Hˆijkopt = argminMijk(Hijk)
(5.39)
(f) We use the true factor matrix Hˆijkopt and the new intensities
(λˆijkopt , γˆ
b
ijkopt , γˆ
ask
ijkopt , γˆ
bid
ijkopt , γˆ
gb
ijkopt , γˆ
sys
ijkopt)(t) as new inputs, compute the dif-
ference between the theoretical and observed values and ﬁnally sum the dif-
ferences across the time series.
Sij = Σ
T
t=1Σ
N
n=1(P
mod
n − P obsn )2
(5.40)
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We do the same operation across each grid point i in grid j and then take the
minimum value of grid j39.
Soptj = min {S1,j, S2,j.........., SI,j}
(5.41)
(g) We pick the minimum value of step (f), use it as a ﬁner local grid and
move to the second grid. We do the same analysis until we reach grid 8. We
stop this iteration across the grids when there is no further improvement in
the ﬁtting.
• As a robustness check instead of doing a grid search and changing individu-
ally each parameter in the vector (µij, βij, σij, η
b
ij, η
ask
ij , η
bid
ij , η
gb
ij , η
sys
ij ) as we have
done above (from step(a) to step(g)), we take the optimal vector of parameters
(µˆij, βˆij, σˆij, ηˆbij,
ˆηaskij ,
ˆηbidij ,
ˆ
ηgbij ,
ˆηsysij ) retrieved from step(g), put it as initial guess in
a new optimization and run the algorithm in one go. In this procedure, each iter-
ation will require the algorithm to come back to step(a) and redo the calibration
by changing (µij, βij, σij, η
b
ij, η
ask
ij , η
bid
ij , η
gb
ij , η
sys
ij ) at the same time. This method
ensures that our results are robust. The optimal parameters that we get are no
diﬀerent from the one obtained in step(g).
We ﬁt the model to the data with a very small error. We obtain a mean error of 0.305,
39Although grid search method is a robust technique because it allows to optimize non-linear problems, it suﬀers from
the fact that one has to know the acceptable parameter space before starting the optimization, otherwise convergence
is not guaranteed. Therefore, before initializing the vector (µij , βij , σij , η
b
ij , η
ask
ij , η
bid
ij , η
gb
ij , η
sys
ij ) at step(a), we ﬁrst use
trial values and estimate the model few times. This enables us to create a grid inside the acceptable parameter space.
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0.35 and 0.369 bps for both bond and CDS spreads for rating A, BBB and BB respec-
tively. In Figure 5.2, we plot the model-implied bond and CDS spreads with the actual
data. Table 5.1 shows the values of the optimal parameters (µˆij, βˆij, σˆij, ηˆbij,
ˆηaskij ,
ˆηbidij ,
ˆ
ηgbij ,
ˆηsysij ).
Rating BBB and BB have parameters that are in the same range. However rating A
have higher volatility (i.e. ηl). Although in theory, rating A should have lower volatility
we found that it does not converge at values that are in the same range as those of rating
BBB and BB. Therefore, in our calibration exercise, we expand the grid by increment-
ing progressively the grid bounds of the volatility parameters ηl. We stop increasing the
grid when the inner iteration at step(e) retrieve the optimal factor sensitivity matrix
Hˆijkopt .
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5.7.3 Appendix 3: Dynamic Interactions Between CDS and Bond Markets:
Long Run Relationship
In this section we study the dynamic interactions between the diﬀerent components of
CDS and bond markets presented in Table 5.4. The idea is to investigate whether there
is a long run relationship between bond and CDS components for the subinvestment
and investment grades40.
The analysis is based on an econometric model that requires cointegration test be-
tween bond pure credit risk premium bd and CDS pure credit risk premium sdg, bla
and sla where bla is the average of bond liquidity premium bl and bond market liquid-
ity premium blg, sla the average of CDS liquidity premium sl and systematic liquidity
premium slg, and ﬁnally the bond correlation premium bc and the CDS correlation
premium sc.
In case the premium are non-stationary41 and cointegrated, we estimate the Johansen
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) in order to study the long run relationship
between premium and the short term deviations (i.e. adjustment speed). The VECM
approach is very sensitive to the number of lags included in the estimation therefore
in order to deﬁne the optimal lag number we use the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and pick the number of lags with the smallest AIC. In Table 5.5 we present the
maximum likelihood estimation of the cointegrated vector (i.e. unnormalised vector)
and the vector of adjustment parameters42. Since our dataset covers the crisis period,
we split the sample into two in order to be able to interpret the dynamics under diﬀerent
market conditions.
Table 5.5 reports the results of our estimation for the subinvestment and investment
grade categories. We document that for the pre-crisis and crisis periods CDS pure
credit risk premium sdg and bond pure credit risk premium bd are not cointegrated
40Subinvestment grade represents the average of rating BBB and BB. Investment grade corresponds to rating A.
41We apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) to test for the unit root eﬀect.
42Our interpretation of the cointegration relationship will be based on the normalised cointegration vector with respect
to the ﬁrst variable.
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which implies that the eﬀect of bond liquidity plays an important role in the defaultable
leg of the CDS contract. On the other hand, liquidity premia bla and sla seems to be
cointegrated at 1% level during the pre-crisis period. The liquidity of the bond and
the CDS markets are cointegrated with positive sign indicating a negative relationship
between the premia which indicates that low bond liquidity leads to a high liquidity
in the CDS market. On the hand, the cointegration relationship doesn't hold during
crisis time which implies that the long run relationship between the liquidity premium
of both markets is dependent on the magnitude of the default intensity.
The investment grade category displays diﬀerent ﬁndings. In fact, there is no coin-
tegration between the credit risk and liquidity premium. However the correlation pre-
mium of the bond and the CDS markets bc and sc respectively are cointegrated at 5%
signiﬁcance level for both the pre-crisis and crisis time with a negative sign revealing
a positive relationship between the premium. This ﬁnding indicates that when default
risk and liquidity risk are positively correlated in the bond market, the same applies to
the CDS market. This scenario is likely if an increase in default probability increases
bond liquidity which induce investors to use CDSs to hedge their position. This result
is consistent with what we discussed in section 5.5.2.
In summary, the credit risk premium across both markets are not strongly related
which infers that bond liquidity plays an important role in CDS spread movements
and this is consistent with the results of Table 5.4 which show that liquidity plays a
substantial role in the CDS market. The results clearly point to the fact that there
is no stable or long run relationship between the premium of the sovereign CDS and
bond market. This might constitute a possible explanation of the weak weight that the
correlation risk premium carries.
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Figures
Figure 5.1: Average Bond Spreads and CDS Mid Spreads for Ratings A, BBB and BB
The ﬁgures show the plot of the average bond and CDS mid spreads from November 2005 till September
2010 for rating A (top plot) and rating BBB and BB (bottom plot). We extract the bond spreads
from the prices using the method described in section 5.3. The ﬁgures show that the bond and CDS
spreads for rating A, BBB and BB track each other very closely although it seems that on average
bond spreads are slightly higher than CDS spreads.
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Figure 5.2: Model VS Data for Rating A, BBB and BB
This ﬁgure shows the plot of the model implied bond and CDS bid/ask spreads for rating A (top plot),
rating BBB (middle plot) and rating BB (bottom plot). The ﬁgures show that the model ﬁts well the
data. We obtain a mean error of 0.305, 0.35 and 0.369 bps for both bond and CDS spreads for rating
A, BBB and BB respectively.
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Tables
Table 5.1: Latent Factors of Default and Liquidity Intensities
In this table, we report the parameter values (in percent term) of the processes deﬁning the default
x and liquidity intensities yl (where l=b,ask,bid, gb or sys) which are estimated using the calibration
procedure deﬁned in Appendix 5.7.2. ηl and σ are the volatility terms of the Gaussian and CIR
processes respectively deﬁned in equation (5.6) and (5.7). β and α are the parameters speciﬁc to the
drift of the CIR process.
A BBB BB
ηb 50.0 1.0 2.0
ηask 50.0 2.0 2.0
ηbid 50.0 1.0 1.0
ηgb 30.0 2.0 1.0
ηsys 10.0 1.0 2.0
σ 10.0 8.7 8.0
β 20.0 20.8 20.5
α 10.0 10.3 5.0
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Table 5.2: Independent Intensities
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the pure intensities (in percent term) where x corresponds
to the pure default risk, yb to the pure bond liquidity, yask to the pure CDS ask liquidity, ybid to the
pure CDS bid liquidity, ygb to the pure ﬂight-to-liquidity and ysys to the pure systematic liquidity.
The table shows that default intensity is positive across all the ratings however liquidity intensities
have both negative and positive values. The signs are consistent with the assumptions made on the
processes driving the intensities. The signs of the mean of the pure liquidity intensities combined with
the signs of the parameters of the factor sensitivity matrix in Table 5.3 enables us to infer whether the
impact on the correlated intensities is positive or negative (equation (5.4) and (5.5)).
x yb yask ybid ygb ysys
Mean 7.21 10.22 8.16 8.14 3.26 -7.12
A Max 8.43 10.67 9.57 9.55 4.31 -5.12
Min 6.61 9.96 6.03 5.97 2.70 -8.26
Mean 10.77 9.51 9.60 9.59 9.08 -11.21
BBB Max 12.72 10.54 10.51 10.50 10.59 -8.49
Min 9.63 8.98 6.93 6.92 7.90 -12.13
Mean 11.24 3.44 8.83 8.82 12.98 -10.37
BB Max 12.14 5.27 10.32 10.31 14.24 -6.69
Min 10.55 2.58 5.20 4.55 12.09 -12.12
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Table 5.3: Parameters of the Factor Sensitivity Matrix
The table presents the values of the parameters of the factor sensitivities matrix deﬁned in equation
(5.4). The matrix has been estimated using the calibration procedure deﬁned in Appendix 5.7.2. fb,
fask, fbid, fgb and fsys represent the impact of pure default risk x on bond liquidity γ
b(t), CDS liquidity
ask γask(t), CDS liquidity bid γbid(t), bond market liquidity γgb(t) and systematic liquidity γsys(t).
The parameter gb (or gask, gbid, ggb, gsys) corresponds to the impact of pure liquidity intensity y
b(t)
(or yask(t), ybid(t), ygb(t), ysys(t)) on the credit risk premium λ(t). Finally, w represents the direct
link between the diﬀerent liquidity intensities. For example, wgb,ask symbolizes the interaction between
the ﬂight-to-liquidity (or bond market liquidity) (gb) and the CDS ask quote (ask). The parameter w
aims to capture all the possible liquidity shocks between bond and CDS markets.
A BBB BB
fb -0.0026 0.0112 0.0148
fask 0.0043 0.0374 -0.1548
fbid 0.0057 0.0179 0.0370
gb 0.0967 0 -0.0345
gask -0.5045 -0.0212 -0.0685
gbid 0.0986 -0.0153 -0.0680
ggb 0.0976 -0.0044 -0.0345
gsys 0.0978 0.0192 0.0254
wb,ask 0.0979 0.0184 -0.0019
wbid,b 0.0984 0.0257 0.0275
wgb,b 0.0066 0.0191 0.0168
fgb 0 0 0
fsys -0.0051 0.0369 -0.0905
wb,sys 0.0943 -0.8060 0.0359
wbid,ask -0.0034 0.0213 -0.1443
wask,gb 0.0979 0.0184 -0.0019
wask,sys -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.1035
wgb,bid 0.0984 0.0257 0.0275
wbid,sys 0.0039 0.0004 0.0281
wgb,sys 0.0943 -0.8060 0.0359
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Table 5.4: Pure Credit Risk, Liquidity, Global Liquidity Risk and Correlation Premia
In this table, we report the results of our decomposition procedure deﬁned in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.5.2. In
Panel A, we show the percentage values of Bond Pure Credit Risk Premium (bd), Bond Pure Liquidity
Premium (bl), Bond Pure Global Liquidity Premium (blg) and Bond Pure Correlation Premium (bc). In
Panel B, we show the percentage values of CDS Pure Credit Risk Premium (sdg), CDS Pure Liquidity
Premium (sl), CDS Pure Global Liquidity Premium (slg ) and CDS Pure Correlation Premium (sc).
We split our sample period into a pre-crisis and a crisis period and we do the same decomposition
exercise as before. The row BC presents the magnitude (in percent term) of each component for the
period before the crisis which is from November 2005 to January 2008. Likewise, DC introduces the
magnitude (in percent term) of each component for the crisis period which is from January 2008 to
September 2010.
A BBB BB
Panel A
bd(%) 73.8 71.2 74.0
BC bd(%) 74.1 72.3 74.1
DC bd(%) 73.64 70.45 73.97
bl(%) 19.49 13.90 5.0
BC bl(%) 19.78 13.77 3.99
DC bl(%) 19.2 14.06 5.88
blg(%) 6.6 14.7 20.90
BC blg(%) 6.1 13.88 21.89
DC blg(%) 7.08 15.48 20.1
bc(%) 0.00079 0.0031 0.00053
BC bc(%) 0.00065 0.0030 0.00047
DC bc(%) 0.00090 0.0032 0.00058
Panel B
sdg(%) 54.5 55.7 56.6
BC sdg(%) 59.1 58.4 61.0
DC sdg(%) 50.8 53.6 53.2
sl(%) 24.1 16.1 16.4
BC sl(%) 21.6 14.4 13.8
DC sl(%) 26.0 17.4 18.5
slg(%) 21.5 28.1 26.8
BC slg(%) 19.3 27.1 25.1
DC slg(%) 23.2 28.9 28.2
sc(%) 0.0035 0.038 0.090
BC sc(%) 0.0028 0.037 0.088
DC sc(%) 0.0041 0.039 0.092
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Table 5.5: VECM Analysis
In this table, we report our results of the cointegration analysis. We study the cointegration between
bd and sdg (i.e. credit risk premium) , bla and sla (i.e. liquidity premium) and ﬁnally bc and sc (i.e.
correlation premium) where bla is the average of bl and blg, sla is the average of sl and slg. We ﬁrst
test for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. If the series are non-stationary
we estimate the Johansen Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) in order to study the long run
relationship and the short term deviations between the premium. In the table below, we present the
maximum likelihood estimation of the unnormalised cointegrated vector (Coint. Coeﬀ) and the vector
of adjustment (Speed Adj) parameters. On the other hand, if the series are not cointegrated we write
NA (Non Available). In our analysis, we split our sample in two periods (before and during crisis).
The period before the crisis runs from November 2005 to January 2008 and the crisis period goes
from January 2008 to September 2010. Subinvestment Grade refers to the average of rating BBB
and BB, investment grade to rating A. '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level
respectively.
4bd 4sdg 4bla 4sla 4bc 4sc
Panel A: Subinvestment Grade (before crisis)
Coint. Coeﬀ NA NA 0.0013∗ 0.0051∗ NA NA
Speed Adj NA NA −0.48 −3.43 NA NA
Panel B: Investment Grade (before crisis)
Coint. Coeﬀ NA NA NA NA 2.89∗∗ −7.79∗∗
Speed Adj NA NA NA NA 0.022 0.251
Panel C: Subinvestment Grade (During crisis)
Coint. Coeﬀ NA NA NA NA NA NA
Speed Adj NA NA NA NA NA NA
Panel D: Investment Grade (During crisis)
Coint. Coeﬀ NA NA NA NA 0.629∗∗ −2.014∗∗
Speed Adj NA NA NA NA 0.01 −0.39
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Chapter 6
Implied Liquidity Risk in the Term
Structure of the Sovereign Credit
Default Swap Spreads
6.1 Introduction:
In this chapter, we extend the work of Chen, Fabozzi and Sverdlove (2010) and analyse
the eﬀect of liquidity risk in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads. We diﬀer-
entiate ourselves from the authors by using the whole term structure of sovereign CDS
spreads while they work on a dataset that contains mostly 5 year corporate CDSs1.
By using the information embedded in the time-series and cross section, we get more
accurate measure of the credit and liquidity premium. Furthermore, because of data
availability issues, Chen et al (2010) consider that bond and CDS liquidity risk are equal
and use that assumption to explain liquidity of both bonds and CDSs. In fact, this
might represent an issue because CDSs are more liquid than bonds, thus their method
may not give a good representation of the liquidity frictions speciﬁc to the bond mar-
ket. In our study we relax this assumption by using a separate liquidity factor for both
sovereign bonds and CDSs.
In this chapter, we assume that illiquidity reduces the value of the asset. The idea
is that the CDS spreads in the market contain liquidity risk and therefore are less than
1Unlike the corporate CDS market where there is a signiﬁcant trading activity at the ﬁve year point only, the sovereign
CDS market is liquid at diﬀerent maturities which provide us with a rich set of time-series and cross-sectional information.
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hypothetical perfectly liquid CDS spreads. The perfectly liquid CDS spreads are not
observable, however, their values can not be higher than the ask quotes. On the other
hand, the traded CDSs should be relatively illiquid and therefore their values should
be somewhere between the bid and the ask quotes. For convenience, we assume that
the mid quote is a fair price for the traded CDSs. Thus, the ask-mid diﬀerence should
represent an upper bound for liquidity risk.
By using a single factor model, we examine the time-series properties of the risk-
neutral default arrival rate and liquidity risk implicit in the term structure of sovereign
CDS spreads. Our focus on the one factor model is motivated by the high level of co-
movements across maturities documented in the sovereign CDS market2. We choose to
apply our framework to Brazil, Philippines and Turkey, three emerging countries with
diﬀerent credit history and for which a full term structure of sovereign CDS and bond
spreads is available. Moreover, we use two diﬀerent estimation techniques, the Maxi-
mum Likelihood method a la Chen and Scott (1993) and the Kalman ﬁlter approach,
to approximate the liquidity premium and show that the Kalman ﬁlter provides robust
results and give clearer insight on the identiﬁcation of the liquidity premium.
Our study complements the paper of Pan and Singleton (2008) who focus on the dy-
namic properties of the risk neutral default arrival rate and recovery risk. We shed some
light on the liquidity risk that may cause the variation over-time of the term structure
of sovereign CDSs. While Pan and Singleton (2008) emphasize that a signiﬁcant part
of the co-movement among the term structures of sovereign CDS spreads is triggered
by changes in investors appetites for credit exposure at a global level, rather than by
a reassessment of the fundamental strengths of these speciﬁc sovereign economies, our
results suggest that liquidity risk has a non-trivial role and participates directly to the
variation over time of the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads. Moreover, our ﬁnd-
ings imply that CDS buyers beneﬁted from the liquidity premium during the pre-crisis
2Longstaﬀ et al (2011) and others ﬁnd that the ﬁrst principal component can explain a large portion of the variation
in the sovereign CDS market.
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period. However, during crisis time, we observe an increase in the liquidity of the CDS
market which shifted the balance of supply and demand of the CDS protections, thus
CDS buyers were no longer able to earn the liquidity premium. Finally, we provide a
complete picture of the co-movement of bond and CDS liquidity risk term structures
and show empirical evidence that the CDS and bond liquidity ratio are mainly inﬂu-
enced by the magnitude of the default intensity. In fact, in case of high default risk, we
observe that CDS liquidity risk increases more than bond liquidity risk.
Our chapter has important implications for risk managers and policy makers as it
enhances our understanding of the movements along the term structure of sovereign
CDS spreads.
In Section 6.2, we discuss the related literature and in Section 6.3 we provide an
example to illustrate the methodology used to estimate liquidity risk. Section 6.4 intro-
duces the data. Section 6.5 provides a rough estimation of the liquidity risk embedded
in the CDS term structure and compare it with bond liquidity risk. Section 6.6 presents
the theoretical framework. Section 6.7 and 6.8 explain the two estimation techniques
utilised to estimate the model parameters. Finally, Section 6.9 discusses the results and
Section 6.10 concludes.
6.2 Related Literature:
As we have discussed in the previous chapters, the literature of CDS liquidity has seen
an important growth in the past years, however empirical studies that involve the mod-
eling of the entire CDS curve is still quite rare. Zhang (2008) suggests a study that
estimate the default risk using the entire credit curve of the sovereign CDSs for the
Argentine case. The author suggests a model that takes into account the dynamic
interaction between interest rate, default intensity, expected recovery rate and coun-
terparty default risk. He ﬁnds that the risk neutral and physical default probabilities
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increase substantially during the period of the sample when Argentina was close to
default. Secondly, the author documents that the relation between default probability
and default risk premium3 is not monotone. In fact, he ﬁnds that when the default
probability is low, default risk premium plays an important role in CDS pricing. How-
ever, when the default probability is high, the default risk premium tends to decrease
and the actual default probability becomes more important in the valuation of the CDS
contract. Chen, Cheng and Lui (2008) extend the model of ChenChengFabozziLiu
(CCFL-thereafter) model (2006) to study the term structure of CDS spreads by using
a matrix CDS dataset provided by JP Morgan. They ﬁnd that the model ﬁts well
the data and captures most of the cross-sectional dynamics and time-series variation.
Furthermore, they provide evidence of a negative relationship between the default risk
and the risk free rate consistent with the ﬁnding of CCFL (2006). Chen, Chen and Wu
(2011) provide a study that performs a joint analysis on the term structure of interest
rate and credit spreads using CDS data. They mainly focus on the interactions between
the aggregate credit condition of the market and the interest rate curve. They report
interesting results. First, they ﬁnd that unlike the one factor model, the two factors
can price well the whole term structure of the credit spreads. Secondly, they document
that the interest rate factors inﬂuence both the current and future changes of the credit
risk factors. Finally, the authors also study the potential two way relationship between
credit and interest rate factors and observe that the aggregate credit conditions im-
pact both the short and the long end of the interest rate curve. Bedendo et al (2005)
analyse whether the slope of the term structure of credit spreads can predict changes
in future short and long-term credit spread levels. Using both bond and CDS data,
they ﬁnd signiﬁcant predictive power for the short end of the term structure of credit
spreads for both markets. Jarrow, Li and Ye (2009) explore the potential arbitrage
opportunities in the term structure of the corporate CDS spreads. They construct a
3Zhang (2008) deﬁnes the default risk premium as the diﬀerence between the actual and risk neutral default probability
divided by the actual default probability.
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portfolio of CDS contracts in order to test for the arbitrage proﬁtability. Their re-
sults highlight that there are statistical arbitrage opportunities that could be exploited
in the term structure of the corporate CDS spreads. Longstaﬀ et al (2011) use the
sovereign CDS term structure to estimate the systematic distress risk premium em-
bedded in the 5 years sovereign CDS spread. They ﬁnd that on average distress risk
represents a third of the sovereign CDS spreads. Pan and Singleton (2008) investigate
the default intensity and the recovery rate using the term structure of CDS spreads and
show that the ﬁrst principal component captures 96% of the variation over-time of the
term structure. Han and Zhou (2011) study the relationship between the slope of the
term structure of CDS spreads4 and the expected stock return and ﬁnd that the slope
predicts the cross-sectional returns of the stocks and signals deterioration in the ﬁrm's
credit quality. The authors emphasize that this negative relationship is consistent with
the slow diﬀusion of the information, contained in the CDS slope, into stock prices.
Truck, Laub and Rachev (2004) examine the term structure of bond and CDS spreads
for diﬀerent rating categories. They argue that although in theory lower credit quality
tend to accompany high credit spreads, this empirical relationship can be rather con-
troversial when we observe bonds with the same rating and diﬀerent maturities. The
authors provide evidence that there is a positive relationship between the maturity and
the spreads for investment grade debt and this holds for both bond and CDS spreads.
Bajlum and Larsen (2007) present a paper that estimates the impact of accounting
transparency on the term structure of corporate CDS spreads. Typically the structural
credit risk models are well known for under predicting the short end of the bond credit
spreads. The authors argue that one of the reasons behind the model failure is the lack
of information available to investors to assess fairly the ﬁrm value which give them an
incentive to draw inference on delayed accounting data which in turn might be respon-
sible for noisy estimates of the asset value. This phenomena might have an implication
4Han and Zhou (2011) deﬁne the slope as being the diﬀerence between ﬁve-year and one-year CDS spreads.
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on the term structure of credit spreads and one of the aims of their paper is to capture
the component of credit spreads that is due to the lack of accounting transparency. To
this end, they utilise the term structure of corporate CDS spreads and ﬁnd that the
transparency spread is signiﬁcant at the short end and insigniﬁcant at the long end of
the CDS curve. Furthermore, they report that the accounting transparency eﬀect is
large for the most risky ﬁrms and small for the others. As a conclusion, the authors
advance the idea that variables other than accounting transparency should be used to
capture the bias in the short end of the CDS curve. Finally, De Fronseca and Gottschalk
(2012) present a joint study of the term structure of the CDS spreads and the implied
volatility surface and analyse the information ﬂow between credit and volatility factors.
The authors ﬁnd that the credit market is the main responsible for the overall mar-
ket shocks and thus emphasize the importance of the relationship between credit and
volatility markets.
The literature review presented above shows that there are few studies that are
closely related to ours which are those of Zhang (2008), Pan and Singleton (2008) and
Longstaﬀ et al (2011). All of these studies estimate default risk using the entire credit
curve of sovereign CDS spreads. One important contribution of our chapter, however,
is the analysis of the dynamic properties of the liquidity risk embedded in the sovereign
CDS curve. In the following section, we provide an example to illustrate the main idea
of this study.
6.3 A Quick Illustration:
The chapter postulates that illiquidity reduces the value of the asset. This idea can be
clearly illustrated with the following example.
We assume VBond to be the value of a perfectly liquid sovereign bond (i.e. free of
liquidity risk). The full bond pricing formula can be expressed as follows:
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VBond = c
n∑
j=1
PjQj + PnQn + w
T∑
t=0
Pt(∆Qt) (6.1)
with
Qt = e
−h∗t (6.2)
and
∆Qt = Qt−1 −Qt (6.3)
Pt, Qt, h and w represent the risk-free discount factor, the survival probability, the
hazard rate factor and the recovery rate respectively. T corresponds to the time of
default and ∆Qt to the probability of surviving till t− 1 and defaulting between t− 1
and t.
We now deﬁne V ∗Bond to be the value of a bond with liquidity risk and introduce a
liquidity discount factor in the pricing formula.
V ∗Bond = c
n∑
j=1
PjQjLt + PnQnLn +
T∑
t=0
Pt(∆Qt)Lt (6.4)
with
Lt = e
−y∗t (6.5)
representing the liquidity discount factor and y the liquidity risk.
Because of the additional discount factor Lt, V
∗
Bond < VBond. Therefore the liquidity
risk reduces the value of the asset.
The same idea can be applied to the value of the CDS contract VCDS.
VCDS = sT (
n∑
j=1
PjQj) = (1− w)
T∑
t=0
Pt(∆Qt) (6.6)
where sT represents the CDS premium (free of liquidity) paid on a semi-annual
basis. The term sT (
∑n
j=1 PjQj) in equation (6.6) corresponds to premium leg and
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(1−w)∑Tt=0 Pt(∆Qt) to the defaultable leg. We postulate that the CDS spread in the
market contains liquidity risk and should be less than the perfectly liquid CDS spread
sT . Therefore, s
∗
T < sT where V
∗
CDS is deﬁned as:
V ∗CDS = s
∗
T (
n∑
j=1
PjQj) = (1− w)
T∑
t=0
Pt(∆Qt)Lt (6.7)
In order to estimate the credit and the liquidity risk, we will ﬁt equation (6.6) and
(6.7) to the ask quote and mid quotes respectively. In what follows, we describe our
dataset.
6.4 Data Description:
Similarly to the previous chapter, we focus on emerging market countries to run our
analysis. We download bid, ask and mid quotes for the 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years CDS
spreads on a daily basis from Datastream Reuters for the following countries: Brazil,
Philippines and Turkey. These countries have diﬀerent geopolitical characteristics and
have a rich set of sovereign bonds which enable us to study the liquidity of the term
structure of their sovereign bond markets. We use the same bond data as Section 5.3
of Chapter 5.
Table 6.2 presents a description of our bond dataset with information on the average
mid yield, maturity dates, coupon payment rates and issue dates. The diversity in bond
maturities will help us match as closely as possible the diﬀerent maturities of the CDS
contracts.
In the following section, we use our dataset to estimate the liquidity premium for
both CDS and bond spreads.
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6.5 A Rough Estimation of the Liquidity Risk:
In this section, we assume that the default intensity h and the liquidity risk y deﬁned
in equation (6.2) and (6.5) are constant5. We then perform a simple exercise in order
to estimate the liquidity risk in the sovereign CDS term structure and compare it with
bond liquidity risk.
6.5.1 CDS Discretization:
We compute the default and liquidity intensity h and y respectively, directly from the
CDS spreads by using a discrete-time approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned
below.
Equation (6.6) deﬁned above does not have any liquidity adjustment and includes
only a default component. Since we postulate that the ask quote is an upper bound for
the perfectly liquid CDS spreads, we use it to retrieve the implied default intensity h.
The idea can be illustrated as follows:
V askCDS = s
ask
T ∗(
1
2
2K∑
j=1
P (j/2).Q(j/2)) = (1−w)∗1
2
2K∑
j=1
P (j/2)[Q(j−1/2)−Q(j/2)] (6.8)
P (j/2) and Q(j/2) represent the risk free discount factor and the risk-neutral sur-
vival probability respectively, K corresponds to the maturity of the CDS and w to
the recovery rate. Both variables are divided by two in order to account for the semi-
annual payment. We assume a constant risk neutral default intensity h which leads to
a survival probability equal to:
Q(j/2) = e−h/2 (6.9)
5In this study, we use the terms hazard rate and default intensity interchangeably.
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L = (1 − w) is the risk neutral loss rate in the event of default and is equal to 75%
(Pan and Singleton(2008)). The left hand side of equation (6.8) represents the value
of the protection-buyer leg and the right hand side the value of the protection seller at
the initiation of the contract. By rearranging equation (6.8), we can infer the default
intensity sT/2 = L(e
h/2 − 1) which leads to:
h = 2 ∗ log(1 + s
ask
T
2 ∗ (1− w)) (6.10)
Equation (6.10) represents the implied default intensity implied from the CDS ask
quote.
On the other hand, equation (6.7) contains a penalty for illiquidity and a default
adjustment. Since we assumed that all the CDS spreads in the market are illiquid (or
not perfectly liquid) and therefore less than the ask quote, we use the CDS mid6 to
retrieve the implied default and liquidity intensity (h and y respectively). Thus, we can
rewrite the discretized CDS pricing formula as follows:
V midCDS = s
mid
T ∗(
1
2
2T∑
j=1
P (j/2).Q(j/2)) = (1−w)∗1
2
2T∑
j=1
P (j/2)[Q(j−1/2)−Q(j/2)]∗L(j/2)
(6.11)
where
L(j/2) = e−y/2 (6.12)
which leads to:
h+ y = 2 ∗ log(1 + s
mid
T
2 ∗ (1− w)) (6.13)
Equation (6.13) corresponds to the credit and liquidity intensity implied from the
CDS mid quote. Finally, we take the diﬀerence between equation (6.13) and (6.10) to
6In this study, we assume that the CDS mid quote is a fair price for the CDS.
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isolate the implied default intensity and focus only on the liquidity intensity y which
provide us with a rough liquidity risk estimate.
We redo the same analysis across the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads (i.e
for the 1y, 3y, 5y, 7y and 10y maturity) and we plot the time series of the CDS liquidity
risk term structure of Brazil (Figure 6.1), Philippines (Figure 6.2) and Turkey (Figure
6.3).
Overall, the ﬁgures show that for the period preceding the crisis the term structure
of CDS liquidity risk has a ﬂat behavior especially for Turkey and Philippines, although
we observe that the liquidity risk is slightly higher for the short and the long end of the
term structure. The case of Brazil is diﬀerent as we see that the ﬁrst part of the sample
is characterized by few spikes in the liquidity risk and after that the term structure
ﬂattens similarly to Philippines and Turkey. During the crisis period and for all the
countries, we observe spikes in the liquidity risk and the shape of liquidity risk term
structure is inverted with the short end having higher values than the long end of the
curve. This result points to the fact that liquidity risk is pressurizing more at the short
end of the CDS curve. In their study Pan and Singleton (2008) ﬁnd that their log-
normal one factor model captures quite well the behavior of the sovereign CDS term
structure but misprices the 1 year CDS contract. The authors provide as a possible
explanation the liquidity and/or the eﬀects of supply and demand pressure. We add
to their explanation an empirical evidence showing that illiquidity plays an important
role in the short end of the curve7.
In this following, we analyse CDS liquidity behavior with respect to bond liquidity.
The liquidity of the underlying bond market is also important to consider because CDS
traders hedge their positions with cash market instruments and the higher the liquidity
risk in the bond the higher would be the impact on CDS spreads.
7We redo the same analysis by trying diﬀerent values for the loss rate (50%, 60%, 90%) and although it inﬂuences
the magnitude of the hazard rate and liquidity premium it doesnt change the results described above.
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6.5.2 The Term Structure of Bond and CDS Liquidity Risk: A Compara-
tive Analysis
We do a comparative analysis between bond and CDS liquidity risk at both term
structure and time series levels. To this end, we need to match bond and CDS maturities
(i.e. 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years), therefore for the 1 year CDS we should have bonds that
mature between 2006 and 2011, for the 3 year CDS we need bonds that mature between
2008 and 2013, for the 5 year CDS we require bonds maturing between 2010 and 2015,
for the 7 year CDS we should use bonds maturing between 2012 and 2017 and ﬁnally
for the 10 year CDS we should have bonds maturing between 2010 and 2020. Although
the countries we picked have a large amount of bonds issued at diﬀerent dates8, it is not
enough to match all the CDS maturities, however for each CDS maturity we pick bond
that fall into the maturity intervals mentioned above. Therefore, in order to proxy for
the 1 year bond liquidity risk we use the diﬀerence between the mid and ask yields of
the shortest maturity we have for each country (i.e. 02/2013 for Philippines, 08/2011
for Brazil and 06/2011 for Turkey). Likewise, we proxy the liquidity risk of the 3 year
bond by taking the diﬀerence between the mid and ask yields of bonds that expire right
after the shortest maturity (i.e. 01/2014 for Philippines, 01/2012 for Brazil, 01/2013
for Turkey). For the 5 year bond, we choose bonds with maturity dates that do not
exceed 2015 (i.e. 03/2015 for Philippines, 03/2015 for Brazil and 03/2015 for Turkey).
For the 7 year bond, we pick bonds that have maturity dates that are around 2017 (i.e.
01/2017 for Philippines, 01/2018 for Brazil and 07/2017 for Turkey) and ﬁnally we do
the same thing for the 10 year bond and collect bonds that have maturities that are
as close as possible to 2020 (i.e. 10/2024 for Philippines, 01/2020 Brazil and 02/2025
Turkey).
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of bond and CDS liquidity risk and shows
that overall the mean of the term structure of bond liquidity risk over the sample period
8Table 6.2 presents a description of our bond dataset with information on the average mid yield, maturity dates,
coupon payment rates and issue dates.
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is slightly higher than that of the CDS liquidity risk for Brazil, Philippines and Turkey.
Finally, we plot the ratio of bond and CDS liquidity term structures in order to analyse
their joint behavior. The results are shown in Figure 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
For Brazil, Figure 6.4 shows that at short-end of the curve we have a low CDS/bond
liquidity ratio which implies that bond liquidity risk is higher than the CDS liquidity
risk9. However during the crisis, we observe an increase in the default intensity pushing
up the CDS/bond liquidity ratio which indicates that the CDS liquidity risk increases
more strongly than the bond liquidity risk10. Furthermore, during the crisis the mag-
nitude of the increase in the CDS/bond liquidity ratio is higher for the long end of the
curve than for the short end which implies that longer maturities are more sensitive
to the default intensity. This result is intuitive as there is more uncertainty for longer
maturities.
As far as Philippines is concerned, Figure 6.5 exhibits a diﬀerent behavior. Before
the crisis, we see that the bond liquidity risk is higher than the CDS liquidity risk
across the whole term structure. On the other hand, during the crisis, the increase
in the default intensity impacts the ratio of CDS/Bond liquidity in the same manner
across the whole term structure with CDS liquidity risk increasing more strongly than
the bond liquidity risk.
Finally for Turkey we observe in Figure 6.6 that the short end of curve has a stable
CDS/bond liquidity ratio (of about 1) and that this value is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by the changes of the default intensity. During the crisis the ratio stays at around 1
which indicates that both bond and CDS liquidity risk increase with the same inten-
sity11. On the other hand, the long end of the curve shows a high value of the CDS/bond
liquidity ratio implying that the CDS liquidity risk is higher than the bond liquidity
9In the long end curve we observe few spikes in the CDS liquidity risk which push the ratio CDS/Bond liquidity to
a high level.
10When we plot the time series of bond liquidity we see that bond liquidity risk increases during the crisis time, this
is valid for Brazil, Philippines and Turkey.
11When we plot the bond and CDS liquidity individually we observe a sharp increase in liquidity risk in both markets.
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risk. Furthermore, during the crisis, the ratio decreases in value meaning that bond
liquidity risk increased substantially during that period, though CDS liquidity risk still
seems to be higher.
In summary, the results show that CDS/bond liquidity relationship is largely inﬂu-
enced by liquidity issues relevant to each country, however we report that an increase
in the default intensity changes dramatically the relationship between bond and CDS
liquidity as we see a surge in liquidity risk in both markets with a stronger increase
from the CDS side.
6.6 Exponential Aﬃne Framework: Credit and Liquidity Fac-
tors
In this section, we model the dynamics of the credit and liquidity factors using a
stochastic process. We use one single factor model in our study as Pan and Singleton
(2008) ﬁnd that one principal component can explain over 96% of the variation over
time of the sovereign CDS term structure. Moreover, we assume that both the hazard
rate ht and the liquidity risk yt follow a CIR process. The reason is because in our
model we are assuming that both default and liquidity risk reduce the price of the
asset, this implies that both discount factors have to be positive.
dht = (α1µ1 − (α1 + λ1) ∗ h) ∗ dt+ σ1
√
h ∗ dW1 (6.14)
dyt = (α2µ2 − (α2 + λ2) ∗ y) ∗ dt+ σ2√y ∗ dW2 (6.15)
where h and y represent the risk neutral hazard rate and liquidity risk respectively.
αi corresponds to the mean reversion speed, µi the mean reversion level, σi the volatility
and λi the risk premium with i = 1, 2. dW1 ∗ dW2 = 0.
Following Longstaﬀ et al (2005), we derive a closed form solution for the expected
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values of the default ht and liquidity risk yt. We have:
Qt = E[exp(−
ˆ t
0
hudu)] (6.16)
We solve for h using the following expression:
Qt = A(t, s) ∗ exp(−ht ∗B(t, s)) (6.17)
where
A(t, s) = [
2 ∗ φ ∗ exp(0.5 ∗ (α1 + λ1 + φ) ∗ (s− t))
2 ∗ φ+ (α1 + λ1 + φ)(exp(φ(s− t))− 1)]
2∗α1∗µ1
σ21 (6.18)
with s > t and
B(t, s) = [
2 ∗ (exp(φ(s− t))− 1)
2 ∗ φ+ (α1 + λ1 + φ)(exp(φ(s− t))− 1)] (6.19)
with
φ =
√
(α1 + λ1)2 + 2 ∗ σ21 (6.20)
In the same way we solve for the liquidity risk y:
Lt = E[exp(−
ˆ t
0
yudu)] (6.21)
Lt = A(t, s) ∗ exp(−yt ∗B(t, s)) (6.22)
where A(t, s) and B(t, s) are similar to the expressions deﬁned in equation (6.18)
and (6.19) but diﬀer by having new parameters α2, µ2, σ2 and λ2.
In the following section, we estimate the aﬃne model using the maximum likelihood
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technique described below.
6.7 Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood (ML)
6.7.1 Hazard Rate and Liquidity Risk:
In order to implement the maximum likelihood method, we need to use the density
function implied by the CIR process. The density function of both the hazard rate and
liquidity risk is the non central chi-squared distribution. Since liquidity and hazard rate
follow the same process we only discuss the hazard rate process. We deﬁne the hazard
factor in the following way:
Q(t) = A+B ∗ h(t) (6.23)
where B and A are scalars.
f(Qt | Qt−1) = 1
det(B)
∗ f(ht | ht−1) (6.24)
where f(ht | ht−1) is deﬁned as follows:
f(ht | ht−1) = c ∗ exp(−c ∗ ht − c ∗ e(−α1∗∆t) ∗ ht−1) ∗ ( ht
exp(−α1 ∗∆t) ∗ ht−1 )
0.5∗q (6.25)
∗Iq(2 ∗ c ∗
√
ht ∗ exp(−α1 ∗∆t) ∗ ht−1)
where
c =
2 ∗ α1
σ21 ∗ (1− exp(−α1 ∗∆t))
(6.26)
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and
q =
2 ∗ α1 ∗ µ1
σ21
− 1 (6.27)
Iq is the modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind of order q.
The log-likelihood function for a sample of observations on a state variable ht for
t=1,..,T is:
lnL(hi,t, ......, hi,T ) =
T∑
t=2
ln(f(hi,t | hi,t−1)) (6.28)
Given a set of observations12 at time t=2,....,T.
L = ∑Tt=2 log(f(Qt | Qt−1)) = ∑Tt=2 {log( 1det(B) ∗ f(ht | ht−1))}
(6.29)
=
∑T
t=2 {−ln | B | +ln(f(ht | ht−1))}
We use the method of maximum likelihood deﬁned in Chen and Scott (1993) to
estimate the parameters of the model. Therefore, we assume that the discount factor
Q is perfectly priced at 5 year maturity and observed with some errors for the other
maturities (i.e. 1, 3, 7 and 10 years):
12We maximize the log-likelihood function conditioned on the ﬁrst observation being deterministic.
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
−lnQt1(t) = −lnA1(t, s1) +B1(t, s1) ∗ ht + u1,t
−lnQt3(t) = −lnA3(t, s3) +B3(t, s3) ∗ ht + u3,t
−lnQt5(t) = −lnA5(t, s5) +B5(t, s5) ∗ ht
−lnQt7(t) = −lnA7(t, s7) +B7(t, s7) ∗ ht + u7,t
−lnQt10(t) = −lnA10(t, s10) +B10(t, s10) ∗ ht + u10,t
(6.30)
where Ai and Bi are deﬁned above and i = 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 correspond to the maturities
chosen for our study (1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years). The errors ut follow a normal distribution
ut ∼ N(0, σ2) (6.31)
f(uj,t | uj,t−1) = 1√
2pi ∗ σ2 ∗ exp(−
(ut,j)
2
2 ∗ σ2 ) (6.32)
Therefore, the ﬁnal log-likelihood function can be rewritten in the following way:
L∗ = L+
T∑
i=1
log(f(ut | ut−1)) (6.33)
which gives:
L∗ = lnL(hit, ....., hiT )−T ∗ ln | B | −M ∗ T
2
∗ ln(2pi)− T
2
∗ ln(| Ω |)− 1
2
T∑
t=2
u
′
t ∗Ω−1 ∗ut
(6.34)
To estimate the liquidity risk y we follow exactly the same steps.
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6.7.2 ML Results:
Following the assumption of Chen, Fabozzi and Sverdlove (2010), we retrieve the credit
parameters using the mid quote and the liquidity parameters using the ask quote13.
Table 6.3, shows the results of the credit parameters. We see that credit premium
λ1 is not signiﬁcant for all the countries for both the pre-crisis and crisis time which
implies that the credit premium is not priced in the market. However the table shows
that λ1 is priced during the crisis period for Turkey. Table 6.3, indicates that the half
life14 is shorter during the pre-crisis than the crisis period which means that there is a
strong mean reversion during the pre-crisis period across all the countries. This result
is consistent with our time series plot of the default intensity (Figure 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6),
but is in large contrast with the ﬁndings of Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaﬀ
et al (2011) who report that the parameters governing the default intensity under the
risk neutral measure show very slow mean reversion (and even explosive behavior). We
argue that this diﬀerence in due to the fact that we are assuming a CIR process for
default intensity while Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaﬀ et al (2011) assume a
lognormal process.
Moreover, Table 6.3 shows that the pricing errors σ(i) for the CDS contracts with
the maturities of one, three, seven and ten years, are quite small. The parameters
σ(i) represent the standard deviations (in percentage term) of the pricing errors where
i is the maturity of the contract. Overall, the magnitude of the standard deviations
supports our choice of using the one factor model. Furthermore, the errors seem to be
larger in the short end of CDS curve which indicate that the model ﬁts better i=7 and
10 than the shorter maturities i=1 and 3. This result is in line with Pan and Singleton
(2008) who emphasize that there are some components of the short end of CDS curve
13The prices in the OTC market for CDSs are set by the dealers, who want to protect themselves against illiquidity.
Therefore the price that a CDS buyer pays, namely the ask price, will be an illiquid price. When the investor wants to
sell to the dealer, the dealer will pay an (illiquid) bid price. In other words the dealer protects himself against illiquidity
risk by making the bid-ask spread larger. The liquid price would then be somewhere in between the bid and the ask.
For convenience of calculation, we use the midpoint as our estimate of the liquid price.
14The half life gives the slowness of mean reversion process and is computed as follows: t = −ln(0.5)/α
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that are not well captured by the one factor model.
On the other hand, Table 6.4 presents the estimation of the liquidity parameters. We
observe that liquidity premium λ2 is not signiﬁcant across all the periods and countries.
Furthermore, the results have some similarity with Table 6.3 and show that the pricing
errors are higher in both the short and long end of the CDS curve (σ(1) and σ(10)
respectively). Finally, the result reveals stronger mean reversion during the pre-crisis
than the crisis period.
Both Table 6.3 and 6.4 point that the pricing errors are higher during the crisis period
for σ(1) and σ(10), implying the diﬃculty of ﬁtting a highly volatile time series.
Overall, it seems that Chen and Scott (1993) method does not provide us with
encouraging results. In fact, although we ﬁnd that the one factor model produces
small errors in the ﬁtting of the term structure, the credit and liquidity premium are
insigniﬁcant. As we described earlier, Chen and Scott (1993) method assumes that one
maturity (5 year) is perfectly priced, this enables us to invert the function and estimate
the factor ht and/or yt. The choice of the maturity can be rather arbitrary and the
results of the model will depend on that particular choice. In order to double check our
results, we introduce a pricing error to all the maturities and we reestimate the model
using the Kalman ﬁlter technique.
6.8 Kalman Filter Estimation:
In the estimation described below, we allow measurement errors on all the CDS matu-
rities. This estimator diﬀers from the Maximum Likelihood a la Chen and Scott (1993)
because we do not use the non-central chi-squared distribution and we do not restrict
the measurement errors to follow a normal distribution. In fact, the likelihood function
remains relatively simple and tractable.
By adding measurements errors, we improve the precision of the risk premium es-
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timation. Therefore, we believe that the Kalman ﬁlter estimation will give us a good
robustness check on the results discussed above.
6.8.1 State Space Representation:
The model can be expressed in the state space form by adding measurement errors to
the equation of the observable CDS prices.
ht = a+ Φ ∗ ht−1 + vt (6.35)
−lnQt = −lnA(t, si) +B(t, si) ∗ ht + εt (6.36)
where ε
′
t = (ε1, ε3, ε5, ε7, ε10). εi represents the measurement error term introduced
to allow for imperfections and small errors in each maturity i. Since ht follows a CIR
process, we can rewrite it as follows:
ht = µ1(1− exp(−α1 ∗ 4t)) + exp(−α1 ∗ 4t) ∗ hj,t−1 + v1t (6.37)
−lnQt = −lnA(t, si) +B(t, si) ∗ ht + εt (6.38)
where i = 1, ...., 5 represents the number of maturities considered.
The error term vt represents the unanticipated change (or innovation) in the state
variable ht and has a conditional expected mean of zero and conditional variance equal
to:
var(vt | vt−1) = σ1∗
(
1− exp(−α1 ∗ 4t)
α1
)
(0.5∗µ1∗(1−exp(−α1∗4t))+exp(−α1∗4t)∗ht−1
(6.39)
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We adopt the standard assumption in Kalman ﬁlter and we assume that there is no
serial or cross sectional correlation between the measurement errors. Therefore, we can
write the covariance matrix as follows:
Et−1
 vt
εt
 vt
εt

′
=
 Ht 0
0 U
 (6.40)
where Ht and U are the conditional variances of the state variable and the variances
of the measurement errors on the diagonal respectively.
6.8.2 Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) Estimation:
The ﬁxed parameters of the state space representation described above are typically
estimated using the maximum likelihood method. In our case, we are assuming that
ht and yt are following a CIR process, therefore the innovations of the state variables
are not normally distributed which make the standard linear Kalman ﬁlter a biased
estimator of the unobservable state variables. However, De Jong (2000) and Chen
an Scott (2002) perform Monte-carlo exercise and show that there is no evidence of
signiﬁcant bias in the parameter estimates. Therefore, by using the QML estimator
the authors prove that it is possible to obtain consistent estimators. We follow their
approach and estimate the parameters using the QML as follows:
maxθlnL =
T∑
t=1
Lt =
T∑
t=1
−0.5 ∗ (ln | Ht | +u′t ∗ F−1t ∗ ut) (6.41)
where θ represents the vector of parameters to optimize θ = (α1, µ1, σ1, λ1, ε1(1), ε1(3), ε1(5), ε1(7), ε1(10))
and ut and Ft are deﬁned as
ut = −lnQt − (A+B ∗ (a+ Φ ∗ ˆht−1)) (6.42)
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Ft = E(ut ∗ u′t) (6.43)
The estimation is achieved by calculating recursively the distribution of the state
variable ht conditional on the observations at time t. We start the recursion by assuming
that the initial values at time zero of h0 andH0 are equal to the conditional mean µ1 and
variance µ1∗(σ1)
2
2∗α1 respectively. The Kalman ﬁlter algorithm consists of three important
steps: prediction, updating and estimation. In order to estimate the parameter vector
θ, a good initial guess is of a key importance. Therefore, we try diﬀerent initial values
until we reach the global maximum and we estimate the standard errors using the White
method (1982).
For a more detailed description of the Kalman ﬁlter estimation applied to the CIR
process, we refer to De Jong (2000) and Chen and Scott (2002).
6.8.3 Kalman Filter Results:
Table 6.5, shows that the new introduced error ε1(5) is signiﬁcant across all the countries
and during both the pre-crisis and crisis period, which supports our idea of introducing
a measurement error for the 5 year maturity. We can also see that the credit premium
λ1 is signiﬁcant for the period preceding the crisis for Brazil and Turkey. However λ1
has a weak eﬀect during the crisis period. Similarly to the previous section, Table 6.5
implies strong mean reversion (i.e. low half life values), in fact it seems that the speed
of the mean reversion is higher than what was reported in Table 6.3.
Concerning the liquidity risk, we can see in Table 6.6 that the evidence of existence
of a liquidity premium is stronger than that of ML a la Chen and Scott (1993). The
table also shows that the liquidity premium λ2 is stronger during the pre-crisis than the
crisis period. In our model, we assumed that liquidity risk enters only the defaultable
leg of the CDS contract which means that the protection buyer will pay a lower price
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if the CDS market is illiquid15, this is equivalent to say that the protection buyer will
earn the liquidity premium16. Table 6.6 reveals that during the pre-crisis period the
liquidity premium is positive and signiﬁcant for all the countries, this indicates that the
price of liquidity risk has signiﬁcant impact on the defautlable leg of the CDS contract
and does reduce CDS spreads in line with our model assumption. However, we observe
that liquidity premium λ2 decreases in magnitude and even disappears during crisis
time. In fact, this situation is possible if, in crisis time, there is a high demand of CDS
protection to hedge against default risk. If the demand of protection is strong then
protection buyers are not able to demand any compensation for liquidity risk because
the CDS market is more liquid. Therefore, protection sellers are able to beneﬁt from
the shift in the demand and supply to either lower the liquidity premium earned by
protection buyers (i.e. case of Brazil, we observe that λ2 has low signiﬁcance level) or
to remove it (i.e case of Philippines and Turkey, we observe that λ2 is insigniﬁcant).
6.9 Interpretation of the Results:
Overall, it seems that our ﬁndings suggest mixed interpretations. While the ﬁrst method
used (i.e ML a la Chen and Scott (1993)) shows that neither the credit nor the liquidity
premium are priced in the term structure of sovereign CDS curve17. The other technique
(i.e. Kalman ﬁlter) provides stronger evidence of a liquidity premium priced in the term
structure of sovereign CDS spreads especially during the pre-crisis period.
The fact that the measurement error was highly signiﬁcant (at 1% signiﬁcance level)
at 5 year maturity across all the countries and during both the pre and the crisis period
implies that the assumption that the 5 year contract is perfectly priced may not give an
accurate measure of the state variable and this may explain why the results obtained
15If the CDS sellers sell an illiquid protection to the protection buyer, the latter will incur costs if he decides to trade
it therefore he will require a discount as a compensation for that.
16This assumption is diﬀerent from that of Buhler and Trapp (2010) where the liquidity premium enters both default-
able and premium leg of the CDS contract.
17The credit premium is priced during the crisis period for Turkey only.
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from the ML a la Chen and Scott (1993) are diﬀerent from those of the Kalman ﬁlter.
It seems that using the state space form to allow for measurement errors across all
the maturities provides clearer insight on the identiﬁcation of the market price of risk.
It also has the advantage of simplifying the likelihood function and making it easier to
optimize. Therefore, we believe that the Kalman ﬁlter technique gives more accurate
measure and its results suggest that, during some subperiods (i.e during the pre-crisis
period), a part of the time-series variation of term structure of the sovereign CDSs was
caused by changes in liquidity risk rather than changes in the default risk only. We
argue that during the pre-crisis period, the CDS market is relatively less liquid than
during the crisis period therefore CDS buyers earn the liquidity premium and pay less
spreads. However, during crisis period, because of high risk aversion there are more
buyers in the market which increase the liquidity of the CDS market and therefore
cancel the earned liquidity premium.
While Pan and Singleton (2008) emphasize that a signiﬁcant part of the co-movement
among the term structures of sovereign CDS spreads is triggered by changes in investors
appetites for credit exposure at a global level, rather than by the reassessments of the
fundamental strengths of these speciﬁc sovereign economies, our results suggest that
liquidity risk has a non-trivial role and participates to the variation over time of the
term structure of the sovereign CDS spreads.
6.10 Conclusion:
In this chapter, we provide the ﬁrst study that analyses the dynamic properties of the
risk neutral liquidity premium embedded in the term structure of the sovereign credit
default swap spreads. In order to carry out this analysis, we extend the work of Chen,
Fabozzi and Sverdlove (2010) and assume that mid-ask quote provide an upper bound
for the liquidity risk. However, we diﬀerentiate ourselves from the authors by using the
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term structure of sovereign CDS spreads to do our analysis. By using the time series
and cross sectional information, we are able to provide more accurate measure of the
credit and liquidity premium. We choose to apply our framework to Brazil, Philippines
and Turkey, three emerging countries with diﬀerent credit history and for which a
full term structure of sovereign CDS and bond spreads is available. Using a single
factor model, we use two estimation techniques, the Maximum Likelihood a la Chen
and Scott (1993) and the Kalman ﬁlter, to approximate the credit and the liquidity
premium. Although both estimations suggest mixed interpretations, we argue that the
Kalman ﬁlter provides robust results and give clearer insight on the identiﬁcation of
the liquidity premium.
Our results suggest that liquidity risk has a non-trivial role and participates to the
variation over time of the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads, especially during
the period preceding the crisis. Since in our model assumption liquidity risk enters
only the defaultable leg of the CDS contract, our ﬁndings imply that CDS buyers earn
the liquidity premium during the pre-crisis period. However, during crisis time, we
observe an increase in the CDS market liquidity which shifts the balance of supply and
demand of CDS protections, thus CDS buyers are not able to earn the liquidity premium
anymore. Moreover, using the mid-ask yield bond spread, we provide a complete picture
of the co-movement of the bond and CDS liquidity risk term structures. We show that
the co-movement of CDS and bond liquidity ratio is mainly inﬂuenced by the magnitude
of the default intensity. In fact, in case of high default risk, we observe that CDS
liquidity risk increases more than bond liquidity risk. Finally, our ﬁndings complete that
of Pan and Singleton (2008) and give clear indication that the movements along the term
structure of sovereign CDS spreads is driven by (liquidity) factors that do not necessarily
reﬂect the reassessment of the fundamental strength of the countries. Finally, we believe
that further research should be done to better understand the mispricing that occurs
at the one year CDS contract.
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Tables
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Bond and CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure
In this table, we present descriptive statistics of the bond and CDS liquidity risk term structure for
the 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years maturity for Brazil, Philippines and Turkey. The table shows the min, max,
mean and the standard deviations of the bond yield and CDS spreads.
1Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Brazil Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS
Min 0 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Max 0.0071 0.0039 0.0072 0.0026 0.0042 0.0027 0.003 0.0017 0.0026 0.002
Mean 0.0012 0.0006 0.0011 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004
Std 0.001 0.0004 0.0008 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
Philip Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS
Min 0 0.0003 0 0.0002 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0.0002
Max 0.0021 0.0066 0.0024 0.0056 0.0021 0.0032 0.0048 0.0039 0.0012 0.0035
Mean 0.0009 0.0013 0.0004 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007
Std 0.0004 0.001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005
Turkey Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS Bond CDS
Min 0.0003 0.00 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Max 0.0093 0.008 0.0059 0.0049 0.007 0.0032 0.006 0.0029 0.0035 0.0032
Mean 0.0018 0.001 0.0012 0.0007 0.0008 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Std 0.0015 0.001 0.0011 0.0006 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
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Table 6.3: Parameter Estimation of the CIR Process for the Credit Premium: Maximum
Likelihood Method
In this table, we present the estimation of the parameters (in percentage term) of the CIR process
relevant to the hazard rate (or default intensity) h (i.e using the mid quote data). α1 corresponds to
the mean reversion speed, µ1 the mean reversion level, σ1 the volatility and λ1 the credit premium.
The estimation is performed using the Maximum Likelihood method a la Chen and Scott (1993). We
split our sample period in two periods: Before Crisis (BC) and During Crisis (DC). We compute the
standard errors using the BHHH method. The parameters σ(i) represent the standard deviations (in
percentage term) of pricing errors where i is the maturity of the CDS contract. Finally, '∗', '∗∗' and
'∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Brazil Philippines Turkey
BC DC BC DC BC DC
α1
1.95
(3.5)
1.01
(20.42)
1.07
(3.16)
0.354
(22.02)
1.43
(6.07)
0.18
(1.86)
µ1
10.79*
(2.03)
10.63
(208.5)
10.22*
(1.49)
0
(9.54)
50.32
(279)
0.003
(1.0)
σ1
2.41***
(1.40)
4.95
(5.78)
2.08
(1.51)
3.91
(3.46)
2.14
(1.49)
1.80***
(1.05)
λ1
6.87
(6.09)
18.49
(35.48)
8.23
(10.33)
17.42
(25.59)
21.06
(33.78)
4.07**
(2.0)
σ(1) 0.3121 0.3208 0.294 0.33 0.2142 0.4688
σ(3) 0.115 0.0945 0.0973 0.1127 0.0781 0.1462
σ(7) 0.0518 0.0508 0.0489 0.047 0.0419 0.0655
σ(10) 0.0843 0.0822 0.0865 0.084 0.0588 0.1181
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Table 6.4: Parameter Estimation of the CIR Process for the Liquidity Premium: Maximum
Likelihood Method
In this table, we present the estimation of the parameters (in percentage term) of the CIR process
relevant to the liquidity risk y (i.e using the ask quote data). α2 corresponds to the mean reversion
speed, µ2 the mean reversion level, σ2 the volatility and λ2 the liquidity premium. The estimation is
performed using the Maximum Likelihood method a la Chen and Scott (1993). We split our sample
period in two periods: Before Crisis (BC) and During Crisis (DC). We compute the standard errors
using the BHHH method. The parameters σ(i) represent the standard deviations (in percentage term)
of pricing errors where i is the maturity of the CDS contract. Finally, '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%,
5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Brazil Philippines Turkey
BC DC BC DC BC DC
α2
1.87
(3.8)
1.32
(3.53)
0.98
(3.4)
0.34
(25.4)
4.71
(5.55)
0.35
(1.62)
µ2
10.77*
(1.88)
7.69
(6.35)
10.18*
(1.36)
0
(18.83)
1.41
(1.19)
0.0
(4.45)
σ2
2.46***
(1.38)
5.16
(6.34)
2.09
(1.6)
3.98
(3.27)
2.41
(2.65)
1.84
(1.29)
λ2
6.82
(6.22)
19.42
(29.88)
8.23
(10.07)
18.49
(34.18)
5.89
(9.08)
4.25
(1.60)
σ(1) 0.343 0.299 0.272 0.322 0.231 0.4648
σ(3) 0.12 0.0895 0.0916 0.118 0.0866 0.143
σ(7) 0.093 0.0525 0.052 0.0481 0.0491 0.0652
σ(10) 0.1995 0.0842 0.0864 0.0842 0.0713 0.1147
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Table 6.5: Parameter Estimation of the CIR Process for the Credit Premium: Kalman
Filter
In this table, we present the estimation of the parameters (in percentage term) of the CIR process
relevant to the hazard rate (or default intensity) h (i.e using the mid quote data). α1 corresponds to the
mean reversion speed, µ1 the mean reversion level, σ1 the volatility and λ1 the credit premium. The
estimation is performed using the Kalman ﬁlter Method. We split our sample period in two periods:
Before Crisis (BC) and During Crisis (DC). The parameters ε1(i) represent the measurement errors
introduced for each maturity i of the CDS contract. We compute the standard errors using the White
method (1982). Finally, '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Brazil Philippines Turkey
BC DC BC DC BC DC
α1
18.85
(55.49)
26.46
(982.6)
18.58
(137)
1.89
(146.3)
25.04
(56.85)
1.96
(6965)
µ1
3.18
(90.48)
2.05
(1948)
2.7
(226.8)
20.81
(127.75)
2.00
(113.86)
20.07
(6273.4)
σ1
67.18*
(12.28)
69.25
(268.3)
67.22**
(30.36)
94.58*
(29.79)
69.13*
(12.56)
95.02
(1493.2)
λ1
80.09*
(25.94)
79.99
(566)
80.17
(64.18)
84.7***
(49.67)
84.25*
(31.81)
84.37
(2493.9)
ε1(1)
95.32*
(7.41)
99.99*
(2.4)
95.32*
(18.27)
95.25*
(10.6)
93.28*
(10.23)
94.60
(840)
ε1(3)
92.17*
(2.00)
94.62**
(45.5)
92.17*
(4.98)
38.75*
(17.25)
87.73*
(2.74)
87.45
(241.6)
ε1(5)
91.01*
(0.02)
89.02*
(0.5)
91.01*
(0.07)
85.06*
(0.13)
86.01*
(0.29)
85.02*
(3)
ε1(7)
91.81*
(0.02)
92.06*
(30)
91.81*
(3.47)
92.24*
(4.51)
90.2*
(2.15)
86.66
(165)
ε1(10)
96.56*
(9.54)
98.53
(212.5)
96.59*
(23.59)
97.34*
(24.49)
97.00*
(12.39)
96.30
(1101.2)
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Table 6.6: Parameter Estimation of the CIR Process for the Liquidity Premium: Kalman
Filter
In this table, we present the estimation of the parameters (in percentage term) of the CIR process
relevant to the liquidity intensity y (i.e using the ask quote data). α2 corresponds to the mean reversion
speed, µ2 the mean reversion level, σ2 the volatility and λ2 the liquidity premium. The estimation is
performed using the Kalman ﬁlter Method. We split our sample period in two periods: Before Crisis
(BC) and During Crisis (DC). The parameters ε2(i) represent the measurement errors introduced for
each maturity i of the CDS contract. We compute the standard errors using the White method (1982).
Finally, '∗', '∗∗' and '∗∗∗' represent 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance level respectively.
Brazil Philippines Turkey
BC DC BC DC BC DC
α2
18.84
(79.42)
26.89
(85.15)
6.67
(77.15)
1.94
(325.83)
25.04
(58.1)
1.96
(14565)
µ2
3.13
(130.04)
2.01
(164.19)
7.11
(92.08)
20.56
(287.65)
1.98
(114.33)
20.13
(13133)
σ2
67.17*
(16.74)
69.24*
(22.22)
69.45*
(15.42)
94.69
(67.42)
69.12*
(13.11)
94.87
(3098)
λ2
80.05**
(36.73)
79.96***
(48.16)
84.63*
(31.81)
84.92
(112.77)
84.23*
(31.75)
85.28
(5214)
ε2(1)
95.30*
(10.4)
96.79*
(14.1)
95.61*
(9.08)
93.65*
(30.09)
91.42*
(10.54)
94.60
(1762)
ε2(3)
92.16*
(2.82)
92.59*
(3.84)
91.54*
(2.48)
50.73**
(25.7)
86.71*
(2.71)
87.45
(507)
ε2(5)
91.01*
(0.12)
91.01*
(0.08)
90.01*
(0.02)
84.00*
(0.06)
89.01*
(0.22)
85.02*
(7)
ε2(7)
91.81*
(2.09)
92.09*
(2.71)
91.06*
(1.72)
86.15*
(9.8)
91.2*
(2.10)
86.66
(346)
ε2(10)
96.54*
(13.46)
98.52*
(18.06)
97.27*
(11.73)
96.77**
(52.7)
97.01*
(12.42)
96.31
(2312)
168
Figures
Figure 6.1: CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure Brazil
This ﬁgure shows the time series plot of the estimated CDS liquidity risk (in decimals) of the 1, 3, 5, 7
and 10 year maturity for Brazil. We estimate the liquidity risk y by using a discrete-time approximation
of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1.
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Figure 6.2: CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure Philippines
This ﬁgure shows the time series plot of the estimated CDS liquidity risk (in decimals) of the 1, 3,
5, 7 and 10 year maturity for Philippines. We estimate the liquidity risk y by using a discrete-time
approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1.
170
Figure 6.3: CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure Turkey
This ﬁgure shows the time series plot of the estimated CDS liquidity risk (in decimals) of the 1,
3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturity for Turkey. We estimate the liquidity risk y by using a discrete-time
approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1
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Figure 6.4: Bond and CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure: Brazil
The (top) ﬁgure shows the time series plot of the estimated hazard rate (or default intensity) of the
1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturity for Brazil. We estimate the hazard rate h by using a discrete-time
approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1. The (bottom) ﬁgure shows the
time series plot of the ratio of CDS over bond liquidity for Brazil. We estimate the CDS liquidity risk
y by using the same discrete-time approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1.
However, bond liquidity risk is approximated by taking the diﬀerence between the mid and ask yield
of the relevant maturity.
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Figure 6.5: Bond and CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure: Philippines
The (top) ﬁgure shows the time series plot of the estimated hazard rate (or default intensity) of the 1,
3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturity for Philippines. We estimate the hazard rate h by using a discrete-time
approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1. The (bottom) ﬁgure shows the
time series plot of the ratio of CDS over bond liquidity for Philippines. We estimate the CDS liquidity
risk y by using the same discrete-time approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section
6.5.1. However, bond liquidity risk is approximated by taking the diﬀerence between the mid and ask
yield of the relevant maturity.
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Figure 6.6: Bond and CDS Liquidity Risk Term Structure: Turkey
The (top) ﬁgure shows the time series plot of the estimated hazard rate (or default intensity) of the
1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturity for Turkey. We estimate the hazard rate h by using a discrete-time
approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1. The (bottom) ﬁgure shows the
time series plot of the ratio of CDS over bond liquidity for Turkey. We estimate the CDS liquidity risk
y by using the same discrete-time approximation of the CDS pricing formula deﬁned in Section 6.5.1.
However, bond liquidity risk is approximated by taking the diﬀerence between the mid and ask yield
of the relevant maturity.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we study the determinants of the sovereign credit default swap spreads.
As a ﬁrst step, we utilise a panel regression model in order to investigate the eﬀect of
CDS and bond liquidity on sovereign CDS spreads. Using diﬀerent liquidity proxies,
we ﬁnd that, during crisis time, search frictions and inventory costs do not represent
a constraint to market participants, however bond liquidity has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
sovereign CDS spreads.
Secondly, we explore the eﬀect of commonality in liquidity. To this end, we extend
the Liquidity-Adjusted CAPM model of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and construct
beta risk factors that aim to capture both CDS and bond systematic liquidity risk.
We ﬁnd that market liquidity plays an important role in CDS spread movements. We
conclude the chapter by advancing the idea that speculation may participate to the
widening of bid-ask spreads and that funding liquidity risk is more constraining during
crisis time.
As a further step in our analysis, we concentrate on the pricing issues and use a
factor model in order to decompose sovereign CDS spreads into a pure default risk, pure
liquidity and correlation components. The main objective is to measure the weight of
liquidity in sovereign CDS spreads not by using liquidity proxies such as bid-ask spreads
or volumes but by jointly calibrating the model to both bonds and CDSs. By doing
so, we are able to use a large amount of information on sovereign default risk and thus
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present a better decomposition and estimate the components more precisely.
Overall, our results reveal that sovereign CDS spreads are highly driven by liquidity
and that sovereign bond spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions and therefore
could represent a better proxy for sovereign default risk. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the results of Chapter 4, where we demonstrate empirically that market liquidity risk is
a priced state variable. Finally, our decomposition exercise puts forward the idea that
the increase in the CDS spreads observed during the crisis period was mainly due to a
surge in liquidity rather than to an increase in the default intensity.
Last but not the least, we analyse the dynamic properties of the risk-neutral liquidity
premium embedded in the term structure of the sovereign CDS spreads. As a main
assumption, we postulate that mid-ask quotes provide an upper bound for liquidity
risk. Our results suggest that liquidity risk participates directly to the variation over
time of the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads. Moreover, using the mid-ask yield
bond spreads, we provide a complete picture of the co-movement of the bond and CDS
liquidity risk term structures and show that CDS and bond liquidity ratio is mainly
inﬂuenced by the magnitude of the default intensity.
In summary, all our results underline that liquidity is one of the important driving
factors of the sovereign CDS spreads. Our ﬁndings give clear indication that liquidity
inﬂuences asset prices by drifting them away from their fundamental values. We thus
believe that this thesis enhances our understanding of the sovereign CDS market and
its results have important implications for practitioners and policy makers.
More research is warranted to understand the eﬀect of speculation on CDS spreads.
Moreover, further investigation is required to interpret the mispricing that occurs at
the one year CDS contract.
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